Allison Christine MacPherson

The defendant, Rodrigo Flores-Romero, was convicted by a jury of manslaughter in the death of a nearly 3-year-old child.

The Crown sought a 12-year sentence, while the defence proposed 6-8 years.

The court found the offence to be an aggravated manslaughter, emphasizing the victim's vulnerability, the breach of trust, the brutality of the assault, and the defendant's calculated efforts to conceal the crime.

The court rejected the defendant's claim of accidental injury and lack of genuine remorse.

Considering statutory directives for denunciation and deterrence, and mitigating factors such as the defendant's personal challenges and pre-trial custody, the court imposed a global sentence of 10 years imprisonment, with 4 years credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in 6 years remaining.

Bismark Addo-Binney applied to terminate a 20-year Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order imposed after his 2011 sexual assault conviction.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court considered the test under s. 490.016(1) of the Criminal Code, which requires the applicant to show that the impact of continuing the order is grossly disproportionate to the public interest in protecting society.

Relying on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Ndhlovu, the court found that the significant anxiety and interference with the applicant's career and personal life, coupled with a low risk of reoffending and limited utility of registration for this type of offence, made the continued order grossly disproportionate.

The application was granted, and the SOIRA order terminated.

Terrence Noftall, convicted of multiple sexual and child pornography offences, challenged the validity of production orders obtained by the Crown for psychiatric, psychological, medical, and employment records.

These records were sought in preparation for a potential dangerous offender application.

The defence argued that the production orders lacked statutory authority under s. 487.014 of the Criminal Code, as a dangerous offender application had not yet commenced, and that the disclosure of MCSCS records via a Memorandum of Understanding violated privacy rights.

The court dismissed the defence's application, ruling that s. 487.014 applies to the sentencing phase, including pre-assessment for dangerous offender applications, and that the MCSCS records were lawfully obtained under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The accused, charged with the first-degree murder of his son, sought to exclude video-taped statements made to police on the basis that they were involuntary and obtained in violation of his Charter rights.

The accused argued that prior unrecorded interactions with police tainted the subsequent video-taped statements, and that police failed to properly advise him of his jeopardy for culpable homicide.

The court dismissed the application, finding no sufficient temporal or contextual connection between the unrecorded and recorded statements to taint the latter.

The court also held that the accused was not under genuine suspicion for murder at the time of the interviews, meaning the initial caution for failing to provide necessaries of life was adequate.

The statements were ruled voluntary and admissible for cross-examination.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder in the death of her young son, brought an application to exclude statements she made to police.

She argued her arrest was premature, she was not brought before a justice within 24 hours, her right to counsel was violated, she was not properly advised of her jeopardy, and her statements were involuntary.

The court found a minor section 9 Charter breach for the delay in bringing her before a justice but granted no remedy.

The court dismissed the other Charter claims, finding the police had reasonable grounds for the initial arrest for failing to provide necessaries of life, and that the accused understood her right to counsel and her jeopardy at the time.

The October 13 statement was ruled voluntary and admissible, while an October 16 statement was excluded in oral reasons.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder of his son, brought an application to exclude a video found on his cell phone.

The police searched the phone incident to arrest without a warrant.

The court found the search violated section 8 of the Charter because there was no urgency to justify searching the phone before obtaining a warrant.

However, applying the Grant framework under section 24(2), the court admitted the evidence, finding the breach was minor, the privacy intrusion was minimal, and the video was highly reliable and crucial to the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The court also dismissed the argument that the video's prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

Following conviction for sexual assault, the Crown sought a dangerous offender designation and an indeterminate sentence.

The court held that the predicate offence was a serious personal injury offence and that the offender had demonstrated a failure to control sexual impulses, a pattern of repetitive and aggressive conduct, and a likelihood of causing future injury, pain, or other evil to women and children.

Relying heavily on forensic psychiatric evidence, extensive prior offending, deviant writings, and failed prior treatment and supervision, the court found the risk of violent and sexually violent recidivism to be unmanageable.

The court further concluded there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control in the community under the long-term offender regime, because any effective conditions would virtually replicate incarceration.

A dangerous offender designation was therefore made and an indeterminate sentence imposed.

At the close of the Crown's case in a jury trial for conspiracy to commit murder and related firearms offences, the accused moved for a directed verdict of acquittal on the conspiracy count.

The accused argued there was no evidence they participated in a conspiracy to murder the complainant.

The court reviewed the circumstantial evidence, including a prior bank fraud involving the parties, cell phone communications, video surveillance of the accused acting in concert, and the coordinated ambush of the complainant.

Applying the test for a directed verdict, the court found there was some admissible evidence upon which a reasonable jury, properly instructed, could infer an agreement to murder the complainant.

The application for a directed verdict was dismissed.

A preliminary inquiry into the death of a four-year-old child.

The Crown sought committal on a charge of First Degree Murder.

The defendants, the child's parents, contested committal on this charge, conceding only to Second Degree Murder.

The court found sufficient evidence of planning and deliberation based on the totality of circumstances, including evidence of chronic malnutrition, vicious beating, head trauma, aspiration of gastric contents, and post-offence conduct.

The court committed both defendants to trial on First Degree Murder and on the additional charge of Failure to Provide the Necessaries of Life.

In a criminal prosecution for sexual offences against a child, the accused brought a third-party records application after the Crown inadvertently disclosed a DVD of the complainant's therapy session.

The court held that, because the disclosure was illegal and directly engaged Parliament's concern with protecting the confidential patient-therapist relationship, the DVD had to be returned and any future access determined under ss. 278.1 to 278.9 of the Criminal Code.

