Paul Aubin

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing death, dangerous driving causing death, and operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL causing death.

The charges arose from a fatal collision on Major Mackenzie Drive in Markham, Ontario on September 14, 2022, in which the defendant's vehicle crossed the centre line and struck an oncoming vehicle driven by an off-duty police officer, resulting in the officer's death.

The court found the defendant guilty on all counts.

The court rejected the defence argument that falling asleep at the wheel provides an absolute defence to dangerous driving, finding instead that the defendant's decision to drive while tired and under the influence of alcohol constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The court also found that the defendant's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol to any degree, satisfying the test for impaired driving.

The blood-alcohol analysis showing 80 mg/100 mL was admitted under the presumption of accuracy.

This is an addendum to a Garofoli ruling dismissing an application to quash a search warrant.

The original ruling was released on August 19, 2025.

The application involved a search warrant based substantially on evidence from a confidential informant, requiring extensive redactions to the Information to Obtain to protect informer privilege.

The initial ruling was sent only to the Crown to prevent inadvertent disclosure of the informant's identity.

Upon Crown counsel's request, one sentence in paragraph 13 of the ruling was redacted before release to defence counsel and the trial office.

The unredacted paragraph and pertinent emails are sealed as exhibits to preserve the record.

The court sentenced Fahmid Iqbal, a youthful first offender, for possession of a loaded restricted firearm contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code.

After a detailed review of the facts, mitigating and aggravating factors, and relevant case law, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, to be served in the community under strict conditions, followed by two years of probation.

The decision discusses the principles of denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, and the appropriateness of a conditional sentence in the circumstances.

The appellant, Isaiah Todd, appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded firearm and possession of a firearm while prohibited, following the dismissal of his s. 8 Charter application.

The Court of Appeal upheld the reviewing judge’s finding that the confidential informant’s information was compelling and corroborated, and that the Information to Obtain (ITO) established reasonable grounds for the search warrant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused applied to exclude evidence, including a firearm, seized from his home under a search warrant, arguing insufficient grounds for the warrant's issuance.

The court found insufficient grounds to establish an offence had been committed and that a firearm would be found in the home due to staleness of information and lack of clear evidence.

The application was granted, and the evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, emphasizing the seriousness of the police conduct (carelessness in disclosure) and the significant impact on the applicant's privacy interests.

Terrell Harrison pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and discharging a firearm with intent to wound after shooting his father.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the severity of the offence, and significant mitigating factors, such as his difficult childhood, family dysfunction, and sincere remorse.

The judge also factored in the unconscionable delay in obtaining the Enhanced Pre-sentence Report and the harsh conditions of his pre-sentence custody.

The court imposed a sentence of seven years, concurrent on both counts, with credit for pre-sentence custody amounting to 5 years and 6 months, leaving 18 months left to serve.

The 17-year-old offender pleaded guilty to second degree murder and aggravated assault following a series of gang-related shootings.

The Crown applied to have the young person sentenced as an adult.

The court found that the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness, noting the youth's cognitive limitations, mental health issues, substance abuse, and vulnerability to older criminal peers.

The court also found that a youth sentence would be sufficient to hold the offender accountable.

The young person was sentenced to the maximum youth sentence of seven years for second degree murder, comprising four years in secure custody and three years of community supervision.

The Crown sought a ruling on the voluntariness of the defendant's statement to an RCMP officer after her arrest for importing cocaine.

The defendant brought a cross-motion alleging violations of her Charter rights under sections 7, 8, 9, and 10 by a Canada Border Services Officer (BSO).

The court found the defendant's statement to the RCMP officer voluntary.

However, the court determined that the BSO violated the defendant's section 7 and 10 Charter rights by engaging in intrusive questioning, beyond routine border inspection, after particularized suspicion arose, without advising her of her rights to counsel and to remain silent.

Applying the Grant factors under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the seized drugs and the defendant's incriminating statements.

The applicant defendant challenged a search of his person and vehicle under the Cannabis Control Act, 2017, arguing violations of Charter sections 8 and 9.

The court found that the police officer lacked objective and subjective reasonable grounds for the search, as the smell of marijuana and a marijuana stem were insufficient to establish current possession of unpackaged cannabis.

The officer's testimony regarding the stem and residue was found to lack veracity due to circumstantial evidence.

Applying the Grant factors, the court determined that the serious state misconduct (bad faith, deliberate disregard for rights, misleading testimony) and significant impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

Consequently, the seized handgun, cannabis, and hashish were excluded from evidence, leading to an acquittal on the firearm charge.

Taylor Griffith was found guilty of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, trafficking in cocaine and crack cocaine, and failing to comply with probation and firearms prohibition orders.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the dangerous combination of guns and drugs, the quantity of drugs, and Griffith's prior record.

Mitigating factors included his youth, family support, remorse, and participation in rehabilitation programs while in custody.

The court also addressed a Charter violation claim for sentence reduction, finding no additional harm or prejudice connected to the breach of delaying contact with counsel.

