John Spencer

The defendants moved to dismiss the proposed class proceeding for delay under s. 29.1 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The plaintiffs did not oppose the dismissal but requested a 60-90 day delay of the effective date to locate new representative plaintiffs for a fresh action.

The court held that s. 29.1 is a mandatory provision and the court lacks discretion to delay the effective date of the dismissal.

The motion to dismiss was granted.

This is a joint decision from the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, Ontario Superior Court of Justice, and Superior Court of Québec concerning the administration and termination of the national Hepatitis C class action settlement.

Class Counsel sought orders approving a third pro rata payment from the PELD Fund, payment of class counsel disbursements, approval of administrative expenses, waiving a future audit, and a declaration terminating the Settlement Agreement.

The courts approved all requests, with a minor variation regarding the termination process, and also granted relief from forfeiture to a class member for a missed payment.

The plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of Canadian cattle farmers against the Government of Canada, alleging negligence in its response to the threat of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as 'mad cow disease'.

The plaintiff claimed that Canada failed to implement a ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban in a timely manner and failed to prevent cattle imported from the United Kingdom from entering the animal feed chain, which led to the discovery of a BSE-infected Canadian cow in May 2003 and the subsequent closure of international borders to Canadian cattle and beef.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the claim was barred by section 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act because the class members had received compensation through various government financial assistance programs.

Furthermore, the court held that Canada did not owe a private law duty of care to the cattle farmers and that its policy decisions regarding the monitoring of imported cattle and the timing of the feed ban were reasonable and did not breach the standard of care.

Class counsel brought an application to assess the financial sufficiency of the Compensation Fund established under the Hepatitis C class action settlement and sought a declaration prioritizing the transfer of surplus funds to the insolvent Past Economic Loss and Dependents Fund (PELD Fund).

The court found that the Compensation Fund was solvent with a small projected surplus, while the PELD Fund remained insolvent.

To prevent inequity for eligible class members who had received nothing from the depleted PELD Fund, the court authorized the transfer of the remaining Compensation Fund surplus to the PELD Fund, with the specific allocation to be determined at a future hearing.

The Attorney General of Canada and the Joint Committee representing Class Members brought competing applications regarding the allocation of approximately $236 million in excess capital held in the trust fund established by the 1986-1990 Hepatitis C Settlement Agreement.

Canada argued the excess capital should be returned to it, while the Joint Committee sought to allocate the funds to increase benefits for Class Members.

The court dismissed Canada's application, finding that the excess capital allocation provision was intended to provide an opportunity to bridge compensatory gaps for Class Members.

The court approved seven of the Joint Committee's nine recommendations for allocating the funds, including increases to fixed payments and loss of services compensation, to be implemented by way of special distribution.

The Steering Committee, an unincorporated group of physicians and scientists, sought to intervene in a joint hearing of motions concerning the allocation of actuarially unallocated funds from the 1986-1990 Hepatitis C Settlement Agreement.

The Committee proposed allocating funds to its "National HCV Initiative" which aimed to benefit all Canadians with HCV, not just class members.

The court dismissed the intervention request, finding that the Steering Committee was a stranger to both the Settlement Agreement and the underlying litigation, lacking privity of contract or any substantive right to participate in the administration of the settlement.

Following the allowance of the Crown's appeal, the Crown sought costs of the action against the Litigation Administrator and Litigation Guardian, solely to support a Rule 57.07 award of costs against Class Counsel personally.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the request, finding that while Class Counsel's conduct in pursuing the matter following the Supreme Court's decision was questionable, it did not constitute bad faith or the type of conduct required to found an order for costs against a solicitor personally under the test in Young v. Young.

The cost orders of the trial judge were set aside as a result of the original order allowing the appeal.

The Crown appealed a motion judge's decision awarding $4.6 billion in damages to a class of disabled veterans for the Crown's failure to invest or pay interest on administered pension funds prior to 1990.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that a previous Supreme Court of Canada decision upholding the validity of s. 5.1(4) of the Department of Veterans Affairs Act finally ended the litigation.

The Court held that s. 5.1(4) constituted a complete bar to the class's claims for damages, and that the motion judge erred in interpreting it as only a partial bar.

Furthermore, the Court found that the claims were time-barred and that the doctrine of equitable fraud did not apply to toll the limitation period.

The representative plaintiff, a disabled veteran, sued the federal Crown for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to pay interest on pension funds administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs.

Parliament enacted legislation barring claims for interest prior to 1990.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the expropriative legislation was valid and not inconsistent with the due process or fair hearing protections of the Canadian Bill of Rights, as Parliament has the power to expropriate property without compensation using clear and unambiguous language.

The successful respondent in an appeal regarding the Crown's breach of fiduciary duty to disabled veterans sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The Crown argued for partial indemnity costs and requested that the quantum be referred to an assessment officer.

The dissenting judge would have awarded substantial indemnity costs due to the Crown's historical conduct.

However, the majority of the Court of Appeal held that because the Crown raised serious and important issues of law on appeal, the appropriate scale was partial indemnity.

The court unanimously agreed that the case was exceptional and referred the quantum of costs to an assessment officer.

The representative plaintiff, a disabled war veteran, brought a class action against the federal Crown for failing to invest or pay interest on pension funds administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs.

The Crown appealed a summary judgment decision that found it had breached its fiduciary duty and declared a statutory bar on interest claims inoperative under the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Crown owed and breached a fiduciary duty to the veterans, the Superior Court had jurisdiction, and the statutory bar was inoperative for depriving the veterans of property without due process and denying a fair hearing.

The National Council of Veteran Associations in Canada brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an appeal concerning whether the Crown owed a fiduciary duty to pay interest on surplus statutory benefits to disabled veterans.

The court applied the Peel test for intervention and found that the proposed intervenor did not have a special contribution to make regarding the interpretation of the legislation or the scope of the fiduciary duty.

The court concluded that the public interest would be adequately represented by the Attorney General of Canada and dismissed the motion.