Mark Siboni

The City of Toronto sought the appointment of a receiver and manager over the property, assets, and undertaking of Harry Sherman Crowe Housing Co-operative Inc. due to operational, financial, and governance challenges.

The court addresses the Receiver’s motion for approval of its activities, fees, and a proposed process (RFEIQ) for identifying and qualifying future board members to transition the Co-op out of receivership.

The court approves the Receiver’s activities and fees, and partially approves the RFEIQ process, requiring further reporting and court oversight before any subjective vetting of board candidates.

The appellant, a former mayoral candidate, appealed the Superior Court's dismissal of his application challenging the validity of the Toronto mayoral election.

The original application, brought under the Municipal Elections Act, alleged issues with media coverage, polling, and exclusion from mayoral debates.

The motion judge had dismissed the application as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01(3) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, concluding that even if the complaints were valid, they could not lead to a finding that the election was invalid.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the motion judge's analysis and dismissed the appeal, with no order as to costs.

The applicant, an unsuccessful candidate for mayor of the City of Toronto, brought an application to invalidate the election results, alleging unfair media coverage and polling practices.

The respondent requested the application be dismissed as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01.

The court found that the Municipal Elections Act does not regulate media or pollsters, and the application lacked any legal basis.

The court dismissed the application as frivolous and vexatious.

The applicant, Luke Vitale, sought costs after successfully appealing a City of Toronto Order to Comply regarding his property's dwelling units.

Although Vitale's application was granted on terms, the court found a fatal flaw in the City's order.

Despite Vitale's technical victory, the court noted his unnecessary maligning of the City and mutual miscommunications.

The City sought no costs.

The court ultimately ordered no costs, deeming it a technical victory for Vitale but satisfying the City's concerns, concluding that no order as to costs was appropriate.

The applicant, a real estate developer, appealed a Building Code Act Order to Comply issued by the City of Toronto, which mandated reverting his five-unit residential multiplex to a three-unit dwelling.

The property, originally a single-family home, was converted to multiple units before the applicant's purchase in 2011, and was zoned for single-family use in 1963.

The City initiated prosecution for non-compliance.

The court found the City's Order, issued under s. 10(1) of the Building Code Act, was based on an error of law, as that section applies to a change in use by the current owner, not a pre-existing condition.

Despite the appeal being out of time, an extension was granted.

The appeal was allowed on terms that the property must be used for only three dwelling units, aligning with the Act's public welfare objectives.

The applicant, a taxpayer in Toronto, sought to quash a City of Toronto by-law that provided a one-time contribution of up to $100,000 to legal challenges against Quebec's Bill 21.

The applicant argued the by-law was ultra vires as it lacked a valid municipal purpose.

The court found that the by-law, which funded litigation against a Quebec law with no extra-territorial effect on Torontonians, did not serve a valid municipal purpose related to the social or economic well-being of the City.

Citing precedents like Shell Canada and Eng v. Toronto, the court concluded that giving 'voice to values' was not a valid exercise of municipal power when the issue did not directly affect the local community.

The court granted the order, quashing the funding portion of the by-law and awarding costs to the applicant.

This motion concerned an application by two members of a co-operative housing enterprise, Saffia Abdul-Haqq and Masbal Abokar, for an advance payment of $46,000 in legal fees from the co-op's funds.

The purpose of these funds was to oppose a pending motion by the City of Toronto to extend the appointment of an interim receiver over the co-op's business and affairs.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicants failed to satisfy the "highly exceptional" test for advance interim costs, specifically failing to establish a prima facie meritorious case or special circumstances, despite their impecuniosity.

The court found no conflict between the Housing Services Act and the Co-operative Corporations Act regarding receivership, nor any infringement of Charter rights.

The co-op's funds were deemed necessary for essential repairs and financial rehabilitation, not for funding the applicants' opposition.

The plaintiff, Joroga Real Estate Ltd., initiated an action against its insurer, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, and the City of Toronto for damages resulting from a water main rupture.

State Farm brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action against it or limit its coverage obligations.

The court dismissed State Farm's motion, finding that granting partial summary judgment would lead to duplicative proceedings, a risk of inconsistent factual findings with the ongoing negligence claim against the City, and would not advance the litigation as a whole in a timely, proportionate, and affordable manner.

The court emphasized that partial summary judgment should be reserved for discrete, standalone issues.

Following a successful application by the City of Toronto to inspect a residential property for Building Code compliance, the City sought costs.

The respondents argued the City was unsuccessful on most of its requested orders.

The court rejected this, finding the City obtained the necessary inspection orders and was the successful party.

The court awarded the City $20,000 in costs on a partial indemnity scale, noting the respondents' conduct unnecessarily lengthened the proceedings.

The municipality applied under s. 38 of the Building Code Act, 1992 for orders requiring property owners to permit inspection of a residential addition constructed without a building permit and to provide engineering reports verifying compliance with the Building Code.

The owners argued the City lacked authority to inspect without a warrant and that the requested relief violated their Charter rights.

The court held that s. 38 empowered the court to order compliance with the Act and that inspections were a necessary part of the statutory scheme governing building permits.

The owners could not rely on the dwelling status of the property to resist inspection where the construction had been carried out illegally.

The application was granted and the City was authorized to inspect the property and uncover portions of the construction if necessary.

The applicant sought to quash a warrant issued under s. 20 of the Fire Protection and Prevention Act, 1997 authorizing Toronto Fire Services to enter and inspect his residence for fire safety concerns after complaints that the home was occupied by a hoarder.

The court treated the proceeding as an application for judicial review under the Judicial Review Procedure Act because the applicant effectively sought certiorari to set aside a justice of the peace’s decision.

The court held that the justice of the peace had reasonable grounds to issue the warrant based on an affidavit describing complaints, repeated unsuccessful attempts to inspect, and concerns about combustible materials in a rowhouse dwelling.

The court further found no violation of s. 8 of the Charter because regulatory fire safety inspections involve a reduced expectation of privacy and serve an important public safety purpose.

The application was dismissed and the warrant’s expiry date was extended.

The applicants sought a declaration that provisions of a site‑specific zoning by‑law prohibiting “adult entertainment establishments as defined by the Municipal Act, 2001” were vague, void for uncertainty, and discriminatory.

The court considered whether the by‑law provided a sufficiently clear delineation of prohibited conduct and whether citizens could reasonably determine when they were in breach.

The court held that the by‑law failed to define key terms such as “goods” and “designed to appeal to erotic or sexual appetites or inclinations,” leaving merchants unable to determine compliance and granting excessive enforcement discretion.

The court further found that the by‑law could produce discriminatory outcomes by permitting identical goods in some retail settings but prohibiting them in others.

The impugned provisions were therefore declared void for uncertainty and the application for declaratory relief was granted.