Asher G. Honickman

The defendants brought motions to strike the self-represented plaintiff veterinarian's statement of claim arising from disciplinary proceedings by the College of Veterinarians of Ontario.

The plaintiff alleged abuse of process, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, Charter breaches, and defamation related to a nearly two-decade disciplinary history.

The court struck the claim without leave to amend, finding it was a collateral attack on prior proceedings, that the College enjoyed statutory immunity under s. 45(1) of the Veterinarians Act absent particularized bad faith, and that the claim against the Attorney General was a nullity for failure to provide 60 days' notice under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act.

The claims against the Minister of Agriculture disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

This costs decision addresses the allocation of costs for a distribution motion concerning competing claims over preserved funds in a complex fraud and investment scheme case.

The Trial Parties, who succeeded at trial on fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, and unjust enrichment claims, sought to recover their judgment from preserved funds.

The Settling Parties, who had reached settlement agreements with the defendants before trial, sought equitable liens and constructive trusts over the same preserved funds.

The court awarded costs to the Trial Parties against the Settling Parties, finding that the Settling Parties had deliberately delayed enforcement of their settlements and improperly sought to benefit from the Trial Parties' litigation efforts without bearing the associated costs and burdens.

On a post-trial distribution motion arising from a failed land development scheme, the court addressed competing claims between settling investors and investors who proceeded through trial and appeals.

The settling parties obtained judgment on their settlement agreements, but were denied equitable liens over preserved funds because their rights were contractual, the defendants were not shown to own the preserved funds, and equity favoured the trial parties who preserved assets and bore the burdens of the litigation.

The court also held that the trial parties lacked standing to raise limitation defences to enforcement of the settlements, and excluded a disputed email under settlement privilege.

The funds paid into court were ordered distributed pro rata among the trial parties, subject to specified limitations tied to claims against one defendant.

The appellant, a board member of a not-for-profit anti-hate organization, sued the respondents for defamation over two tweets that criticized the organization but did not name him.

The Small Claims Court dismissed the action, finding the appellant failed to prove the tweets would lead a reasonable person to believe they referred to him.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the decision, concluding the trial judge applied the correct legal test.

The court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, confirming that the impugned words were not reasonably understood to refer to the appellant.

The appellant, Emad Beshay, appealed an order dismissing his action for delay under Rule 48.14(7)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action, commenced in December 2016 for breach of contract and misrepresentation related to a business purchase, had seen no significant progress for over five years.

The motion judge rejected the appellant's explanations for delay, including family deaths, mental illness, and financial problems, finding them unsupported by cogent evidence and contradicted by his business activities.

The motion judge also found the respondents would suffer prejudice due to fading memories of witnesses and lost banking records.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's discretionary decision and finding no palpable and overriding errors in her assessment of the evidence or application of the two-part test for delay dismissal (acceptable explanation and no non-compensable prejudice).

The applicant, a taxpayer in Toronto, sought to quash a City of Toronto by-law that provided a one-time contribution of up to $100,000 to legal challenges against Quebec's Bill 21.

The applicant argued the by-law was ultra vires as it lacked a valid municipal purpose.

The court found that the by-law, which funded litigation against a Quebec law with no extra-territorial effect on Torontonians, did not serve a valid municipal purpose related to the social or economic well-being of the City.

Citing precedents like Shell Canada and Eng v. Toronto, the court concluded that giving 'voice to values' was not a valid exercise of municipal power when the issue did not directly affect the local community.

The court granted the order, quashing the funding portion of the by-law and awarding costs to the applicant.

The applicant sought reconsideration of a decision finding he made a material misrepresentation on his automobile insurance application, which excluded him from income replacement benefits and required him to repay $72,881.74 to the insurer.

The applicant argued the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction, violated procedural fairness, made factual errors, and that new evidence was available.

The adjudicator dismissed the request, finding no procedural unfairness, confirming the Tribunal's jurisdiction over the dispute, and concluding the applicant was improperly attempting to relitigate the initial findings.

The adjudicator also held that the alleged new evidence could have been obtained prior to the initial hearing with due diligence.

The plaintiff moved for an order to extend the time to set the matter down for trial, which the defendants opposed, seeking dismissal for delay.

The action, arising from a business purchase, had been dormant for over five years.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion and the action, finding the plaintiff's explanations for delay (family deaths, wife's mental health, own mental health, financial strain, COVID-19 impact) unacceptable due to lack of cogent evidence and the plaintiff's apparent financial capacity and other business activities.

The court also found actual prejudice to the defendants due to faded witness memories and unavailable banking records, emphasizing the importance of respecting procedural timelines for timely access to justice.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving parties (defendants) sought full indemnity costs totalling over $1.1 million.

The court awarded full indemnity costs as requested, subject to a reduction for the costs of non-active counsel, clerks, or students.

The court also apportioned liability, finding one plaintiff jointly and severally liable only for costs related to the OMA dispute, while the other plaintiff was solely liable for costs related to the COVID-19 dispute.

