Stuart Jude Huxley

Following the dismissal of the applicant's motion for a stay and the granting of the respondents' motion to strike, the parties could not agree on costs.

The respondents sought partial indemnity costs.

The applicant argued that no costs should be awarded as this was public interest litigation.

The court held that the public interest nature of the case did not exempt the applicant from costs rules, especially given the voluminous record and the significant economic interests at stake.

The court fixed costs at $35,000 for the proponent and $12,500 for the City, payable by the applicant.

The applicant sought a stay of a zoning bylaw amendment that permitted a Battery Energy Storage System (BESS) in Ottawa, pending its application for judicial review.

The respondents opposed the stay and moved to strike portions of the application and the applicant's affidavit evidence.

The court dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm and the balance of convenience favoured the respondents.

The court granted the motion to strike in part, striking the challenge to the Municipal Support Resolution as statute-barred, striking portions of the application that impermissibly sought reasonableness review of the bylaw, and striking several affidavits and portions of affidavits that contained impermissible opinion evidence from unqualified laypersons.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a status hearing and a timetable order to set the action down for trial.

The defendants opposed, seeking dismissal for delay.

The underlying action was a subrogated claim by TD Insurance for foundation damage to the plaintiff's home, allegedly caused by construction at the Chinese embassy.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion and the action for delay, finding that the plaintiff failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay and that the defendants would suffer non-compensable prejudice due to lack of transparency, failure to obtain a confidentiality order, inappropriate venue, and remediation work done without notice to the defendants.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a substantial indemnity basis for PCL and fixed amounts for the other parties.

The plaintiffs initiated a class action against numerous governmental and international entities, including Pope Francis and Queen Elizabeth II, alleging harms from COVID-19 protocols and constitutional infringements.

Several defendants moved to dismiss the action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the statement of claim to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process due to its rambling nature, irrelevant historical allegations, and lack of specific legal basis for claims.

The action was dismissed in its entirety against all defendants, with no costs awarded.

This is an appeal from the dismissal of a proposed class action and constitutional challenge as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The underlying action asserted a global conspiracy related to COVID-19, seeking billions in damages from various domestic and foreign entities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion, legal analysis, or factual findings, and affirmed that the case was a clear instance for applying Rule 2.1.01.

The defendant municipality requested the dismissal of two actions brought by the self-represented plaintiff challenging a mandatory mask by-law enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found that the plaintiff's pleadings, which alleged Charter violations based on the right to choose what to wear, were repetitive, rambling, and lacked a viable cause of action.

Applying Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court dismissed both actions as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The appellant appealed an order from the Superior Court of Justice that dismissed her application for directions and other interlocutory and injunctive relief related to a proposed class action that had not yet been commenced.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the lower court's order was not a final order as required by s. 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The order merely dismissed a request for directions under r. 37.17 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and did not dispose of a proceeding or finally determine an issue.

The moving party sought an extension of time to perfect her appeal from a decision dismissing her application against the City of Ottawa (Ottawa Public Library), as well as relief from various procedural requirements including electronic service, dispensation from filing hard copies of appeal materials, and dispensation from filing a transcript of evidence.

The application judge had dismissed the underlying application on the basis that it did not disclose a cause of action and that the relief sought was moot.

The motion judge granted the extension of time, permitted electronic service, accepted an agreed-upon transcription of the oral reasons, and granted relief from filing hard copies based on the moving party's financial hardship and the court's lack of proper technological infrastructure.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Ottawa Community Housing Corporation and the City of Ottawa that required him to pay parking charges in addition to his rent-geared-to-income.

The applicant argued that parking charges must be included in the geared-to-income rent calculation under the Housing Services Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that while the Housing Services Act does not authorize adding parking charges to geared-to-income rent, it does not preclude a separate contractual agreement for parking under the Residential Tenancies Act.

The court held that any dispute regarding the validity of the parking charges or the tenancy agreement must be determined by the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The applicant sought relief from the statutory penalty imposed for failing to file an audited municipal campaign financial statement by the deadline under the Municipal Elections Act.

The financial statement had been filed three minutes late and without the required audit due to financial hardship, though the audited version was later filed and materially identical.

The municipality argued that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to waive the statutory penalty barring the applicant from running in the next municipal election.

The court held that relief could be granted by applying the good‑faith and inadvertence criteria in s. 92(6) of the Act, even where no prosecution had been initiated.

Finding the applicant acted in good faith, committed an error in judgment, and caused no prejudice, the court waived the penalty.

The respondent property owner applied to the City of Ottawa for a reduction in property taxes, alleging a gross or manifest error in the assessment roll.

The City declined to hold a meeting or make a decision on the application.

The respondent successfully applied to the Divisional Court for an order of mandamus compelling the City Council to hold a meeting.

The City appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Municipal Act, 2001 provides a statutory right of appeal to the Assessment Review Board when a municipal council fails to make a decision.

The court held that the respondent was required to exhaust this adequate alternative remedy before seeking judicial review.

The appellant's land was unlawfully taken by the respondent's predecessor in 1989.

The parties settled the ensuing litigation in 1991, agreeing to proceed under the Expropriations Act, but the respondent failed to implement the settlement for 13 years.

The appellant commenced a new action in the Superior Court for compensation and damages.

The motion judge dismissed the action, finding the Ontario Municipal Board had exclusive jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Superior Court has jurisdiction because the action arises from the respondent's failure to implement a settlement of a Superior Court proceeding.

The appellants, previously found to be vexatious litigants, sought leave to bring an application under s. 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge dismissed their requests.

The appellants attempted to appeal these dismissals.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeals, holding that s. 140(4)(e) of the Courts of Justice Act clearly and unambiguously precludes any appeal from a refusal to grant leave under s. 140(3).

The City of Ottawa appealed a decision of the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal that found it to be a 'landlord' under the Tenant Protection Act after it reinstated a rent supplement for a tenant facing eviction.

The Divisional Court found that the underlying dispute between the tenant and the property owner had been resolved, as the tenant had vacated the premises and no arrears were owed.

Applying the Borowski test, the court concluded the appeal was moot and declined to exercise its discretion to hear it, noting that the issue of whether the City is a landlord is best left to the legislature.

The respondent employees were transferred from the Ottawa Police Force to the City of Ottawa.

They alleged that prior to the transfer, the City entered into a pre-employment agreement guaranteeing they would retain their previous terms and conditions of employment.

After the transfer, they were placed under a collective agreement with reduced benefits and brought an action for damages.

The City moved to strike the claim, arguing the dispute fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of a labour arbitrator.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the essential character of the dispute concerned a pre-employment contract, not the collective agreement, meaning the courts had jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the factual dispute regarding the existence of the contract could not be resolved on a preliminary motion to strike.

The appellants, former civilian employees of the police force, alleged they agreed to transfer to the respondent's employment based on a pre-employment representation that their terms and conditions would remain the same.

The motions judge dismissed their action, holding under the Weber doctrine that the dispute arose out of a collective agreement and was subject to exclusive arbitral jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that a pre-employment agreement does not necessarily arise out of the collective agreement, and therefore the court may have jurisdiction.

This appeal concerned a construction tender in which the tender document and bid bond, read together, disclosed an obvious discrepancy between the stated tender price and the amount said to represent five percent bid security.

The court held that the mistake was apparent on the face of the tender, distinguishing the situation from the governing principle in Ron Engineering, which did not address facially apparent tender errors.

Because the error was evident from the tender package itself, the appellants were legally entitled to refuse to execute the construction contract after promptly notifying the respondent and seeking correction or withdrawal.

The appeal was allowed, the trial judgment was set aside, and the action was dismissed with costs.