William Knights

The plaintiff brought a class action on behalf of Canadian cattle farmers against the Government of Canada, alleging negligence in its response to the threat of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), commonly known as 'mad cow disease'.

The plaintiff claimed that Canada failed to implement a ruminant-to-ruminant feed ban in a timely manner and failed to prevent cattle imported from the United Kingdom from entering the animal feed chain, which led to the discovery of a BSE-infected Canadian cow in May 2003 and the subsequent closure of international borders to Canadian cattle and beef.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the claim was barred by section 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act because the class members had received compensation through various government financial assistance programs.

Furthermore, the court held that Canada did not owe a private law duty of care to the cattle farmers and that its policy decisions regarding the monitoring of imported cattle and the timing of the feed ban were reasonable and did not breach the standard of care.

During a class action trial regarding the federal government's alleged negligence in preventing mad cow disease, the defendant sought to read into evidence discovery transcripts from the current representative plaintiff, the deceased former representative plaintiff, and other class members.

The court denied the request to read in the current representative plaintiff's evidence, applying the rule in Browne v. Dunn, as the plaintiff had already testified and the evidence did not merely fill a gap.

The court also denied leave to read in the deceased former plaintiff's evidence under Rule 31.11(6) and (7), finding the excerpts to be of limited importance and lacking cross-examination.

However, the court permitted the defendant to read in discovery evidence from other class members, as it provided helpful real-world insight into the financial impact on different cattle producers.

During a common issues trial regarding the federal government's alleged negligence in preventing the spread of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (mad cow disease), the plaintiff sought to admit eight foreign public records for the truth of their contents.

The defendant argued the documents should only be admitted to show the government's knowledge of them.

The court held that the documents, which included reports from the World Health Organization and the European Commission, met the criteria for the public documents exception under s. 25 of the Ontario Evidence Act and were admissible for the truth of their contents, though the court reserved judgment on the weight to be given to them.

During a common issues trial concerning the impact of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) on Canadian farmers, the plaintiff sought to admit the affidavit and cross-examination transcript of a deceased witness, Mr. Mel McCrea.

The defendant, the Attorney General of Canada, objected on the basis of necessity, arguing that other witnesses could provide similar information.

The court applied the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding that Mr. McCrea's evidence met both the necessity and reliability thresholds.

The court emphasized the unique nature of Mr. McCrea's first-hand account regarding the first Canadian-born BSE-diagnosed cow and the prior cross-examination, ruling the evidence admissible.

This ruling addresses a hearsay objection raised by the defendant during a common issues trial concerning the 2003 Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak.

The defendant sought to strike out several paragraphs from the affidavit of Lawrence Sears, the plaintiff's principal, arguing they contained inadmissible hearsay.

The court dismissed the objection, finding that the statements in the affidavit were based on Mr. Sears' personal knowledge, experience, and observations, and thus were not hearsay.

The judge emphasized that the evidence could be tested through cross-examination.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of the plaintiff's expert reports as evidence-in-chief in a complex common issues trial concerning the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak.

The defendant objected to the hybrid trial process, arguing that expert evidence should be presented viva voce rather than through reports.

The court dismissed the defendant's objection, affirming the trial judge's discretion to admit expert reports as direct evidence in non-jury hybrid trials, consistent with prior case management orders.

The decision emphasized that this approach enhances trial efficiency and does not prejudice the opposing party's right to cross-examination.

The parties in a class action jointly sought an adjournment of the trial commencement to allow time to finalize settlement discussions.

The court granted the adjournment, moving the trial start date from February 1, 2021, to February 16, 2021, noting that no further adjournments would be granted.

The defendants in a 15-year-old class action regarding the federal government's response to the mad cow disease crisis brought a motion to adjourn the peremptory trial date of January 18, 2021, to September 2021.

They cited difficulties preparing due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the late delivery of supplementary expert reports by the plaintiff.

The court dismissed the motion for a lengthy adjournment, finding that the parties were well-resourced to conduct a virtual trial and that the late expert reports were responsive to the defendants' own late productions.

The trial commencement was postponed by two weeks to February 1, 2021, to allow for the completion of remaining pre-trial steps.

The representative plaintiff in a certified class action regarding the introduction of Mad Cow Disease into Canada brought a motion for approval of a third-party litigation funding agreement.

