Raymond Gary Colautti

The appellant, a former foster parent, appealed the striking of his claims against child welfare agencies for negligence, misfeasance in public office, and Charter breaches arising from an investigation into allegations of sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the negligence and Charter claims, confirming that child welfare agencies do not owe a duty of care to foster parents.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, restoring the misfeasance in public office claim against one agency, finding that the pleadings and particulars sufficiently alleged bad faith and collaboration with malicious adoptive parents.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment attacking a police towing procurement process, challenging municipal towing licensing requirements, and alleging unlawful interference with economic interests.

The court held that the applicable procurement thresholds under the municipal purchasing by-law turned on the municipality’s annual expenditure, not the supplier’s anticipated revenue, so no RFT or RFP was required and no procurement breach occurred.

The court further found no breach of procurement-related duties of fairness or good faith, no basis to invalidate the towing contract awarded to the successful bidder, and no merit to the claim that an out-of-municipality towing operator was exempt from Windsor’s licensing regime when towing within the city.

The tort claim also failed because the impugned police conduct did not constitute actionable unlawful means against third parties and there was no proof of intention or damages.

The plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion was dismissed, the defendants’ cross-motion was granted, and the action was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's motion for a stay and the granting of the respondents' motion to strike, the parties could not agree on costs.

The respondents sought partial indemnity costs.

The applicant argued that no costs should be awarded as this was public interest litigation.

The court held that the public interest nature of the case did not exempt the applicant from costs rules, especially given the voluminous record and the significant economic interests at stake.

The court fixed costs at $35,000 for the proponent and $12,500 for the City, payable by the applicant.

The applicant sought a stay of a zoning bylaw amendment that permitted a Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) in Ottawa, pending its application for judicial review.

The respondents opposed the stay and moved to strike portions of the application and the applicant's affidavit evidence.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm and the balance of convenience favoured the respondents.

The court granted the motion to strike in part, striking the challenge to the Municipal Support Resolution as statute-barred, striking portions of the application that impermissibly sought reasonableness review of the bylaw, and striking several affidavits and portions of affidavits that contained impermissible opinion evidence from unqualified laypersons.

The defendant J.T., who was 16 years old at the time, reported to police that the plaintiff had sexually assaulted them four years earlier.

The plaintiff was charged but acquitted after the trial judge found J.T.'s evidence to be fabricated.

The plaintiff subsequently sued J.T. for malicious prosecution.

J.T. brought a motion to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court granted the motion, finding that J.T.'s report to police was an expression on a matter of public interest, and that the malicious prosecution claim lacked substantial merit because J.T. did not initiate the prosecution.

The court also dismissed the police defendants' crossclaim against J.T. and their motion to amend pleadings.

The moving party brought a motion for directions concerning a February 21, 2025 order of Justice Rady, seeking clarification on whether the order was final or interlocutory and the proper route of appeal.

The moving party contended the order was final and that jurisdiction lay with the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The responding parties agreed with this position.

The Court dismissed the motion, holding that parties cannot confer jurisdiction by agreement, but that where jurisdiction is not contested, the appeal should proceed in the normal course without requiring an advance motion for a positive finding on jurisdiction.

The Court noted that jurisdiction is ultimately a matter for the panel hearing the appeal.

A dispute arose between a seller of an endodontics practice and the proposed purchaser regarding the sale of the practice.

The parties executed a Letter of Intent that contained conditions precedent to closing, including the negotiation of a new lease on terms satisfactory to the purchaser and the purchaser's satisfaction with due diligence investigations.

The purchaser terminated the Letter of Intent after learning of key employee departures and difficulties in finalizing the lease agreement.

The seller alleged breach of good faith and honest performance.

The court found no breach, holding that the purchaser exercised his contractual discretion reasonably and in good faith, and was entitled to terminate the transaction when conditions precedent were not met.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Perfetto J. dated March 24, 2025.

The Divisional Court reviewed the written materials submitted by the parties.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The moving parties were ordered to pay costs of $5,853.40 to the responding party within thirty days.

The appellants brought motions under Rule 59.06 to set aside a 2018 Divisional Court judgment that upheld securities fraud findings and sanctions against them.

In response, the Ontario Securities Commission moved for security for costs and to strike out seven expert reports filed by the appellants.

The Divisional Court granted the Commission's motions, ordering the appellants to post $100,000 in security for costs due to unpaid prior costs awards.

The court also struck out all seven expert reports, finding they improperly opined on matters of domestic law and factual findings that are the exclusive province of the court, failing the necessity criterion for expert evidence.

The appellant appealed a Notice of Proposal to refuse its registration as a motor vehicle dealer.

The Registrar argued that the sole director's past failure to pay a disciplinary fine, subsequent bankruptcy, and current financial position demonstrated financial irresponsibility.

The Tribunal found that while there were no reasonable grounds to believe the business would not be carried on with integrity and honesty, the director's financial history and lack of insight established that the appellant could not reasonably be expected to be financially responsible.

The Tribunal directed the Registrar to carry out the proposal to refuse registration.

The Estate of John McKinlay sought summary judgment against the Municipality of Chatham-Kent for a declaration that the Municipality was responsible for maintaining a drainage tile (Drain) on the Estate's property and for reimbursement of repair costs and crop losses.

