Daniel Steven Ableser

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision granting a Writ of Possession and a stay of the Writ pending appeal.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal on the issue of whether the Superior Court had jurisdiction to grant the Writ rather than deferring to the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The court also granted a stay of the Writ pending appeal, on the condition that the moving party pay $2,000 per month as an occupancy payment and permit access to prospective purchasers.

The respondent brought a motion for a determination of the appropriate quantum of temporary spousal support.

The court was tasked with determining the applicant's income for support purposes, considering personal expenses paid by the business and non-arm's length wages.

The court averaged expert calculations to arrive at an income of $634,733 for the applicant and ordered temporary spousal support of $20,000 per month, retroactive to December 1, 2017.

The decision emphasized "rough justice" for interim orders and the application of Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines despite the payor's income exceeding the ceiling.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment granted by the motion judge in favour of the respondent.

The motion judge determined that the appellants' shareholder loan outstanding as of February 6, 2014 was $219,315 and that the outstanding balance at the time of the company's bankruptcy was at least $161,724.75.

The appellants argued that partial summary judgment was inappropriate and that the motion judge erred in making factual determinations without evidence rebutting their assertions regarding payments made on behalf of the bankrupt company.

The Court of Appeal upheld the partial summary judgment, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the matter was essentially an accounting exercise determinable on documentary evidence and that the appellants' evidence did not support their claims.

The appellant, the common-law spouse of the deceased, appealed a trial decision awarding her $350,000 in dependant's relief from the deceased's estate.

The Divisional Court found that the trial judge made several errors in principle, including misapplying the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, improperly relying on the deceased's unimplemented intentions, and incorrectly calculating the net estate assets.

The Court set aside the trial judgment, conducted its own analysis of the legal and moral claims of the dependants, and increased the appellant's award to $750,000, plus costs, to adequately provide for her proper support while balancing the competing claims of the deceased's separated wife and adult daughters.

A motion was brought by C. M. to be added as a respondent to a custody application brought by the paternal grandmother against the child's parents.

The moving party sought party status following the release of a child psychiatrist's report containing allegations of sexual abuse by the moving party.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party was not a necessary party to the proceeding.

The court held that the dispute between the applicant and respondents could be adjudicated without the moving party as a party, and that any relevant evidence could be presented through witness testimony.

The court emphasized that adding a party solely to protect reputation and not to claim substantive relief would divert focus from the paramount consideration of the best interests of the child.

Following the release of the Court of Appeal's decision allowing the appeal and awarding the statutory pre-retirement death benefit to the appellant, the respondent requested that the court address her entitlement to support under the Succession Law Reform Act (SLRA).

The trial judge had previously dismissed the respondent's SLRA application because she had awarded the death benefit to the respondent, finding no further need for support.

Because the Court of Appeal's decision removed the basis for that dismissal, the court set aside the trial judge's order dismissing the SLRA application and remitted the matter to the Superior Court of Justice for determination.

The deceased was a member of a pension plan who died before the commencement of his deferred pension.

At the time of his death, he was living with a common law spouse but remained legally married to his separated spouse, whom he had designated as a beneficiary along with their daughters.

The Court of Appeal held that because the deceased and his legally married spouse were living separate and apart, the spousal priority under s. 48(1) of the Pension Benefits Act did not apply.

Consequently, the designated beneficiaries were entitled to the death benefit under s. 48(6).

The applicant brought a motion under Rule 4(1)(c) of the Family Law Rules seeking permission to be represented by a non-lawyer companion in ongoing family litigation relating to a prior divorce order addressing custody, access, support, and property issues.

The applicant argued special circumstances existed due to alleged intimidation by the respondent and difficulty retaining counsel because the respondent was a local lawyer.

The court held that non-lawyer representation under Rule 4(1)(c) is a narrow discretionary exception requiring proof of both special circumstances and special expertise.

The court found neither requirement met and further held the proposed representative’s personal relationship with the applicant, potential role as a witness, and animosity toward the respondent made the appointment inappropriate.

The motion for non-lawyer representation was therefore denied and related production motions were adjourned.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for breaching a non-competition clause in his employment contract and ordering him to repay a $20,000 non-compete payment.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in interpreting the contract.

The appellant had met the conditions for the payment by remaining employed for one year and not competing during that time.

Although the non-competition clause was enforceable and breached later, the respondent proved no damages, so the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff employer sued its former president for breach of a non-competition covenant and breach of fiduciary duty after he successfully bid against the employer on a public municipal tender.

The trial judge used blue-pencil severance to cure an ambiguous and unreasonable temporal restriction in the non-competition covenant and found the employee liable.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that blue-pencil severance was unavailable because the severed words were not trivial and there was no evidence the parties would have unquestionably agreed to the contract without them.

The Court also found no breach of fiduciary duty, as the employee did not use confidential information or compete unfairly.

The employee's cross-appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The applicant step-father sought to adopt his wife's 12-year-old child and brought a motion to dispense with the consent of both the birth father and the child.

The applicant argued that the child believed the applicant was his biological father and that learning the truth would cause emotional harm.

The court dismissed the motion to dispense with the birth father's consent because no genuine efforts were made to serve him.

The court also dismissed the motion to dispense with the child's consent, finding insufficient expert evidence of emotional harm and emphasizing the child's statutory right to participate in the adoption process.