Christine Mohr

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered a reference question regarding the constitutionality of the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, Part 5 of the Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No. 1.

The Act establishes a federal carbon pricing scheme applicable to provinces that have not adopted sufficiently stringent carbon pricing mechanisms.

The majority held that the Act is constitutional under the national concern branch of the Peace, Order, and Good Government power, as establishing minimum national standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is a matter of national concern.

The fuel charge and excess emissions charge were found to be valid regulatory charges, not taxes.

Justice Huscroft dissented, arguing that the Act improperly expands federal jurisdiction over greenhouse gas emissions, which are generated by virtually all provincial activities.

The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld decisions finding that complaints challenging Indian Act registration provisions were bare attacks on legislation, not discrimination in the provision of services under s. 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

The Tribunal’s dismissal was upheld because legislation itself is not a service under that provision.

The respondents, a corporation and four individual shareholders, sued the Crown for damages arising from two theories of liability: forced incorporation and failure to enforce.

Under the forced incorporation theory, the respondents alleged that Crown misconduct forced them to incorporate their partnership, resulting in tax liability they would have avoided as Indians under section 87 of the Indian Act.

Under the failure to enforce theory, they alleged the Crown failed to properly implement an anti-smuggling initiative, causing them to compete unfairly against unlicensed contraband manufacturers.

The Crown appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to strike the claims.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the forced incorporation appeal, allowing it to proceed to trial, but allowed the failure to enforce appeal in part by striking the fiduciary duty claims while permitting the negligence and misfeasance claims to proceed.

The appellant, Dr. Lynn Gehl, appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing her application for registration as an "Indian" under the Indian Act.

Dr. Gehl's entitlement to status turned on the 1985 amendments to the Act, which restored status to individuals whose ancestors had been unjustly deprived of it.

The central issue was whether the Registrar's Policy, which imposed strict evidentiary requirements for proving paternity, unreasonably denied Dr. Gehl registration when the identity of her paternal grandfather was unknown.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and granted a declaration that Dr. Gehl was entitled to be registered under section 6(2) of the Indian Act.

Public interest organizations and individual electors sought an interlocutory injunction to suspend a provision of the Fair Elections Act that prohibited the Chief Electoral Officer from authorizing the Voter Information Card as proof of identity or residence for voting in a federal election.

The applicants alleged the provision infringed the right to vote under s.3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and risked disenfranchising certain groups.

The court held the challenge raised a serious issue and that disenfranchisement could constitute irreparable harm.

However, binding appellate authority establishes a rule against granting interlocutory relief that effectively suspends electoral legislation immediately before an election.

Applying that principle, the balance of convenience favoured allowing the legislation to remain in force pending a full constitutional hearing.

The applicants sought urgent scheduling of an interlocutory injunction motion in a constitutional challenge to amendments under the Fair Elections Act affecting federal voting procedures, including voter information cards and vouching.

The court held that requests for expedition must balance procedural fairness, potential irreparable harm, and the practicality of a timetable for the parties and the court.

Given the complexity of the Charter issues and the extensive social science and expert evidence, the court declined the very early hearing date sought by the applicants but ordered an expedited case-managed schedule culminating in a two-day motion hearing in July 2015.

An advocacy organization challenged the constitutionality of federal legislation repealing the long‑gun registry created under the Firearms Act.

The applicant argued that eliminating the registration requirement for non‑restricted firearms violated s. 7 of the Charter by increasing risks to life and security of the person, and violated s. 15 by disproportionately endangering women, particularly in situations of intimate partner violence.

The court held that the alleged harm resulted from private violence rather than state action and that s. 7 does not impose a positive obligation on the state to maintain a risk‑reduction regulatory scheme.

The evidentiary record failed to establish a causal link between repeal of the registry and increased violence or gender‑based harm.

The legislation was therefore constitutional and represented a policy choice within Parliament’s authority.

The Court allowed the appeal and held that the provincial statutory bar in s. 44 of Newfoundland and Labrador’s workers’ compensation statute applied to bar the dependants’ maritime negligence action.

The Court concluded the provincial provision was constitutionally applicable and operative, rejecting both interjurisdictional immunity and federal paramountcy.

The Court held the provincial no-fault compensation regime and the federal maritime cause of action could operate together without conflict.

Three Mexican seasonal agricultural workers were terminated by their employer and repatriated to Mexico.

They sued for wrongful dismissal and alleged violations of their rights under ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter and the Canadian Bill of Rights, claiming they were 'privately deported' without procedural fairness.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the constitutional and Bill of Rights claims.

The court struck the Charter and Bill of Rights claims, finding that the pleadings did not contain sufficient material facts to support a deprivation of liberty or security of the person under s. 7, nor discrimination under s. 15.

The court also struck the contractual claims against Canada and F.A.R.M.S. as they were not parties to the employment contract.

The plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their Charter claims.

This appeal considered whether actuarial surpluses recorded in federal public-sector superannuation accounts were assets in which plan members held legal or equitable interests.