The plaintiffs brought an action for defamation and breach of a non-disclosure agreement regarding derogatory internet posts allegedly authored by the defendant under a pseudonym.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment.

The court dismissed the motion, finding multiple genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly concerning the identity of the author and the credibility of the parties.

The court declined to use enhanced fact-finding powers, holding that a trial was necessary to fully appreciate the voluminous and conflicting evidence.

Additionally, the court awarded $11,860 in costs to a former defendant against whom the action had been discontinued.

The applicant sought an urgent order to be certified as a candidate for the Conservative Party of Canada's National Council election after the returning officer refused her candidacy due to old social media posts.

The court found it had jurisdiction to intervene in the rules of an unincorporated political association where a significant contractual right was breached.

It held that the returning officer acted beyond his authority by imposing additional criteria not found in the party's rules, which explicitly stated that eligible candidates "shall be certified." The court granted the application, ordering the applicant's name to be added to the ballot.

The plaintiff, a unionized employee, brought a tort action against her employer (Toronto Parking Authority) and a co-worker (Vito Ditta) for damages arising from alleged workplace sexual assault and harassment.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action, arguing that the Superior Court of Justice lacked jurisdiction as the dispute fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator under section 48 of the Labour Relations Act.

The court found that the essential character of the dispute concerned workplace violence and harassment, which was covered by the collective agreement and the employer's workplace policies.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's arguments regarding a Charter section 15 violation and a remedial gap, concluding that the dispute was exclusively arbitrable.

The applicant, a designated manager of a pharmacy, sought judicial review of a decision by the Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) of the Ontario College of Pharmacists.

Following a dispensing error where a pediatric patient received the wrong medication, the ICRC ordered the applicant to receive an oral caution and complete a remedial course on root cause analysis.

The applicant argued he was denied procedural fairness and that the decision was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no breach of procedural fairness and concluding that the ICRC's decision was reasonable given the applicant's responsibility for pharmacy policies.

The plaintiff contractor sued the defendant homeowners for unpaid invoices related to a major home renovation.

The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff argued the limitation period was tolled due to mediation and the defendants' enrollment in the Tarion warranty process.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the complex factual matrix and the interplay between the Tarion process and the construction contract could not be fairly and justly adjudicated on a summary record without a full trial.

The plaintiff, a former radio host, brought a defamation action against the defendants over a magazine article detailing his criminal harassment of a former partner.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the action.

The court found that the article related to a matter of public interest (gender-based harassment).

While the plaintiff showed the action had substantial merit and the defence of justification might not succeed, he failed to prove that the harm he suffered from the article outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The court noted the plaintiff's career damage occurred prior to the article's publication due to the criminal charges themselves.

The motion was granted and the action dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's motor vehicle accident claim, arguing it was statute-barred as it was commenced more than five years after the accident.

The plaintiff argued the claim was not discoverable until she received a medical opinion indicating her injuries met the statutory threshold for permanent serious impairment.

The court found that the plaintiff did not have a sufficient body of evidence to know her claim had a substantial chance of succeeding until she was diagnosed with fibromyalgia years later.

The court dismissed the defendant's motion and granted partial summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff, dismissing the limitations defence.

The applicant, Ryan Alford, challenged the Law Society of Upper Canada's requirement for licensees to adopt a Statement of Principles promoting equality, diversity, and inclusion.

The Law Society brought a motion challenging the Superior Court's jurisdiction, arguing the matter should be heard as an application for judicial review in the Divisional Court.

The court found that the Law Society's decision was an exercise of statutory power, falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Divisional Court for judicial review.

The motion to transfer the application to the Divisional Court was granted.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision on a threshold motion in a motor vehicle accident case, which found her injuries did not meet the statutory threshold under the Insurance Act.

The respondent cross-appealed the trial judge's costs award, arguing the threshold decision should have been considered in the costs analysis.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appellant's appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the medical evidence.

The court granted the respondent's cross-appeal on costs, applying the recent decision in Saleh v. Nebel, and remitted the costs issue to the trial judge.

The appellant, a personal injury lawyer, appealed the dismissal of his Small Claims Court action against the respondent, another lawyer who took over his client's file.

The respondent had given a personal undertaking to protect the appellant's account but later revoked it on the client's instructions.

The Divisional Court found that while the trial judge erred in concluding the undertaking ended when the appellant's separate action against the client was dismissed, the trial judge correctly held that the claim against the respondent was barred by the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion for a mistrial during trial, alleging prejudice from a newspaper article and improper conduct by plaintiffs' counsel.

The court dismissed the mistrial motion, finding no real danger of prejudice as no jurors had read the article, and that appropriate judicial instructions could cure any potential harm.

The court also ruled on the admissibility of the plaintiffs' expert evidence regarding dependency loss, specifically allowing a scenario based on career advancement despite some foundational facts not being fully proven, emphasizing that the weight, not admissibility, of expert testimony is affected by unproven facts.