Applying the likely relevance threshold, the court found that differences between the complainant's police interviews and preliminary inquiry evidence, together with the fact of multiple therapy sessions, amounted only to speculation.

The application was dismissed and all copies of the therapy session were ordered returned to the court for sealing.

Sentencing for two counts of possession of child pornography, criminal harassment, and breach of probation arising from sexually explicit materials involving children and persistent unwanted communications causing the complainant to fear for her safety.

The court emphasized denunciation, general deterrence, and specific deterrence, particularly given the offender's prior conviction for a sexual offence against a child, the disturbing content of a lengthy journal advocating sexual activity with children, and compelling psychiatric evidence of entrenched paraphilic interests and risk.

Applying proportionality, the court held the offender could not be sentenced on the basis of future dangerousness alone, but required a substantial penitentiary-equivalent sanction.

A global effective sentence of five years was imposed, realized through ten months' imprisonment after enhanced pre-sentence credit, followed by three years' probation and multiple ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with criminal harassment and breach of probation after leaving a series of unwanted, obsessive voicemails for the complainant at her workplace in 2012.

The accused and the complainant had no contact for 12 years following a previous criminal harassment charge and peace bond in 2001.

The court found that the accused's conduct constituted repeated communication that caused the complainant to reasonably fear for her safety.

The court also found the accused possessed the requisite mens rea of recklessness, as he subjectively appreciated the risk his conduct posed but persisted anyway.

The accused was found guilty of both charges.

The accused was charged with two counts of possession of child pornography arising from photographs and a three‑volume journal containing images and written commentary seized during search warrants.

The accused conceded possession but argued that some materials were not child pornography and that the journal fell within the judicially created private-use exception recognized in R. v. Sharpe.

The court held that several images clearly met the definition of child pornography under s. 163.1(1) of the Criminal Code and that significant portions of the journal advocated or counselled sexual activity with persons under eighteen.

The Sharpe private-use exception did not apply because the journal incorporated pornographic images sourced from outside materials rather than being created solely by the accused.

The court found the accused guilty on both counts.

The accused applied to sever a five-count indictment involving sexual assault, criminal harassment, breach of probation, and two child pornography possession charges.

Applying the balancing framework from R. v. Last, the court considered prejudice to the accused, factual nexus between counts, strategic decisions about testifying, and trial efficiency.

The court found that the historical sexual assault allegation, involving a different complainant and events more than a decade earlier, lacked a legal or factual nexus to the other charges and risked significant moral prejudice if tried together.

The remaining four charges arising from events in 2012 were also severed into two separate trials to preserve the accused’s ability to testify selectively.

The court ordered three separate trials, with the sexual assault charge to be heard by a different judge.

The accused, a recently turned eighteen-year-old student, pleaded guilty to threatening to shoot up his school and threatening damage to property.

The Crown sought detention pending a psychiatric assessment and sentencing, citing concerns about potential access to firearms and possible mental illness.

The court granted bail with conditions, finding that detention was not justified under the primary, secondary, or tertiary grounds of the Criminal Code.

The decision addresses systemic issues in the bail system, including risk-aversion among decision-makers and the divergence between statutory bail provisions and actual bail court practices.

The offender, a repeat firearms offender with an extensive criminal record, was convicted of possessing a loaded prohibited firearm and breaching a lifetime weapons prohibition order for the fifth time.

The Crown sought a 20-year sentence, while the defence argued for 7 to 8 years.

The court found that the offender's repeated failure to abide by firearms laws and prior lenient sentences meant rehabilitation was not a significant factor, prioritizing specific deterrence and public protection.

The court imposed a total sentence of 11.5 years, consisting of 9 years for the firearms possession and a consecutive 2.5 years for breaching the prohibition order, reduced to 7.5 years net after granting enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

Following a jury conviction for manslaughter arising from a fatal stabbing during a confrontation in a public park, the court determined the appropriate sentence.

The accused, aged eighteen at the time and with no prior criminal record, stabbed the victim once in the chest after being slapped during a confrontation that followed earlier intimidation involving a knife.

The court identified significant aggravating factors including carrying a large knife in public while intoxicated, brandishing it earlier to intimidate others, failing to assist the victim, fleeing the scene, and disposing of the weapon.

Mitigating factors included the accused’s youth, lack of criminal record, remorse, supportive background, and low risk of reoffending.

Applying the recognized sentencing range for aggravated manslaughter and balancing aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the court imposed a custodial sentence within the lower end of the established range.

During a second degree murder jury trial, the defence applied for an inquiry under s. 644 of the Criminal Code to determine whether a juror should be discharged due to alleged conduct suggesting partiality, including turning away during the accused’s testimony and making gestures during closing submissions.

The court held that the alleged behaviour did not meet the high threshold required to justify an inquiry into a juror’s fitness.

Juror conduct must raise a serious issue regarding the ability to perform duties before the court interferes with jury secrecy.

The court emphasized that jurors may form provisional views during trial provided they remain open to deliberation.

The application for an inquiry and the related request for a mistrial were dismissed.

The accused was sentenced after jury convictions for making child pornography available, counselling a fourteen-year-old complainant to make child pornography, and communicating with the complainant for that purpose; the possession count was stayed under the rule against multiple convictions.

The sentencing judge emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives in child pornography cases, while also considering the offender's lack of record, family support, remorse, delayed treatment engagement, and rehabilitative prospects.

Aggravating features included the volume of child pornography, distribution of material, and online counselling of a vulnerable child to sexually exploit a four-year-old sibling.

A global penitentiary sentence of three years was imposed, less four months' credit for restrictive bail, together with SOIRA, DNA, forfeiture, prohibition, and no-contact orders.