Alfred J. O'Marra

Appeal from an order dismissing a corporation’s action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and imposing a tailored vexatious litigant order under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act on two non-party individuals associated with the corporation.

The court held that s. 140 applies to non-parties who institute or conduct vexatious litigation through a party, and upheld findings that one appellant directed the litigation from behind the scenes while the other conducted it vexatiously through an inaccurate and unsupported affidavit.

The court found the order proportionate because it was confined to receivership-related proceedings and necessary given repeated abusive relitigation and unpaid costs awards.

Leave to appeal the personal costs order was denied, and appeal costs were fixed at $50,000 all-inclusive.

The Law Society of Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision that remitted a costs decision back to the Law Society Tribunal Hearing Division.

The respondent, a lawyer, had successfully defended against professional misconduct charges and sought costs against the Law Society under Rule 25.01 for 'wasted costs'.

The Hearing Division denied costs, but the Divisional Court found the investigation was procedurally unfair and one-sided.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Law Society's appeal, holding that while the Divisional Court erred in applying a procedural fairness framework, the Hearing Division erred in principle by taking a piecemeal approach to the Law Society's conduct and applying an overly rigid standard for wasted costs.

The matter was properly remitted for a holistic assessment of whether the Law Society's conduct caused wasted costs.

The appellant challenged a trial judgment holding him personally liable on an unsecured line of credit, arguing that the facility was entered on behalf of several corporations and that the trial judge committed multiple factual processing errors.

The Court of Appeal applied the palpable and overriding error standard and held that, although the trial judge failed to address some evidence concerning the rarity of such unsecured personal lending and the borrower's recorded net worth, those errors were not sufficiently significant to vitiate the core factual finding.

The court accepted that the documentary record, account statements, banking records, and post-agreement conduct amply supported the conclusion that the facility was a personal line of credit.

The appeal was dismissed, with costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed from summary judgment dismissing negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims against a lawyer retained to draft a deceased relative’s will.

The court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial because, even accepting the appellant’s version of events, the claim failed on duty, causation, and limitation grounds.

It declined to recognize a novel duty of care to a non-client who was not an intended beneficiary under the will, and found no ad hoc fiduciary undertaking.

The court further held that the alleged losses flowed from prior judicial findings concerning beneficial ownership of trust property, not from the respondent’s conduct, and that the claim was discoverable more than two years before it was commenced.

Appeal dismissed with costs to the respondent.

In a class action arising from a COVID-19 outbreak at a long-term care home, the appellants challenged certification of causation and punitive, exemplary or aggravated damages as common issues, and sought leave to appeal the certification costs award.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge properly found some basis in fact for a workable methodology for proving causation on a class-wide basis through a risk ratio approach supported by available data and expert evidence.

The court also upheld certification of punitive, exemplary or aggravated damages, rejecting the argument that such relief could not be certified absent common compensatory damages, noting that sequencing could address any quantification concerns.

Leave to appeal costs was denied because no strong grounds were shown for appellate intervention in the discretionary costs ruling.

The appellant, a former real estate lawyer, appealed from a summary judgment dismissing his action against his bank.

He alleged that the bank committed repeated double withdrawals from his trust account in connection with certified cheques, causing failed real estate transactions, Law Society intervention, and criminal proceedings.

The motion judge found that although duplicate debits occurred, they were corrected and the appellant failed to establish that the bank's conduct caused the Law Society investigation or the losses claimed.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error and dismissed the appeal with costs of $5,000.

This decision sets the period of parole ineligibility for Godfrey Sig-od, convicted of first-degree murder of his ex-wife and second-degree murder of his daughter.

The court reviews the facts, the character of the offender, the circumstances of the offence, the recommendations of the jury, and relevant case law.

The court imposes life imprisonment without parole for 25 years for the first-degree murder and life imprisonment with parole ineligibility for 18 years for the second-degree murder, emphasizing the gravity of the offence, breach of trust, and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The decision concerns the admissibility of ante-mortem statements made by the deceased, Elvie Sig-od and Angelica Sig-od, in the prosecution of Godfrey Sig-od for their murders.

The Crown sought to admit out-of-court utterances and statements under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, arguing necessity and reliability.

The court reviewed the circumstances of the statements, the relationship history, and the legal standards for necessity and threshold reliability, ultimately admitting the statements with some exclusions for prejudicial content.

Dallas Ly was found guilty of second-degree murder of his mother.

This ruling determines his parole ineligibility period.

The court considered the nature of the offence, the offender's character, jury recommendations, and sentencing objectives.

Aggravating factors included the brutal domestic homicide, desecration of remains by decapitation, and discarding the body by the roadside.

Mitigating factors included no prior criminal record, undiagnosed mental health issues, and rehabilitation potential.

The court set the parole ineligibility period at 13 years, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and DNA order.

Dayne Sitladeen was found guilty of manslaughter in the shooting death of Blain Grindley.

The court considered aggravating factors including his extensive criminal record involving violence and firearms, his leadership role in the offence, and his flight to the United States where he continued criminal involvement.

Mitigating factors included some rehabilitative efforts in detention.

