Oslyn Lyndonna Braithwaite

The defendant, Hacar Khesro-Mohamed-Rasheed, brought an application to re-open his case after being found guilty of assault causing bodily harm.

The application sought to introduce new eyewitness evidence from Kelly Farkas, who was present during the altercation but was not located prior to trial.

The court applied the Palmer test for fresh evidence, considering admissibility, cogency, and due diligence.

Despite the proposed evidence being sparse, the court found it met the threshold for cogency and credibility, and that the defendant had demonstrated sufficient due diligence in attempting to locate the witness.

The application was granted, the finding of guilt was vacated, and the defence was permitted to call the new witness.

The complainant (J.N.) alleged sexual assault by her former family doctor, Romeo Tan, during a physical exam in May 2014.

J.N. had no memory of the incident for three and a half years until she read a newspaper article.

The defence argued the assault did not occur and highlighted inconsistencies in J.N.'s memory and the implausibility of the events.

The court found J.N. to be a sincere and credible witness but was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that her recovered memory was reliable, given her general poor memory, suggestibility, the delay in recollection, and the lack of independent corroboration.

The defendant was acquitted.

The defendant, Hacar Khesro-Mohamed-Rasheed, was charged with assault causing bodily harm following an altercation with the complainant, Mohamad Sulyman.

The incident occurred at Sulyman's apartment, involving a woman who was present.

The defendant claimed self-defence, asserting he acted in response to Sulyman slapping him and attempting to choke him.

The court found that while Sulyman initiated the physical contact with a slap, Rasheed's subsequent and prolonged assault, involving multiple punches that caused significant injuries, was not a reasonable or proportionate response and exceeded the bounds of self-defence.

The court largely accepted Sulyman's account of the events and rejected Rasheed's testimony regarding the extent of the force used against him and his response.

Rasheed was found guilty of assault causing bodily harm.

The offender was convicted of aggravated sexual assault, aggravated assault, forcible confinement, and other offences against a sex trade worker.

The Crown sought a sentence of 7-9 years and a long-term offender designation.

The court reviewed the offender's extensive criminal record, history of domestic violence, and psychiatric assessments indicating a moderate to high risk of sexual re-offending.

The court sentenced the offender to 8 years in custody, less pre-sentence credit, and designated him a long-term offender subject to a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The accused was tried on charges of sexual interference and sexual assault arising from allegations by a child complainant that he touched her vagina on multiple occasions and licked her vagina once while living in the same household as her mother’s common law spouse.

The court admitted the complainant’s videotaped statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code and assessed the evidence under the W(D.) framework, while also applying the common-sense approach to child testimony described by the Supreme Court.

Although the trial judge found the complainant careful, credible, and unaffected by malice, he also found the accused sincere, internally consistent, and capable of raising a reasonable doubt.

Because the Crown failed to disprove the accused’s denial beyond a reasonable doubt, verdicts of not guilty were entered on both counts.

The offender, a 19-year-old international student, was convicted of manslaughter following a jury trial for second-degree murder.

The offender returned to the victim's home after an initial altercation and assaulted the victim, causing a fatal rupture of the victim's vertebral artery.

The court found the assault was a planned and premeditated ambush in the victim's home, elevating the moral blameworthiness of the offence.

After weighing the aggravating factors against the offender's youth, lack of prior record, and rehabilitative prospects, the court imposed a sentence of 5 years' imprisonment, reduced to 53 months after credit for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

The accused was charged with sexual assault against a minor complainant over a period of approximately one year.

The Crown presented evidence from the complainant and his younger sister, both under 18 years old, supported by video-recorded statements under section 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

The accused denied all allegations.

The court found the complainant's testimony credible and reliable, noting the plausibility of the evidence, corroboration from the sister's testimony, and internal consistency with the narrative.

The court convicted the accused of sexual assault, finding that the Crown had proven the allegation beyond a reasonable doubt, though the court could not establish that the touching commenced prior to the complainant's sixteenth birthday.

At the close of the Crown's case in a jury trial for conspiracy to commit murder and related firearms offences, the accused moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on the conspiracy count.

The accused argued there was no evidence they participated in a conspiracy to murder the complainant.

The court reviewed the circumstantial evidence, including a prior bank fraud involving the parties, cell phone communications, video surveillance of the accused acting in concert, and the coordinated ambush of the complainant.

Applying the test for a directed verdict, the court found there was some admissible evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could infer an agreement to murder the complainant.

The application for a directed verdict was dismissed.

Prior to the testimony of the complainant in a trial for conspiracy to commit murder and attempted murder, the parties sought a ruling on the permissible scope of cross-examination regarding the complainant's prior acts of misconduct.

The court ruled that defence counsel could cross-examine the complainant on the factual details underlying his prior convictions, withdrawn charges, and uncharged misconduct detailed in police occurrence reports, provided there was a good faith basis.

However, defence counsel could not cross-examine the complainant on the factual allegations underlying charges for which he was acquitted, as an acquittal represents a verdict of legal innocence, though they could question him on accompanying uncharged fraudulent activities.

The offender was convicted by a jury of two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and two counts of failure to remain at the scene of an accident after rear-ending a motorcycle at high speed and fleeing.

The collision caused severe, life-altering injuries to the two victims.

The court considered the offender's difficult background, lack of alcohol involvement, and the automatic deportation consequence he faced.

The court sentenced the offender to 12 months for dangerous driving and 6 months consecutive for failing to remain, totaling 18 months in custody, along with a 5-year driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking to exclude breath sample evidence based on alleged breaches of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) and section 10(b) (right to counsel) rights.

The accused argued that special circumstances existed due to language barriers and that the police failed to take appropriate measures to ensure meaningful comprehension of his rights.

The court found that the police had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and breath demand based on the totality of circumstances, and that no special circumstances existed requiring additional language accommodations.

The Charter applications were dismissed.

The appellant pedestrian was struck by a bus making a left turn while she was crossing the street with the light.

At trial, the jury found the respondent driver was not negligent and found the appellant contributorily negligent.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the jury's finding regarding the driver's lack of negligence was perverse, as he had a duty to yield.

However, the majority found there was some basis for the jury's finding of contributory negligence.

A new trial was ordered on the issues of contributory negligence and damages, as the damage assessment was tainted by the perverse liability finding and improper evidence regarding collateral benefits.