The court applied the four-factor test for approving such agreements and found that the funding was necessary for access to justice, made a meaningful contribution, protected the defendant's interests, and did not overcompensate the funder.

The court approved the agreement and pre-approved the funder's return of up to 10 percent of any recovery.

Class counsel brought an application to assess the financial sufficiency of the Compensation Fund established under the Hepatitis C class action settlement and sought a declaration prioritizing the transfer of surplus funds to the insolvent Past Economic Loss and Dependents Fund (PELD Fund).

The court found that the Compensation Fund was solvent with a small projected surplus, while the PELD Fund remained insolvent.

To prevent inequity for eligible class members who had received nothing from the depleted PELD Fund, the court authorized the transfer of the remaining Compensation Fund surplus to the PELD Fund, with the specific allocation to be determined at a future hearing.

The Steering Committee, an unincorporated group of physicians and scientists, sought to intervene in a joint hearing of motions concerning the allocation of actuarially unallocated funds from the 1986-1990 Hepatitis C Settlement Agreement.

The Committee proposed allocating funds to its "National HCV Initiative" which aimed to benefit all Canadians with HCV, not just class members.

The court dismissed the intervention request, finding that the Steering Committee was a stranger to both the Settlement Agreement and the underlying litigation, lacking privity of contract or any substantive right to participate in the administration of the settlement.

Following the allowance of the Crown's appeal, the Crown sought costs of the action against the Litigation Administrator and Litigation Guardian, solely to support a Rule 57.07 award of costs against Class Counsel personally.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the request, finding that while Class Counsel's conduct in pursuing the matter following the Supreme Court's decision was questionable, it did not constitute bad faith or the type of conduct required to found an order for costs against a solicitor personally under the test in Young v. Young.

The cost orders of the trial judge were set aside as a result of the original order allowing the appeal.

The Crown appealed a motion judge's decision awarding $4.6 billion in damages to a class of disabled veterans for the Crown's failure to invest or pay interest on administered pension funds prior to 1990.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that a previous Supreme Court of Canada decision upholding the validity of s. 5.1(4) of the Department of Veterans Affairs Act finally ended the litigation.

The Court held that s. 5.1(4) constituted a complete bar to the class's claims for damages, and that the motion judge erred in interpreting it as only a partial bar.

Furthermore, the Court found that the claims were time-barred and that the doctrine of equitable fraud did not apply to toll the limitation period.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action based on a release executed in a prior action.

The appellant argued the release did not cover the current claims or protect respondents who were not parties to it.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the release was unambiguous and barred the action, as the appellant knew the essential elements of the claims when he signed it.

The Court also agreed that the release protected the non-party respondents because it applied to agents and the claims shared the same factual underpinnings.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The moving party sought leave to re-argue a Charter issue that was not addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada when it reversed the Court of Appeal's earlier decision based on the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, noting that the moving party was seeking relief not originally sought and had an alternative route to raise the issue by appealing a recent decision of the class action motion judge.

The appellants sought damages and restitution from the Government of Canada for the 'head tax' imposed on Chinese immigrants between 1885 and 1923.

They argued the legislation violated section 15 of the Charter, breached customary international law, and resulted in unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to strike the claim, finding that the Charter cannot apply retrospectively, customary international law did not invalidate the historical domestic legislation, and the validly enacted statutes provided a juristic reason for any enrichment.

The successful respondent in an appeal regarding the Crown's breach of fiduciary duty to disabled veterans sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The Crown argued for partial indemnity costs and requested that the quantum be referred to an assessment officer.

The dissenting judge would have awarded substantial indemnity costs due to the Crown's historical conduct.

However, the majority of the Court of Appeal held that because the Crown raised serious and important issues of law on appeal, the appropriate scale was partial indemnity.

The court unanimously agreed that the case was exceptional and referred the quantum of costs to an assessment officer.

The representative plaintiff, a disabled war veteran, brought a class action against the federal Crown for failing to invest or pay interest on pension funds administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs.

The Crown appealed a summary judgment decision that found it had breached its fiduciary duty and declared a statutory bar on interest claims inoperative under the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Crown owed and breached a fiduciary duty to the veterans, the Superior Court had jurisdiction, and the statutory bar was inoperative for depriving the veterans of property without due process and denying a fair hearing.