A global sentence of 6 years imprisonment was imposed, with credit for 22 months of pre-sentence custody, resulting in a further 4 years and 2 months incarceration, along with a lifetime firearms prohibition and DNA order.

Taylor Griffith, charged with firearm and drug trafficking offenses, applied to exclude evidence seized during his arrest, alleging violations of his s. 8, s. 9, and s. 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found the arrest and incidental search lawful, with objectively reasonable grounds based on police surveillance and observed hand-to-hand transactions.

However, a breach of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) occurred due to a delay in facilitating contact with a lawyer until after search warrants were executed.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant analysis, the court determined that while the police conduct in delaying counsel was serious, the impact on the accused's Charter interests was minimal as the evidence (loaded firearm and drugs) was seized prior to the breach and was real, reliable, and crucial.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The accused was charged with prowling and breaking and entering with intent to commit an indictable offence on December 31, 2016 and January 2, 2017, as well as breach of probation for possessing a pellet gun on January 24, 2017.

The Crown relied primarily on the identification evidence of the victim, supported by circumstantial evidence including motive, the presence of a matching ammunition magazine at the scene, and sightings of the accused's vehicle.

The defence challenged the reliability of the identification, highlighting significant discrepancies between the victim's descriptions and the accused's physical characteristics, the victim's failure to identify the accused in a photo lineup, and exculpatory DNA evidence from a tuque found at the scene.

The accused was charged with possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking following a traffic stop of a vehicle flagged in the CPIC system as a re-vinned crime vehicle.

The court found multiple Charter violations: a breach of section 10(b) rights to counsel when the accused made incriminating statements about marijuana without being advised of his rights, and a breach of section 8 rights against unreasonable search when police searched the accused's pockets and subsequently the vehicle without lawful authority.

The court excluded the heroin evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the seriousness of the breaches and the impact on the accused's rights outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The Crown brought a mid-trial motion to admit hearsay evidence from a co-accused, Jerome Bent, who refused to testify.

The accused, Shakeil Wheatle, was charged with first-degree murder.

The motion relied on the principled exception to the hearsay rule, requiring assessment of necessity and reliability.

The court found necessity was met due to Bent's refusal.

For reliability, the court distinguished between parts of Bent's statement that incriminated himself and were corroborated, which were deemed inherently trustworthy and admissible, and parts that incriminated Wheatle, which lacked sufficient trustworthiness and corroboration, and were therefore inadmissible.

The court emphasized the lack of opportunity for cross-examination and the circumstances of the statement (jailhouse discussion) as undermining procedural reliability for the parts incriminating Wheatle.

The applicants, jointly charged with drug trafficking, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence obtained during a traffic stop.

The court found that the police stop was a pretext based on racial profiling, constituting arbitrary detention (s. 9) and an unlawful search (s. 8).

Additionally, the applicants' rights to be informed of the reason for detention and to counsel (s. 10(a) and (b)) were infringed.

Applying the Grant test, the court determined that the serious Charter violations, particularly racial profiling, warranted the exclusion of all evidence obtained from the vehicle search and any subsequent utterances.

The applicant, who was on house arrest, was stopped by police while driving a van.

After his arrest for breaching his conditional sentence, police left the van blocking the roadway, subsequently deemed it 'abandoned' under the Highway Traffic Act, and conducted an inventory search that yielded crack cocaine and a loaded handgun.

The applicant brought a Charter application arguing arbitrary detention, denial of right to counsel, and unreasonable search.

The court found the initial stop and detention lawful, but held the inventory search violated s. 8 of the Charter because the police artificially created the abandonment to justify the search.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) due to the serious and deliberate nature of the police misconduct.

The accused was charged with multiple serious offences including armed robberies with firearms, forcible confinement, conspiracy, and weapons offences.

After being released on bail twice with sureties, the accused allegedly breached the curfew condition of her recognizance.

The original surety revoked her bail, resulting in the accused being arrested on breach charges.

The Crown opposed release on primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.

The court granted release on a new recognizance with the same surety, finding that the bail plan was reasonable and had previously succeeded, and that the tertiary ground did not justify detention despite the serious nature of the charges.

The offender was sentenced for his role in a violent armed robbery of a jewellery store, during which his co-accused shot and wounded an employee.

The court considered the offender's significant cooperation with police in a separate murder investigation, which placed him at great personal risk and resulted in harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court determined a global sentence of six years was appropriate, which was reduced to 27.5 months after applying enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

He brought a pre-trial application to exclude evidence, arguing his arrest was unlawful because the undercover officer who allegedly formed the grounds for arrest did not testify, violating his s. 9 Charter rights, and that the subsequent warrantless searches of his person and vehicle violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court dismissed the application, finding the arresting officer had subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds to order the arrest based on the totality of circumstances, including observations of hand-to-hand transactions.

The court also held the vehicle search was a lawful search incident to arrest.