Rupinjit Singh Bal

The appellant was convicted of impaired operation of a motor vehicle and sentenced to a twelve-month driving prohibition.

He appealed the conviction and sentence and brought an application to stay the driving prohibition pending appeal.

The court found that the appeal was not frivolous, the appellant would suffer financial hardship without his license as the sole income earner, and granting the stay would not pose an unacceptable risk to public safety.

The application was granted, and the driving prohibition was stayed with conditions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed J.L.'s application for bail pending appeal from convictions for multiple offences, including sexual assault and intimate partner violence.

The court reviewed the three-part test under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, finding that the grounds of appeal did not clearly surpass the "not frivolous" standard and that public safety and enforceability concerns outweighed reviewability.

The court emphasized the applicant's persistent breaches of release conditions and the risk to the complainant, concluding that continued detention was necessary in the public interest.

The appeal was ordered expedited due to the time already served.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Adeyanju Olaniyan’s application for bail pending appeal of his committal for extradition to the United States on fraud charges.

The court reviewed the statutory test for bail pending appeal in the extradition context, emphasizing the low threshold for the merits of the appeal but the heightened concern for flight risk due to Canada’s international obligations.

The court found that Mr. Olaniyan had not established he was not a flight risk, given his prior breach of bail conditions and the inadequacy of his proposed release plan.

The application was dismissed and the appeal was ordered expedited.

This decision addresses the evidentiary requirements under section 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code regarding the certification of alcohol standard solutions used in breathalyzer testing.

The court found that the qualified breath technician’s viva voce evidence, supported by certificates and physical evidence of the alcohol standard solutions (lot numbers 202205A and 202205E), satisfied the statutory requirements.

The accused’s Charter challenges under sections 8, 9, and the informational delay component of section 10(b) were rejected.

The court convicted the accused on the 80+ blood alcohol concentration charge and stayed the impaired driving charge pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing death and five counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm after driving at high speeds through a red light in downtown Toronto while intoxicated.

The collision killed one pedestrian and severely injured five others.

The court sentenced the accused to 8 years' imprisonment for the death and 4 years concurrent for the bodily harm counts, minus 1,135 days of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody and harsh lockdown conditions.

A 12-year driving prohibition was also imposed.

The defendant, Hacar Khesro-Mohamed-Rasheed, was found guilty of assault causing bodily harm.

This sentencing decision weighed aggravating factors, including significant physical injuries to the victim (broken nose, chipped tooth, facial bruising) and psychological impact, against numerous mitigating factors.

Mitigating factors included the defendant's lack of criminal record, youthfulness, acknowledgment of responsibility, strong community support, self-initiated counselling, and community service.

The Crown sought a 3-month jail sentence, while the defence proposed a conditional discharge or, alternatively, a conditional sentence of 3 to 6 months.

The court rejected a conditional discharge, deeming it inconsistent with the principles of denunciation and deterrence for the severity of the offence.

However, it found a conditional sentence appropriate given the defendant's rehabilitative efforts and low risk to the community.

A 4-month conditional sentence was imposed, along with an 18-month probation term and ancillary orders.

This judgment re-affirms a finding of guilt for assault causing bodily harm after the case was re-opened to hear new defence evidence.

The court had previously found the defendant guilty, and the defence sought to re-open the case after locating a new witness.

The new witness's testimony was found to be unreliable due to intoxication, marijuana use, and inconsistencies.

The court concluded that the defendant's response to the complainant's initial slap was an unreasonable and excessive use of force, not constituting self-defence, and re-affirmed the conviction.

The defendant, G.B., was found guilty after a judge-alone trial of one count of Sexual Interference (s.151 Criminal Code) and one count of Invitation to Sexual Touching (s.152 Criminal Code) involving his daughter, H.B., over a protracted period from ages 7-8 to 13-14.

The court considered sentencing principles, including proportionality, denunciation, and deterrence, giving particular weight to the Supreme Court of Canada's guidance in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9.

Aggravating factors included abuse of a position of trust (father-daughter relationship), the victim being under 18, and the repeated nature of the abuse.

The sole mitigating factor was the defendant's lack of a prior criminal record.

The court emphasized that denunciation and deterrence must predominate in such cases.

Omar Mansour pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and breach of a bail condition.

The court considered aggravating factors, including carrying the weapon in public while on bail for drug trafficking and under house arrest, and mitigating factors such as his youth, guilty plea, remorse, family support, and productive use of time in custody.

The Crown sought a 39-month global sentence, while the defence sought 18-24 months (time served).

The judge imposed a global sentence of 36 months, with 32 months credit for time served (including harsh conditions), leaving 4 months to serve, plus three years probation.

A conditional sentence was rejected due to the seriousness of the conduct.

The defendant, Hacar Khesro-Mohamed-Rasheed, was charged with assault causing bodily harm following an altercation with the complainant, Mohamad Sulyman.

The incident occurred at Sulyman's apartment, involving a woman who was present.

The defendant claimed self-defence, asserting he acted in response to Sulyman slapping him and attempting to choke him.

The court found that while Sulyman initiated the physical contact with a slap, Rasheed's subsequent and prolonged assault, involving multiple punches that caused significant injuries, was not a reasonable or proportionate response and exceeded the bounds of self-defence.

