Christine Mohr

The defendant moved to stay this proposed class action regarding systemic racism against Indigenous members of the RCMP, arguing the claims fell within two certified class actions (Greenwood and AMPMQ) and duplicated another proposed class action (Hudson).

The Court dismissed the motion regarding Greenwood and AMPMQ for reasons issued in Hudson.

However, as the plaintiff agreed to hold the action in abeyance pending Hudson, the Court allowed the motion in part and stayed the action pending a final determination in Hudson.

Canada moved to stay the proposed class action against the RCMP for systemic racism, arguing it was duplicative of two certified class actions (Greenwood and AMPMQ) covering harassment and discrimination.

The Federal Court dismissed the motion, finding that the factual basis of the present action, which focuses on systemic racism through implicit misconduct and policies, is distinct from the explicit misconduct focused on in the other actions.

The applicants, Democracy Watch and Duff Conacher, challenged the constitutionality of the federal judicial appointments and elevations processes.

They argued that the system's structure, in which the Minister of Justice has significant control over Judicial Advisory Committees and frequently consults with political actors before making recommendations to Cabinet, undermined judicial independence and impartiality.

The Court found that portions of the applicants' evidence—primarily media reports and opinions—were inadmissible hearsay or improper opinion evidence.

While recognizing the applicants met the test for public interest standing and invoking the doctrine of necessity to permit a Federal Court judge to hear the case, the Court ultimately dismissed the application.

Applying the framework established in Valente v. The Queen, the Court concluded that the required objective conditions of judicial independence apply post-appointment.

The Constitution itself vests the appointment power in Cabinet, a political body, meaning political involvement in appointments does not inherently render the process unconstitutional.

The parties in a settled class action regarding sexual misconduct in the military brought a motion for directions on implementing a provision for late claims.

Over 640 late claims were received after the extension period expired.

The Federal Court directed that the 'interests of justice' test applies to granting leave for late claims.

Rather than deciding hundreds of individual leave applications, the Court delegated this duty to the settlement Administrator to assess the claims according to specific criteria, subject to a final cut-off date of 30 days from the order.

The applicant moved for an order declaring the respondents in breach of a settlement agreement concerning the Canadian Thalidomide Survivors Support Program.

The applicant argued that the decision letters rejecting claims under the program provided inadequate reasons, as they relied on an opaque diagnostic algorithm.

The Federal Court dismissed the motion, holding that the settlement agreement required reasons but did not establish a standard for the quality or adequacy of those reasons.

The Court noted that the applicant's complaints should be addressed through judicial review of individual decisions rather than as a breach of the settlement agreement.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class proceeding against the RCMP for systemic negligence regarding bullying, intimidation, and harassment.

The Crown argued the court should decline jurisdiction due to available internal and legislative remedies.

The court found those alternatives inadequate given the systemic nature of the claims.

Concluding that the pleadings disclosed a reasonable cause of action, an identifiable class existed, common issues predominated, a class proceeding was the preferable procedure, and the representative plaintiffs were appropriate, the court granted the certification motion.

The Claimant sought review of a determination by the Administrator of the EI Sickness Benefits Class Action denying her claim for sickness benefits under the Settlement Agreement.

The Claimant argued she was wrongly advised by Service Canada in 2003 that she did not qualify for sickness benefits because she became ill at the beginning of her parental leave.

The Prothonotary upheld the Administrator's determination, finding no evidence that the Claimant had made a formal application for sickness benefits while in receipt of parental benefits, as required by the class definition.

The Prothonotary noted that the certified class explicitly excluded individuals who merely relied on oral or written advice not to apply.

The Claimant sought review of an Administrator's determination denying her claim for sickness benefits under a class action Settlement Agreement.

The Court found no evidence that the Claimant applied to convert her parental benefits to sickness benefits or suffered an illness during the relevant period.

As she did not meet the class definition, the Administrator's determination was upheld.

The Claimant applied for a review of the Administrator's determination denying her claim for sickness benefits under the Employment Insurance Sickness Benefits Class Action Settlement Agreement.

The Claimant sought sickness benefits for a five-week period during which she was receiving maternity benefits, not parental benefits.

The Court upheld the Administrator's determination, finding that the Claimant did not meet the class definition because the illness occurred while she was on maternity leave, whereas the class definition requires the illness to have occurred while in receipt of parental benefits.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered a reference question regarding the constitutionality of the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, Part 5 of the Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No. 1.

The Act establishes a federal carbon pricing scheme applicable to provinces that have not adopted sufficiently stringent carbon pricing mechanisms.

The majority held that the Act is constitutional under the national concern branch of the Peace, Order, and Good Government power, as establishing minimum national standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is a matter of national concern.

The fuel charge and excess emissions charge were found to be valid regulatory charges, not taxes.

Justice Huscroft dissented, arguing that the Act improperly expands federal jurisdiction over greenhouse gas emissions, which are generated by virtually all provincial activities.