The Drain was installed under an easement granted by the Estate's predecessor to the Province, which was later transferred to the Municipality's predecessor.

The court found that the easement granted the Municipality the right to maintain the Drain but did not impose a positive obligation to do so.

Therefore, the claim for declaratory relief was dismissed.

However, the court declined to grant summary judgment dismissing the entire action, noting that the Estate's amended statement of claim pleaded facts capable of supporting a claim for damages in nuisance, which was not fully canvassed during the motion.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, allowing the nuisance claim to proceed to trial.

The appellants, a foster parent and his daughters, appealed a motion judge's decision to strike their claims against Family and Children’s Services of the Waterloo Region (FCS) and two of its employees.

The claims included breach of statutory duty, breach of duty of care, breach of fiduciary duty, and defamation, stemming from an FCS investigation into sexual abuse allegations.

The motion judge struck the claims, granting leave only for misfeasance in public office.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, holding that child welfare agencies do not owe a duty of care or fiduciary duty to foster parents, as their paramount duty is to the child, which would create an irreconcilable conflict of interest.

The Court also upheld the striking of claims against individual employees, finding the allegations of bad faith insufficiently particularized to overcome statutory immunity under s. 15(6) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Third Party, GPN, brought a motion to dismiss or stay a Third Party Claim by the Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton (CCAS) or, alternatively, to permit her to continue as litigation guardian for the minor Plaintiff, JTB.

The CCAS brought a cross-motion to dismiss GPN's motion and remove her as litigation guardian, appointing the Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL).

The court dismissed GPN's motion, finding the Third Party Claim was not frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process, and that it pleaded a reasonable cause of action for contribution and indemnity.

The court granted the CCAS's motion to remove GPN as litigation guardian due to a conflict of interest, but adjourned the decision on appointing the OCL.

The appellants appealed the City of Windsor's approval of a Zoning By-law Amendment that permitted a four-storey, 23-unit multiple dwelling on a vacant lot in the Walkerville Heritage Area.

The appellants argued the development was incompatible with the neighbourhood's character, citing concerns over massing, setbacks, shadowing, and parking, and argued the City ignored a previous zoning decision for single-family homes on the site.

The Tribunal dismissed the appeal, finding the proposal was compatible with the surrounding area, provided an appropriate transition from a commercial arterial road, and met all provincial and municipal planning requirements, including heritage conservation policies.

The defendants, Chatham-Kent Children’s Services (CKCS), moved to compel the plaintiffs, Brian and Betty-Jo Kivell, to produce unredacted medical and counselling records and a further affidavit of documents.

The plaintiffs claimed the redacted portions were irrelevant, embarrassing, and subject to Wigmore privilege, relating to a private marital matter.

The court found the redacted information relevant to the plaintiffs' claimed psychological injuries and the defendants' causation defence.

The court rejected the privilege claim, finding insufficient evidence to satisfy the fourth Wigmore criterion (injury from disclosure outweighing benefit to litigation).

The motion was granted, ordering Mr. Kivell to produce the unredacted documents and a further affidavit of documents within 45 days, with a warning that failure to comply would result in dismissal of his claim.

The Ontario Land Tribunal held a Case Management Conference regarding an appeal against the City of Windsor's approval of a Zoning By-law Amendment to permit a four-storey multiple dwelling on the site of a former heritage church.

The Tribunal finalized the Issues List, approved the Procedural Order, and scheduled a four-day hearing on the merits for October 2023.

The applicant brought a motion to dismiss the appellants' appeal of a zoning by-law amendment without a hearing, arguing the appeal lacked apparent land use planning grounds.

The appellants opposed the motion, intending to present evidence on heritage planning and infill studies, and to cross-examine the applicant's witnesses.

The Tribunal denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the appellants had demonstrated an intention to bring legitimate land planning issues to a merits hearing and had not met the criteria for dismissal under the Planning Act or the Ontario Land Tribunal Act.

The appellant appealed a permanent injunction that prevented the operation of his tavern, Paradise Night Club, without a municipal business license.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's decision.

The court found that the municipal Business Licensing By-law applied to the appellant's business and did not conflict with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario under the Liquor Licence and Control Act, 2019.

The court reiterated that a business can be required to hold multiple licenses and that an injunction to enforce a bylaw should only be refused in exceptional circumstances, which were not present in this case.

During an appeal of a zoning by-law amendment, the appellants brought a motion for discovery seeking extensive internal correspondence from the City, audio-visual recordings of public meetings, and raw data from a shadow study.

The Tribunal partially granted the motion, ordering the production of the public meeting recordings and the shadow study data, as these were relevant to the planning evidence.

However, the Tribunal dismissed the requests for internal emails and memoranda, finding them irrelevant to the planning merits and excessive under the principle of proportionality in discovery.

The applicant sought judicial review of a municipal Appeal Committee decision upholding the refusal of a business licence for his night club.

The Divisional Court found that the hearing was procedurally unfair because the municipality's lawyer acted as both counsel and witness, and the applicant was effectively denied the right to present his case.

The court also held the decision was unreasonable as it lacked intelligible reasons explaining why the appeal was denied.

The decision was quashed and remitted to a different appeal committee for reconsideration.