The Court held the accounts were statutory accounting records tracking Consolidated Revenue Fund transactions, not segregated asset pools.

It rejected claims based on proprietary entitlement, fiduciary duty, unjust enrichment, constructive trust, and alleged expropriation.

The Court further held the statutory amendments authorized debiting surplus amounts and did not require compensation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The federal government sought costs of $16,235.75 on a partial indemnity scale against the Barbra Schlifer Commemorative Clinic and the City of Toronto following the dismissal of their respective motions for leave to appeal and leave to intervene regarding changes to the firearms registry.

The court declined to award costs against the City of Toronto, noting the usual rule that intervenors are neither granted nor awarded costs and that the City acted in good faith.

The court also declined to award costs against the Clinic, recognizing it as a non-profit organization that advanced a claim in the public interest with a genuine interest in the issues in dispute.

The City of Toronto sought leave to intervene in a motion for leave to appeal a decision refusing an interlocutory injunction regarding the federal firearms registry.

The underlying application by the Barbra Schlifer Commemorative Clinic challenged the constitutionality of legislation eliminating the requirement to register unrestricted firearms.

The court dismissed the City's motion to intervene, finding that the City could not make a useful contribution to the narrow issue of whether leave to appeal should be granted, as no further evidence would be admitted and the applicant could fully argue the relevant issues.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision refusing an interlocutory injunction to prevent the federal government from destroying data about unrestricted firearms in the Firearms Registry.

The moving party argued that the destruction of data would disproportionately affect women and endanger their safety, violating sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no conflicting decisions that applied different principles and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's discretionary decision to refuse the injunction.

The appellants, the Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario, appealed a decision regarding the enforcement of sponsorship debts against eight sponsors whose relatives received social assistance.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the government has a duty to collect the full sponsorship debt, it retains a limited discretion to defer enforcement based on a sponsor's circumstances.

In exercising this discretion, the government owes a minimal duty of procedural fairness to notify the sponsor, allow them to explain their circumstances, consider those circumstances, and notify them of the decision.

The Court found that Ontario's debt collection policy did not improperly fetter its discretion and met the requirements of procedural fairness.

The parties consented to an order fixing the costs of the appeal at $100,000, all inclusive, payable to the respondent Crown.

The appellants, representing federal public servants, RCMP, and Canadian Forces personnel, appealed the dismissal of their actions seeking the return of over $28 billion to their pension plans.

The Government had amortized and later withdrawn actuarial surpluses from the Superannuation Accounts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Superannuation Accounts were merely legislated ledgers containing no actual assets, as employee contributions were deposited into the Consolidated Revenue Fund.

The Court held that the Government did not owe a fiduciary duty to the plan members regarding the surplus, nor was it unjustly enriched.

Furthermore, the 2000 amendments to the governing statutes clearly authorized the Government to withdraw the actuarial surplus.

The appellant, a U.S. corporation, submitted a bid for a military procurement contract.

When another bidder was awarded the contract, the appellant filed a complaint with the Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) alleging violations of the Agreement on Internal Trade (AIT).

The CITT ruled the appellant had standing, but the Federal Court of Appeal quashed the ruling.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that non-Canadian suppliers do not have standing before the CITT to bring a complaint under the AIT, as the AIT is a domestic free trade agreement and its procurement provisions apply only to Canadian suppliers.

The appellant, a former resident of an Indian Residential School, brought a civil action alleging he was sexually assaulted by a supervisor decades earlier.

The trial judge found the appellant credible despite inconsistencies in his testimony and concluded the assaults occurred.

The Court of Appeal overturned the decision, holding that the trial judge failed to apply a standard of proof commensurate with the serious nature of the allegations.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's decision, definitively ruling that there is only one standard of proof in civil cases: proof on a balance of probabilities.

The Court rejected the notion of a shifting standard based on the gravity of the allegations and clarified that corroboration is not legally required in civil sexual assault claims.

The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) audited the Redeemer Foundation, a registered charity, regarding its forgivable loan program.

The CRA requested and obtained donor information from the Foundation without prior judicial authorization, and subsequently used this information to reassess the donors' tax returns.

The Foundation applied for judicial review, arguing the CRA needed judicial authorization under section 231.2(2) of the Income Tax Act to obtain information about unnamed persons.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Minister was entitled to the donor information under the broad audit powers in section 231.1(1) combined with the charity's record-keeping obligations under section 230(2)(a), and that judicial authorization was not required when the information was sought for the legitimate purpose of auditing the charity.

Following the allowance of the Crown's appeal, the Crown sought costs of the action against the Litigation Administrator and Litigation Guardian, solely to support a Rule 57.07 award of costs against Class Counsel personally.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the request, finding that while Class Counsel's conduct in pursuing the matter following the Supreme Court's decision was questionable, it did not constitute bad faith or the type of conduct required to found an order for costs against a solicitor personally under the test in Young v. Young.

The cost orders of the trial judge were set aside as a result of the original order allowing the appeal.