Emma Haydon

The accused, C.N., was sentenced for three counts of sexual interference and one count of invitation to sexual touching involving his half-sister, DT, who was between 8 and 10 years old at the time of the offences.

He also pled guilty to failing to comply with a release order.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the victim's young age, abuse of trust and authority, degree of physical interference, duration and frequency of offences, location (victim's home), persistence, and grooming.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record, a difficult childhood, and efforts to address mental health and substance use post-offences.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, guided by R. v. Friesen, and imposed a total penitentiary sentence of 7.5 years.

In a preliminary inquiry concerning six bank robberies, the Crown sought to adduce similar fact evidence to prove identity.

The defence conceded the admissibility for the last four robberies but argued against the first two due to differences in modus operandi.

The court applied the R. v. Handy test, finding that despite some dissimilarities, the cumulative effect of numerous significant similarities across all six incidents, including proximity in time and place, suspect description, attire, and distinctive handwritten notes, established the objective improbability of coincidence.

The court granted the Crown's application, allowing the similar fact evidence for identity on all counts, noting that the preliminary inquiry context lessened potential prejudice.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder and interfering with a body.

The court found that while the accused appreciated the nature and quality of his acts and knew they were legally wrong, his schizophrenia rendered him incapable of knowing his conduct was morally wrong.

Based on expert psychiatric opinions and other evidence, the court concluded that the accused met the burden of proof for the Not Criminally Responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCR-MD) defence under s. 16(1) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant, Hacar Khesro-Mohamed-Rasheed, brought an application to re-open his case after being found guilty of assault causing bodily harm.

The application sought to introduce new eyewitness evidence from Kelly Farkas, who was present during the altercation but was not located prior to trial.

The court applied the Palmer test for fresh evidence, considering admissibility, cogency, and due diligence.

Despite the proposed evidence being sparse, the court found it met the threshold for cogency and credibility, and that the defendant had demonstrated sufficient due diligence in attempting to locate the witness.

The application was granted, the finding of guilt was vacated, and the defence was permitted to call the new witness.

An appellant found not criminally responsible on grounds of mental disorder appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition placing him on a detention order with removal of an alcohol prohibition condition.

The appellant argued the detention order was more restrictive than his previous conditional discharge and that the Board's objectives could have been achieved through maintaining the conditional discharge while removing only the alcohol prohibition.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Board's decision, finding that when viewed holistically with the privileges and prohibitions included, the detention order was actually less restrictive and was justified to allow implementation of a Community Treatment Order and to manage the appellant's risk to public safety.

The offender was convicted of human trafficking, procuring, aggravated assault, sexual assault, and related offences against an Indigenous woman over a four-year period.

The offender controlled the victim through violence, psychological manipulation, and financial exploitation, culminating in a severe aggravated assault where he severed her Achilles tendon with a broken glass.

The court applied the Tang factors to assess the aggravating circumstances and sentenced the offender to a global term of 13 years' imprisonment, including a consecutive sentence for choking, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought committal on a charge of First Degree Murder.

The defendant was charged with the murder of Brent Gartner on January 10, 2015.

The sole issue was whether there was evidence of planning and deliberation to support committal on First Degree Murder, or whether committal should be on Second Degree Murder only.

The court found circumstantial evidence capable of supporting an inference of planning and deliberation, including the defendant's stated intention to "deal with something," his request for money from the deceased, multiple phone calls between the parties on the day of the incident, and the defendant's possession of a knife with the victim's blood on it.

The defendant was committed for trial on First Degree Murder.

The defendant was charged with assault, assault with a weapon (knife), and theft under $5,000 arising from a robbery on June 18, 2014.

The Crown conceded that the weapon had not been established and proceeded only on simple assault.

The central issue was the identification of the defendant as the alleged lookout in the robbery.

The complainant identified the defendant based on recognition from the community, a yearbook photo identification, and the name "Kadir" mentioned during the incident.

The court found significant shortcomings in the identification evidence, including poor lighting conditions, lack of proper police photo lineup procedures, and inconsistencies in the complainant's description.

The defendant was acquitted due to the Crown's failure to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder following a stabbing that occurred in an apartment building elevator lobby.

At sentencing, the court considered whether to increase the statutory 10‑year period of parole ineligibility under s. 745.4 of the Criminal Code, having regard to the nature of the offence, the offender’s character, and the jury’s recommendation.

The offender was a young first‑time offender who expressed genuine remorse, and most jurors recommended the minimum period.

Although the attack was vicious and involved a knife carried in anticipation of an altercation, the court concluded the offence did not justify increasing the parole ineligibility period beyond the statutory baseline.

Life imprisonment with 10 years’ parole ineligibility was imposed, along with mandatory firearm prohibition and DNA orders.

The applicant, charged with first degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion for directions on whether the jury should be instructed on self-defence using the former or newly amended provisions of the Criminal Code.

The alleged offence occurred before the Citizen's Arrest and Self-defence Act came into force.

The court held that the presumption against retrospective application of legislation affecting substantive rights was rebutted.

The new provisions were intended to clarify and simplify the law, providing a benefit to claimants, and therefore apply retrospectively to the applicant's trial.

In a sexual assault prosecution, the Crown sought to present its case through the complainant's earlier-recorded statements (911 calls and a police interview) because the complainant was absent from trial and unwilling to attend.

The court considered whether these hearsay statements could be admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, which requires both necessity and reliability.

While the court found the necessity criterion marginally satisfied based on reasonable diligent efforts to locate the complainant, it rejected the application on reliability grounds.

The court found that the circumstances surrounding the statements, combined with the absence of any opportunity for cross-examination, created identifiable dangers that were not sufficiently overcome by confirmatory evidence.

The court emphasized that the live issues of consent and use of force could be significantly affected by cross-examination, and that the evidence could not be deemed inherently trustworthy.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings at the beginning of trial, alleging that his Charter section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The charge was a sexual assault arising from an alleged inappropriate touching of a patient's breast by the accused, who was an assistant to a physiotherapist at a rehabilitation clinic.

The overall delay from charge to trial was approximately 15 months.

The court applied the Morin framework and found that the delay was reasonable given the nature of the charge, the number of anticipated witnesses, and the complexity of the case.

The application for a stay was dismissed.