D. Guttman

Vinventory Canada Inc. brought an application challenging the constitutional applicability of Ontario's Occupational Health and Safety Act, arguing that it was subject to federal derivative labour jurisdiction under the Canada Labour Code.

The corporation, a sub-contractor providing rail yard management and automobile handling services at a Canadian Pacific Railway facility, contended its operations were an integral part of a federally regulated undertaking.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that Vinventory's work was not sufficiently integral or permanently dependent on the federal undertaking to displace the presumptive provincial labour jurisdiction.

The accused, charged with sexual assault, applied for certiorari and mandamus to quash a trial judge's decision to defer hearing a constitutional challenge and stay of proceedings application until after the trial on the merits.

The accused argued that a police media release violated their Charter rights and sought a stay.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding the trial judge committed no jurisdictional error in exercising his discretion to manage court resources and defer the constitutional issue, noting that an acquittal would render the constitutional issues moot for the purpose of the criminal trial.

The appellant appealed her conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg, arguing her s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached because noise in a police privacy booth prevented meaningful communication with duty counsel.

The trial judge dismissed the application, finding the appellant told police she understood the advice and failed to diligently pursue her rights.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge made no error in finding no 'special circumstances' required police to re-advise her of her rights, and that the trial judge's comments about a lack of prior complaints regarding the booth were merely obiter.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on charges of sexual assault and forcible confinement.

The appeal court found the trial judge misapprehended material evidence regarding the complainant's testimony, misapplied the legal principles relating to consent by accepting implied consent, and erred in finding an air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief.

The trial judge's errors led to a finding of reasonable doubt where none should have existed.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for 'Over 80 care and control' after being found asleep in his parked vehicle, which was blocking a commercial driveway.

The trial judge convicted him on the basis that the vehicle's position created a realistic risk of danger to persons or property, satisfying the third limb of the test for care and control.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the risk of danger.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion was a finding of fact supported by the evidence and entitled to deference.

The applicant brought a certiorari application to quash his committal for trial on charges of carrying a concealed weapon and aggravated assault, arguing the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional errors.

The applicant had brandished a firearm during a domestic dispute, causing the complainant to flee down a staircase and break her ankle.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the preliminary inquiry judge made no jurisdictional errors, as there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to infer the weapon had been concealed and that the applicant's actions were a significant contributing cause to the complainant's injuries with objective foreseeability of the risk of bodily harm.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of child pornography, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his section 8 Charter application.

The appellant contended the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant for his residence lacked sufficient grounds.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the amplified record and found the trial judge made no error in concluding the ITO contained reasonable and probable grounds that an offence had been committed and that evidence would be found at the appellant's residence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and appealed on four grounds.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal on the ground that the trial judge materially misapprehended two aspects of the appellant's testimony, which significantly impacted the judge's credibility findings.

The court found that these misapprehensions were sufficiently material to warrant a new trial.

The other grounds of appeal, concerning a Section 11(b) Charter violation, restrictions on cross-examination of prior sexual activity under Section 276 of the Criminal Code, and the Crown's re-election to proceed by summary conviction, were dismissed.

A new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the imposition of a curative discharge for impaired driving offences, arguing the sentencing judge erred in finding a breach of s. 15 of the Charter because the respondent failed to file a proper Notice of Constitutional Question challenging the Criminal Law Amendment Act.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed that the failure to file an appropriate Notice rendered the constitutional finding a nullity.

The appeal was allowed, and a new sentencing hearing was ordered with directions for the respondent to file a proper Notice of Constitutional Question.

The applicant appealed a conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge erred in rejecting a Crown concession that a Charter s. 10(b) breach occurred, in refusing to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) after finding an unlawful detention contrary to s. 9, and in concluding that impairment was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appeal judge held that a trial judge is not bound to accept a Crown concession on a Charter issue and must reach an independent conclusion.

Although the trial judge erred in failing to recognize that the unlawful detention also produced a separate s. 10(b) breach, the evidence would still not have been excluded under the s. 24(2) analysis.

The remaining grounds of appeal lacked merit and the conviction was upheld.