Gaetana Campisi

In a class action arising from a COVID-19 outbreak at a long-term care home, the appellants challenged certification of causation and punitive, exemplary or aggravated damages as common issues, and sought leave to appeal the certification costs award.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge properly found some basis in fact for a workable methodology for proving causation on a class-wide basis through a risk ratio approach supported by available data and expert evidence.

The court also upheld certification of punitive, exemplary or aggravated damages, rejecting the argument that such relief could not be certified absent common compensatory damages, noting that sequencing could address any quantification concerns.

Leave to appeal costs was denied because no strong grounds were shown for appellate intervention in the discretionary costs ruling.

The plaintiff sought certification of a class action under section 5(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, alleging the defendant was grossly negligent in its response to the COVID-19 pandemic at Oakwood Park, a long-term care home.

The classes comprised residents and visitors who contracted COVID-19 and their family members during the period January 25, 2020 to May 5, 2023.

The defendant consented to certification.

The court found all five certification requirements satisfied, including cause of action, identifiable class, common issues supported by expert methodology on causation and damages, preferability of a class proceeding, and adequate representative plaintiffs with a workable litigation plan.

The defendants brought motions to strike the self-represented plaintiff veterinarian's statement of claim arising from disciplinary proceedings by the College of Veterinarians of Ontario.

The plaintiff alleged abuse of process, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, Charter breaches, and defamation related to a nearly two-decade disciplinary history.

The court struck the claim without leave to amend, finding it was a collateral attack on prior proceedings, that the College enjoyed statutory immunity under s. 45(1) of the Veterinarians Act absent particularized bad faith, and that the claim against the Attorney General was a nullity for failure to provide 60 days' notice under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act.

The claims against the Minister of Agriculture disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiffs sought certification of a class action arising from a COVID-19 outbreak at Roberta Place Long Term Care Centre in Barrie, Ontario, from January 8 to February 18, 2021.

During the outbreak, 129 residents tested positive for COVID-19, resulting in 73 resident deaths (57% of the resident population).

The plaintiffs alleged systemic gross negligence by the defendants in failing to properly plan for and respond to the pandemic and implement adequate infection prevention and control (IPAC) measures.

The court certified the action as a class proceeding with three classes: residents who tested positive, estates of those who died from COVID-19, and eligible family members.

The court found that the plaintiffs met all five certification requirements under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, including establishing common issues regarding duty of care, standard of care, breach, causation, and punitive damages.

The court rejected certification of aggregate damages as a common issue due to lack of evidence of a workable methodology.

The defendants brought a motion to compel answers to questions refused on the examination for discovery of the plaintiff Gabriella Brockie.

The plaintiffs had refused to answer based on relevance and claims of solicitor-client, litigation, and common interest privilege.

The court found that solicitor-client privilege had been waived by implication due to fairness, as the plaintiffs were seeking reimbursement of legal costs under an insurance policy, thereby putting the nature of those costs directly in issue.

Litigation privilege was deemed inapplicable because the underlying Competition Bureau investigation had concluded, and the current action for indemnity did not share its essential purpose.

Common interest privilege was also rejected.

The motion to compel answers was granted, and a sealing order was issued for any answers required to be filed with the court.

The moving parties (Peel Housing Corporation and The Corporation of the Regional Municipality of Peel) sought summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's (Jacqueline Barrett) action for damages due to alleged arsenic fume exposure.

The plaintiff failed to provide admissible medical evidence to support her claim, specifically an affidavit from her family doctor despite court orders, leading to an adverse inference.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and granted summary judgment, dismissing the action.

The alternative motion for security for costs was not addressed.

The defendants brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiffs' 70-page Fresh As Amended Statement of Claim under Rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs' action alleged misfeasance in public office and Charter breaches arising from a withdrawn child protection proceeding.

The Master found she had jurisdiction to hear the motion and concluded that the pleading was overly prolix, contained evidence, argument, and immaterial facts, and violated the rules of pleading.

The motion was granted, striking numerous paragraphs with leave to amend, and costs were awarded to the defendants.

In a medical negligence action, the court addressed how the trial should proceed where liability was to be determined by a jury but a limitations defence invoking the doctrine of special circumstances was to be decided by the judge alone.

The defendants argued that the jury must hear all evidence or that the jury notice should be struck, asserting that the evidence relating to liability and the limitation issue was intertwined.

The plaintiffs proposed limiting the jury’s exposure to evidence related to liability and having the limitation issue addressed separately.

The court held that under s. 108(3) of the Courts of Justice Act it could direct that certain issues of fact be tried without a jury.

The trial was ordered to proceed in two phases: a jury phase determining liability followed by a judge-alone phase addressing the limitation issue and related evidence.

During the early stage of a medical negligence jury trial, the defendants brought an oral motion to strike the jury notice and discharge the jury.

The motion arose after the plaintiffs proposed that evidence relating to liability be heard by the jury, while evidence relating to a limitation defence and the doctrine of special circumstances be heard only by the judge.

The court considered whether such compartmentalization of evidence would make the trial unworkable or compromise fairness.

Emphasizing the importance of the substantive right to a jury trial and the substantial onus required to strike a jury notice, the court declined to discharge the jury at that stage.

The judge adopted a “wait and see” approach, permitting the jury to be excluded for witnesses whose evidence related solely to the limitations issue while reserving the decision regarding witnesses whose evidence might overlap both issues.

The defendants brought motions to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim for professional negligence.

The plaintiffs alleged negligence against a lawyer and a capacity assessor involved in a guardianship application for the plaintiff's mother.

The court struck the statement of claim in its entirety, finding it disclosed no reasonable cause of action against the capacity assessor or the lawyer for two of the plaintiffs.

The court also found the pleading was scandalous, frivolous, and vexatious.

The corporate plaintiff's claim was additionally struck for failing to be represented by counsel.

One plaintiff was granted leave to amend the claim against the lawyer defendants only.