Paul Aubin

The accused was charged with prowling and breaking and entering with intent to commit an indictable offence on December 31, 2016 and January 2, 2017, as well as breach of probation for possessing a pellet gun on January 24, 2017.

The Crown relied primarily on the identification evidence of the victim, supported by circumstantial evidence including motive, the presence of a matching ammunition magazine at the scene, and sightings of the accused's vehicle.

The defence challenged the reliability of the identification, highlighting significant discrepancies between the victim's descriptions and the accused's physical characteristics, the victim's failure to identify the accused in a photo lineup, and exculpatory DNA evidence from a tuque found at the scene.

The accused was charged with possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking following a traffic stop of a vehicle flagged in the CPIC system as a re-vinned crime vehicle.

The court found multiple Charter violations: a breach of section 10(b) rights to counsel when the accused made incriminating statements about marijuana without being advised of his rights, and a breach of section 8 rights against unreasonable search when police searched the accused's pockets and subsequently the vehicle without lawful authority.

The court excluded the heroin evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the seriousness of the breaches and the impact on the accused's rights outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The Crown brought a mid-trial motion to admit hearsay evidence from a co-accused, Jerome Bent, who refused to testify.

The accused, Shakeil Wheatle, was charged with first-degree murder.

The motion relied on the principled exception to the hearsay rule, requiring assessment of necessity and reliability.

The court found necessity was met due to Bent's refusal.

For reliability, the court distinguished between parts of Bent's statement that incriminated himself and were corroborated, which were deemed inherently trustworthy and admissible, and parts that incriminated Wheatle, which lacked sufficient trustworthiness and corroboration, and were therefore inadmissible.

The court emphasized the lack of opportunity for cross-examination and the circumstances of the statement (jailhouse discussion) as undermining procedural reliability for the parts incriminating Wheatle.

The applicants, jointly charged with drug trafficking, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence obtained during a traffic stop.

The court found that the police stop was a pretext based on racial profiling, constituting arbitrary detention (s. 9) and an unlawful search (s. 8).

Additionally, the applicants' rights to be informed of the reason for detention and to counsel (s. 10(a) and (b)) were infringed.

Applying the Grant test, the court determined that the serious Charter violations, particularly racial profiling, warranted the exclusion of all evidence obtained from the vehicle search and any subsequent utterances.

The applicant, who was on house arrest, was stopped by police while driving a van.

After his arrest for breaching his conditional sentence, police left the van blocking the roadway, subsequently deemed it 'abandoned' under the Highway Traffic Act, and conducted an inventory search that yielded crack cocaine and a loaded handgun.

The applicant brought a Charter application arguing arbitrary detention, denial of right to counsel, and unreasonable search.

The court found the initial stop and detention lawful, but held the inventory search violated s. 8 of the Charter because the police artificially created the abandonment to justify the search.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) due to the serious and deliberate nature of the police misconduct.

The accused was tried on multiple firearm and ammunition possession and storage charges after a prohibited firearm and loaded magazines were found in a bag on her bed when police investigated a reported break and enter.

The case turned on circumstantial evidence and whether the accused knew the firearm and ammunition were in the apartment.

Applying the W.D. framework, the court held the accused's evidence raised a reasonable doubt, particularly given her repeated opportunities to remove the firearm before police found it and the plausibility of her explanation that another person had access to her room.

The Crown failed to establish that guilt was the only rational inference.

The accused was acquitted on all charges.

The applicant sought to exclude eyewitness identification evidence arising from a photo line‑up.

Evidence revealed that police had shown the witness several mug shots of suspects prior to conducting the formal photo line‑up and failed to keep notes or records of that interaction.

The court held that the undocumented pre‑line‑up exposure created a serious risk that the witness’s identification had been tainted and could not be meaningfully tested through cross‑examination.

Given the uncertainty surrounding the circumstances of the earlier photographs and the witness’s statements during the line‑up indicating influence from them, the probative value of the identification evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The identification evidence was therefore excluded.

The accused challenged the admissibility of evidence consisting of a name and phone number stored in a third party’s cell phone, arguing that it constituted hearsay.

The Crown sought to admit the evidence as circumstantial evidence of the state of mind of the person who recorded the contact information and its connection to events relevant to the prosecution.

The court held that the entry of a name and phone number in a cell phone constituted non-verbal conduct rather than hearsay and could be admitted for the limited purpose advanced by the Crown.

Alternatively, the evidence satisfied the principled exception to the hearsay rule due to circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and necessity where the phone’s owner had absconded.

The issue of the ultimate reliability and weight of the evidence was left to the jury.

During a criminal jury trial, the defence challenged testimony suggesting that the accused was known by a nickname, arguing the evidence was inadmissible hearsay.

The Crown contended the statement was admissible as an adoptive admission by silence because it was allegedly made in the accused’s presence.

The court reviewed the governing principles for adoptive admissions, including the requirement that the accused must have heard the statement and reasonably been expected to respond.

Because the evidentiary record did not establish that the accused was present or heard the statement, the foundational requirements were not met.

The jury was therefore prohibited from using the testimony as substantive evidence.