The court largely accepted Sulyman's account of the events and rejected Rasheed's testimony regarding the extent of the force used against him and his response.

Rasheed was found guilty of assault causing bodily harm.

Judge-alone criminal trial on a direct indictment alleging sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving three complainants who described events occurring while they were under 16.

The court reviewed the reasonable doubt standard, the W.(D.) framework, delayed and incremental disclosure principles, and cautions against myth-based reasoning in sexual offence cases.

The evidence relating to two complainants raised reliability concerns preventing findings beyond a reasonable doubt on sexual purpose or commission of the offences.

The court accepted the evidence of one complainant beyond a reasonable doubt and entered convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching, while acquitting on the remaining two counts.

The accused was arrested for impaired driving and lodged in an OPP holding cell.

She was provided a privacy gown but given no instructions on its use.

When she used the toilet in her cell, she was video recorded with her genitals exposed.

The court found a serious violation of her section 8 Charter rights, noting the police's failure to follow their own policies regarding detainee privacy established after the Mok decision.

Given the egregious nature of the breach and the humiliation suffered by the accused, the court ordered a stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed his conviction and 12-month sentence for sexual assault against his employee.

He argued the trial judge misapplied the W.(D.) framework by relying on R. v. J.J.R.D. to reject his evidence without identifying material flaws, effectively turning the trial into a credibility contest.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the burden of proof, provided sufficient reasons for accepting the complainant's evidence, and properly rejected the appellant's evidence based on a considered acceptance of the Crown's case.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the 12-month term was fit given the aggravating factors, including the appellant's position of authority.

The accused was arrested and released on an undertaking with a first appearance date.

On the appearance date, no information had been laid before the court.

Over six months later, an information was sworn and a summons issued.

The accused brought an application to dismiss the proceeding for want of prosecution under s. 485 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that jurisdiction over the person was lost when the Crown failed to lay an information before the return date on the undertaking.

Because the Crown failed to issue a summons or warrant within three months of the loss of jurisdiction, the proceeding was deemed dismissed for want of prosecution under s. 485(3).

The accused applied under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code to sever an indictment alleging sexual offences involving three complainants, arguing prejudice, lack of nexus, and differing intentions to testify.

The court held it was premature to determine the Crown's similar fact application at the severance stage, and considered only whether such an application was viable.

Applying the interests of justice framework from Last, the court found a sufficient nexus in the disclosure and possible collusion issues, little evidentiary complexity, no adequate evidentiary foundation for the accused's asserted selective intention to testify, and significant efficiency and timeliness concerns favouring a joint trial.

The court concluded the accused had not shown on a balance of probabilities that severance was clearly required.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for impaired driving and driving over 80.

He argued the trial judge erred by dismissing his lost evidence application regarding unrecorded 911 calls, finding the roadside screening demand was made 'forthwith', and concluding his right to counsel was not breached despite a delay in implementation.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's factual findings that the 911 recordings never existed, the brief delay in the breath demand was justified by the officer managing the collision scene alone, and privacy for a phone call to counsel could not be provided until arrival at the police station.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol.

The trial addressed several Charter issues, including the validity of a breath demand (s. 8), delay in reading rights to counsel (s. 10(b)), and a "Mok" issue concerning the monitoring and recording of the defendant's use of the toilet in a police cell (s. 8).

The court dismissed the challenges to the breath demand and the delay in reading rights, finding police actions reasonable.

However, the court found a Section 8 Charter violation regarding the toilet privacy, as the measures taken (fogging video, blanket provision without instruction) were inadequate to ensure a reasonable degree of privacy.

Despite the violation, the court denied a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence, concluding there was no sufficient causal or temporal connection between the Charter breach and the obtaining of the breath samples or other evidence.

The defendant was found guilty of impaired operation, and the excess alcohol count was stayed on the Kienapple principle.

The defendant, charged with impaired driving and exceeding 80 mg, brought a pre-trial application to stay proceedings for unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The total delay from information sworn to trial date was 750 days (25 months).

The court considered a significant portion of this delay, specifically 224 days spent in resolution discussions, as implicitly waived by the defence, following the reasoning in R. v. Lim.

After deducting implicitly and explicitly waived periods, the net delay was calculated to be 505 days (16.8 months), which falls below the presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases.

Consequently, the application to stay proceedings was dismissed.

The Crown applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a preliminary inquiry judge's order discharging the respondent on a charge of dangerous driving causing death.

The respondent had struck and killed a cyclist after entering an intersection on a red light.

The preliminary inquiry judge found sufficient evidence of the actus reus but discharged the respondent, concluding that his 9-10 seconds of inattention was merely momentary and lacked the requisite mens rea.

The Superior Court found the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by misapprehending the law on mens rea, specifically by focusing solely on the brevity of the inattention rather than whether a reasonable person would foresee the risks, and by failing to consider the whole of the evidence.

The application was granted, the discharge quashed, and the respondent committed for trial.

The appellant appealed her conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg, arguing her s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached because noise in a police privacy booth prevented meaningful communication with duty counsel.

The trial judge dismissed the application, finding the appellant told police she understood the advice and failed to diligently pursue her rights.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge made no error in finding no 'special circumstances' required police to re-advise her of her rights, and that the trial judge's comments about a lack of prior complaints regarding the booth were merely obiter.