Alanna Justine Fedak-Tarnopolsky

Judge-alone criminal trial on a direct indictment alleging sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving three complainants who described events occurring while they were under 16.

The court reviewed the reasonable doubt standard, the W.(D.) framework, delayed and incremental disclosure principles, and cautions against myth-based reasoning in sexual offence cases.

The evidence relating to two complainants raised reliability concerns preventing findings beyond a reasonable doubt on sexual purpose or commission of the offences.

The court accepted the evidence of one complainant beyond a reasonable doubt and entered convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching, while acquitting on the remaining two counts.

The Crown applied to admit a video statement from a deceased complainant under the principled exception to the hearsay rule in a sexual assault prosecution.

The complainant had passed away before trial.

The Crown argued the statement had sufficient procedural and substantive reliability.

The respondent opposed admission, contending the statement lacked adequate procedural and substantive reliability and that cross-examination could not be substituted.

The court dismissed the application, finding the Crown had not established sufficient reliability on either ground.

The statement was not made under oath, the declarant was not warned about false statements, and there were inconsistencies with other evidence including the complainant's own handwritten statement.

The applicant, Nivethan Alakeswaran, sought a stay of proceedings after being convicted of aggravated assault, alleging a Charter breach (ss. 7 and 12) due to an assault by a Peel Regional Police constable during his post-arrest interview.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant's evidence unreliable and incredible, and that the alleged assault was not established on a balance of probabilities.

The accused, charged with robbery, brought a motion to exclude his videotaped statement to police, alleging breaches of his s. 10(b) and s. 7 Charter rights.

Although the accused spoke briefly with Duty Counsel, he expressed confusion during the subsequent police interview and indicated he wanted to speak to a lawyer of his own choosing.

The interviewing officer interrupted the accused's attempt to find a lawyer in the phone book and continued questioning him.

The court found that the officer failed to facilitate the accused's right to counsel, resulting in a serious breach of s. 10(b).

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the statement under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant, who was on house arrest, was stopped by police while driving a van.

After his arrest for breaching his conditional sentence, police left the van blocking the roadway, subsequently deemed it 'abandoned' under the Highway Traffic Act, and conducted an inventory search that yielded crack cocaine and a loaded handgun.

The applicant brought a Charter application arguing arbitrary detention, denial of right to counsel, and unreasonable search.

The court found the initial stop and detention lawful, but held the inventory search violated s. 8 of the Charter because the police artificially created the abandonment to justify the search.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) due to the serious and deliberate nature of the police misconduct.

The appellant appealed his convictions for impaired care or control and driving with excess alcohol.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay, in exhibiting a reasonable apprehension of bias by preparing reasons before hearing submissions, in failing to exclude breath readings due to a s. 2(a) Charter breach involving the removal of his turban, and in rejecting his evidence of bolus drinking.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in his s. 11(b) analysis, his s. 2(a) analysis, and his credibility findings regarding the appellant's bolus drinking defence.

A new trial was ordered on both counts.