The accused was charged with multiple serious offences including armed robberies with firearms, forcible confinement, conspiracy, and weapons offences.

After being released on bail twice with sureties, the accused allegedly breached the curfew condition of her recognizance.

The original surety revoked her bail, resulting in the accused being arrested on breach charges.

The Crown opposed release on primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds.

The court granted release on a new recognizance with the same surety, finding that the bail plan was reasonable and had previously succeeded, and that the tertiary ground did not justify detention despite the serious nature of the charges.

The offender was sentenced for his role in a violent armed robbery of a jewellery store, during which his co-accused shot and wounded an employee.

The court considered the offender's significant cooperation with police in a separate murder investigation, which placed him at great personal risk and resulted in harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court determined a global sentence of six years was appropriate, which was reduced to 27.5 months after applying enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

He brought a pre-trial application to exclude evidence, arguing his arrest was unlawful because the undercover officer who allegedly formed the grounds for arrest did not testify, violating his s. 9 Charter rights, and that the subsequent warrantless searches of his person and vehicle violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court dismissed the application, finding the arresting officer had subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds to order the arrest based on the totality of circumstances, including observations of hand-to-hand transactions.

The court also held the vehicle search was a lawful search incident to arrest.

The offender was convicted by a jury of possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Crown sought a penitentiary term of two years, citing the offender's prior convictions for similar offences.

The defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court weighed the aggravating factor of the offender's criminal record against his compliance with previous court orders and his 40 months on bail without incident.

The court concluded that the offender did not pose a danger to the community and imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by 12 months of probation.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences and his 50-month sentence.

He argued the police used the Highway Traffic Act as a pretext to stop and search his vehicle, violating his Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the stop had a valid dual purpose and that the smell of marijuana provided reasonable grounds for arrest.

The court also upheld the admission of evidence under s. 24(2) despite a minor s. 10(b) breach.

On the sentence appeal, the court found the appellant was not entitled to enhanced pre-sentence custody credit because he was on bail and bound by a weapons prohibition at the time of his arrest.

The appellant appealed his conviction for public mischief, arguing that the false allegations he made to the Children's Aid Society did not constitute a 'report' under s. 140(1)(c) of the Criminal Code because they were not made directly to a police officer.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that a report does not need to be made directly to the police.

The court also found ample evidence that the appellant intended to mislead the police and upheld the trial judge's instruction on the burden of proof.

The applicant sought to prevent prosecution for possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking on the basis of issue estoppel.

In an earlier conditional sentence breach hearing, the court had dismissed the allegation after finding the Crown failed to prove possession because the evidence consisted of inadmissible hearsay.

The applicant argued that the earlier finding constituted a final determination of the factual issue of possession.

The court held that the three-part test for issue estoppel was satisfied because the same factual issue had been conclusively determined between the same parties in the prior proceeding.

To avoid inconsistent factual findings and ensure fairness to the accused, the court entered a judicial stay on the trafficking-related possession charge.

In a criminal trial arising from a shooting at a house party, the complainant initially identified the accused as the shooter but later refused to confirm the identification at trial.

The Crown sought to admit five prior statements made to police, including statements at the scene, at hospital, a hospital photo identification, a later written statement, and a formal photo line-up.

Applying the principled exception to the hearsay rule under R. v. KGB and subsequent jurisprudence, the court found the necessity requirement satisfied because the witness recanted or claimed lack of memory.

The court held that threshold reliability was met, particularly due to the videotaped photo line-up and the opportunity for meaningful cross-examination at trial.

The prior formal statement and photo line-up were admitted as substantive evidence, while earlier statements were admitted to provide contextual background.

Sentencing decision for possession of a restricted firearm together with readily accessible ammunition.

Police executed a search warrant at an apartment where the accused attempted to discard a handgun through a window; numerous rounds of ammunition and a magazine were also discovered in the residence.

Although the court previously found a breach of the accused’s s. 8 Charter rights relating to the search warrant, the evidence was admitted under the framework in R. v. Grant.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence in firearms offences, particularly where the accused possessed a handgun and large quantities of ammunition in a residence with young children while subject to a prohibition order.

Considering both mitigating factors and significant aggravating features, the court imposed a penitentiary sentence.

The applicant sought exclusion of a firearm, ammunition, and related evidence under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms following the execution of a search warrant.

The court found the warrant was issued without sufficient information to establish reasonable and probable grounds, resulting in a breach of s. 8 of the Charter.

However, the firearm was discarded from a window during execution of the warrant, which the court held constituted abandonment with only a tenuous causal connection to the Charter breach.

Although the later warrantless seizure of ammunition from a suitcase violated s. 8, the court applied the Grant framework and concluded the evidence should not be excluded.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The offender was convicted of multiple counts of trafficking cocaine, possessing proceeds of crime, offering to transfer a firearm, and possession for the purpose of trafficking following an undercover police operation.

The Crown sought a global sentence of five to six years, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The court weighed the aggravating factors of the large quantity of cocaine sold against the offender's significant community volunteer work, minor dated record, and compliance with bail.

The court imposed a global sentence of three years in penitentiary, along with a ten-year weapons prohibition and a DNA order.