9 total
The court ordered disclosure of a father's hospital records but protected his psychologist's notes.
The case involved competing parenting motions, initiated by the respondent mother's motion to change a final order, following the applicant father's brief psychotic episode and hospitalization.
The primary issue was the disclosure of the father's medical records.
The court ordered the disclosure of hospital records from his recent hospitalization, subject to strict confidentiality restrictions, but dismissed the request for his treating psychologist's clinical notes and records, deeming them overly intrusive and not proportional given the availability of primary hospital records.
Interim supervised parenting time arrangements were also ordered.
Administrative dismissal of a spousal support application was set aside due to lawyer inadvertence.
The appellant sought to set aside an administrative dismissal of her spousal support application, which was initially refused by the motion judge.
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in principle by treating the factors for setting aside a dismissal as rigid hurdles, misanalyzing prejudice, and failing to properly consider the policy favoring determination on merits.
The Court emphasized that lawyer inadvertence and the ability to restart the claim without limitation period expiry weighed against upholding the dismissal.
The dissenting opinion argued for deference to the motion judge's discretion and emphasized the importance of enforcing Family Law Rules timelines to combat delay.
The court deferred ruling on the urgency of a child access motion, ordering a case conference instead.
The applicant father sought an urgent motion for access to his daughter, Sophie, alleging the respondent mother was not adhering to a prior consent order for shared parenting.
The motion was brought under the COVID-19 emergency protocol, requiring a determination of urgency.
The court declined to rule on urgency immediately, instead directing a case conference to be scheduled to discuss the access issues, with a ruling on urgency to follow if the motion remained necessary after the conference.
The court imputed income to a business owner by averaging expert calculations of personal expenses paid by the corporation to award $20,000 per month in temporary spousal support.
The respondent brought a motion for a determination of the appropriate quantum of temporary spousal support.
The court was tasked with determining the applicant's income for support purposes, considering personal expenses paid by the business and non-arm's length wages.
The court averaged expert calculations to arrive at an income of $634,733 for the applicant and ordered temporary spousal support of $20,000 per month, retroactive to December 1, 2017.
The decision emphasized "rough justice" for interim orders and the application of Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines despite the payor's income exceeding the ceiling.
Court declines to compel mortgage guarantee; compensates applicant through increased spousal support.
The applicant brought a motion seeking an order compelling the respondent spouse to cooperate as guarantor in the renewal of a mortgage on the matrimonial home at a lower interest rate.
The applicant argued the order was authorized under provisions of the Family Law Act relating to preservation and encumbrance of the matrimonial home.
The court declined to determine whether it had jurisdiction to compel a non‑titled spouse to guarantee the mortgage and, in any event, declined to exercise such jurisdiction given that the mortgage could be renewed without the guarantee and the home would likely be sold.
Instead, the court addressed the financial impact by ordering an increase in spousal support equivalent to the difference between the mortgage payments with and without the guarantee, grossed up for tax.
No order was made as to costs due to mixed success.
Appeal dismissed; constructive dismissal and damages upheld where employer unilaterally changed employment terms.
The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding it had constructively dismissed the respondent employee.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the employer unilaterally and fundamentally changed the terms of employment.
The Court also agreed it was objectively unreasonable to expect the employee to return to work for the same small employer after losing faith in them.
The damages awarded were upheld based on the Bardal factors, considering the employee's age, length of service, position, and difficulty finding other work.
Appeal from order denying motion to amend pleadings dismissed as motion judge's finding of prejudice was reasonable.
The appellant appealed an order denying a motion to amend a statement of claim to add a new cause of action.
The motion judge had found non-compensable prejudice and denied the motion.
The Court of Appeal held that there was an evidentiary basis for the motion judge's finding and that the decision was not unreasonable.
The appeal was dismissed without costs.
Appeal from refusal to dismiss for delay dismissed as defendants failed to deliver affidavit of documents.
The defendants appealed an order refusing their motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that the defendants had failed to deliver their affidavit of documents for seven years, which under Rule 24 was a condition precedent to bringing the motion to dismiss.
The motion judge did not err in exercising his discretion to refuse the motion.
Wrongful dismissal and slander judgment upheld on appeal.
The appellant employer appealed a judgment awarding the respondent employee damages for wrongful dismissal and slander.
The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's factual findings, including that the dismissal allegations were not sincere and were motivated by a desire to remove long-serving employees, were open on the evidence and answered the employer's arguments.
The court also upheld the defamation finding, concluding that any qualified privilege was defeated by the equivalent of a finding of malice.
The respondent's cross-appeal for increased slander damages, punitive and aggravated damages, and damages for intentional infliction of mental distress was dismissed.