The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld decisions finding that complaints challenging Indian Act registration provisions were bare attacks on legislation, not discrimination in the provision of services under s. 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

The Tribunal’s dismissal was upheld because legislation itself is not a service under that provision.

The respondents, a corporation and four individual shareholders, sued the Crown for damages arising from two theories of liability: forced incorporation and failure to enforce.

Under the forced incorporation theory, the respondents alleged that Crown misconduct forced them to incorporate their partnership, resulting in tax liability they would have avoided as Indians under section 87 of the Indian Act.

Under the failure to enforce theory, they alleged the Crown failed to properly implement an anti-smuggling initiative, causing them to compete unfairly against unlicensed contraband manufacturers.

The Crown appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to strike the claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the forced incorporation appeal, allowing it to proceed to trial, but allowed the failure to enforce appeal in part by striking the fiduciary duty claims while permitting the negligence and misfeasance claims to proceed.

The appellant, Dr. Lynn Gehl, appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing her application for registration as an "Indian" under the Indian Act.

Dr. Gehl's entitlement to status turned on the 1985 amendments to the Act, which restored status to individuals whose ancestors had been unjustly deprived of it.

The central issue was whether the Registrar's Policy, which imposed strict evidentiary requirements for proving paternity, unreasonably denied Dr. Gehl registration when the identity of her paternal grandfather was unknown.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and granted a declaration that Dr. Gehl was entitled to be registered under section 6(2) of the Indian Act.

The defendant Attorney General of Canada brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim, which sought $1.5 billion in damages for negligence, misfeasance in public office, breach of aboriginal rights, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The claims arose from the Crown's alleged forced incorporation of the plaintiffs' tobacco manufacturing partnership and its failure to enforce anti-contraband initiatives on the reserve.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding that it was not plain and obvious that the claims would fail, given the evolving nature of aboriginal law and the specific interactions pleaded.

The court granted the plaintiffs leave to amend their pleading to add all partners as plaintiffs and to provide further material facts for the aboriginal rights claim.

The applicants sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision refusing to grant an interlocutory injunction to suspend the operation of s. 46(3) of the Fair Elections Act ahead of a federal election.

The impugned provision removed the Chief Electoral Officer's discretion to authorize voter identification cards as a valid form of identification.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's conclusion that the balance of convenience did not favour granting the injunction.

Public interest organizations and individual electors sought an interlocutory injunction to suspend a provision of the Fair Elections Act that prohibited the Chief Electoral Officer from authorizing the Voter Information Card as proof of identity or residence for voting in a federal election.

The applicants alleged the provision infringed the right to vote under s.3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and risked disenfranchising certain groups.

The court held the challenge raised a serious issue and that disenfranchisement could constitute irreparable harm.

However, binding appellate authority establishes a rule against granting interlocutory relief that effectively suspends electoral legislation immediately before an election.

Applying that principle, the balance of convenience favoured allowing the legislation to remain in force pending a full constitutional hearing.

The applicants sought urgent scheduling of an interlocutory injunction motion in a constitutional challenge to amendments under the Fair Elections Act affecting federal voting procedures, including voter information cards and vouching.

The court held that requests for expedition must balance procedural fairness, potential irreparable harm, and the practicality of a timetable for the parties and the court.

Given the complexity of the Charter issues and the extensive social science and expert evidence, the court declined the very early hearing date sought by the applicants but ordered an expedited case-managed schedule culminating in a two-day motion hearing in July 2015.

An advocacy organization challenged the constitutionality of federal legislation repealing the long‑gun registry created under the Firearms Act.

The applicant argued that eliminating the registration requirement for non‑restricted firearms violated s. 7 of the Charter by increasing risks to life and security of the person, and violated s. 15 by disproportionately endangering women, particularly in situations of intimate partner violence.

The court held that the alleged harm resulted from private violence rather than state action and that s. 7 does not impose a positive obligation on the state to maintain a risk‑reduction regulatory scheme.

The evidentiary record failed to establish a causal link between repeal of the registry and increased violence or gender‑based harm.

The legislation was therefore constitutional and represented a policy choice within Parliament’s authority.

The Court allowed the appeal and held that the provincial statutory bar in s. 44 of Newfoundland and Labrador’s workers’ compensation statute applied to bar the dependants’ maritime negligence action.

The Court concluded the provincial provision was constitutionally applicable and operative, rejecting both interjurisdictional immunity and federal paramountcy.

The Court held the provincial no-fault compensation regime and the federal maritime cause of action could operate together without conflict.

Three Mexican seasonal agricultural workers were terminated by their employer and repatriated to Mexico.

They sued for wrongful dismissal and alleged violations of their rights under ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter and the Canadian Bill of Rights, claiming they were 'privately deported' without procedural fairness.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the constitutional and Bill of Rights claims.

The court struck the Charter and Bill of Rights claims, finding that the pleadings did not contain sufficient material facts to support a deprivation of liberty or security of the person under s. 7, nor discrimination under s. 15.

The court also struck the contractual claims against Canada and F.A.R.M.S. as they were not parties to the employment contract.

The plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their Charter claims.