The court imposed a sentence of 13 years imprisonment, to be served consecutively to his unexpired U.S. sentence, along with a lifetime firearms prohibition and a DNA order.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for firearm-related offences.

The young person accused was charged with second-degree murder, armed robbery, and possession of a prohibited firearm after shooting a flea market manager during a robbery.

The accused admitted to the robbery, firearm possession, and manslaughter, but contested the murder charge, arguing a lack of subjective intent for murder due to severe drug intoxication, sleep deprivation, and mental health issues.

The court declined to apply the common-sense inference of intent, finding that the cumulative effect of the accused's substance abuse, sleeplessness, and other health issues left the accused without the requisite subjective foresight of the likelihood of death.

The accused was found not guilty of second-degree murder but guilty of manslaughter, armed robbery, and possession of a prohibited firearm.

The Crown brought an application to admit the accused's rap music videos and lyrics as prior discreditable conduct evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to use the evidence to establish the accused's membership in a street gang and to provide a motive for the shooting.

The court dismissed the application, finding no evidence of a relationship between the deceased and the accused, nor any evidence that the deceased was involved in gang activity.

The court concluded that the lyrics were not relevant to an issue at trial and their prejudicial effect far outweighed any probative value.

The accused, FZ, was charged with two counts of sexual assault against his wife, WLM, involving alleged non-consensual vaginal intercourse on January 5, 2019, and non-consensual touching of her breast on June 6, 2020.

The Crown's case relied solely on the complainant's testimony, while the defence presented the accused's testimony and expert evidence from a forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Julian Gojer, who opined that FZ exhibited "complex trauma" and a passive, apologetic personality.

The court found the complainant's evidence to be disingenuous and inconsistent with the textual evidence and the accused's psychological profile, which suggested a controlling dynamic where the complainant was the dominant party.

The court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the sexual assaults occurred and consequently dismissed both charges.

The applicant, Dontay Williams, brought Charter applications under sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence.

He alleged unlawful detention and arrest without reasonable grounds, insufficient grounds for a search warrant, an unreasonable strip search, and unreasonable delay in accessing counsel.

The court dismissed all Charter applications, finding that the police had reasonable grounds for arrest, the search warrant was valid despite a technical error in its execution timeframe, the strip search was justified and conducted reasonably, and the delay in accessing counsel was reasonable given the circumstances.

The applicants sought a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay, arguing their trial, scheduled for May 2023, exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court matters established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found a 5-day period of defence delay but noted the total delay still exceeded the ceiling by at least two months.

The Crown argued the COVID-19 pandemic constituted an exceptional circumstance, and they had taken reasonable steps to mitigate the delay, including offering earlier trial dates through a "Jordan court." The court agreed that the pandemic was an unforeseen and unavoidable discrete event causing delay and that the Crown and court administration had made reasonable mitigation efforts.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

Sheldon Livingston, a co-accused, brought a motion for severance from his co-accused, Yasmin Muzafary, to allow him to call her as a witness in support of his self-defence claim.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the co-accused would testify if severed, or that her testimony would favorably affect the verdict, especially given the strong video evidence of a joint attack.

The court emphasized the strong presumption in favour of joint trials for co-accused acting in concert and the public interest in judicial efficiency.

The applicant, charged with sexual assault, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was 36 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court deducted 7.5 months of delay caused by the exceptional circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic and a subsequent technical issue at the preliminary inquiry.

The remaining delay of 28.5 months fell below the presumptive ceiling, and the applicant failed to establish that it was a clear case of unreasonable delay.

The application was dismissed.

Jason Hadfield was found guilty of robbery and manslaughter.

The Crown applied to have him found not criminally responsible (NCR) due to mental disorder and designated as a high-risk accused (HRA).

Both parties agreed on the NCR finding due to schizophrenia.

The court then considered the HRA designation, which the defence resisted.

The court reviewed the nature of the offences, the accused's repetitive violent behaviour, current mental condition, past treatment, and expert opinions.

The court found a substantial likelihood that the accused, if unrestrained and untreated, would use violence endangering others.

Consequently, the accused was designated a high-risk accused, requiring detention in a hospital with strict conditions on absence.

The United States sought the extradition of the respondent for sex trafficking offences.

The Attorney General of Canada sought an order for committal under the Extradition Act, based on the corresponding Canadian offence of receiving a financial or other material benefit from human trafficking.

The respondent argued that the conduct amounted only to prostitution, which is legal in Canada, thus failing the double criminality requirement.

The court found that the essence of the offence was exploitation and human trafficking, not merely prostitution.

Finding sufficient evidence of the essential elements of the Canadian offence, the court ordered the respondent committed into custody to await extradition.

The applicant, charged with firearms and drug offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the date of the charges to the anticipated end of the trial was 39.25 months.

After deducting 4.5 months of defence delay, the net delay was 34.75 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling set in Jordan.

However, the court found that the COVID-19 pandemic constituted a discrete exceptional event.

The court deducted 14.25 months of delay caused by the pandemic, bringing the remaining delay to 20.5 months, well below the presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.