Gordon Howard Bourgard

On an appeal concerning GST treatment of municipal transit capital expenditures, the Court addressed whether the municipality made one exempt supply or separate exempt and taxable supplies under the Excise Tax Act.

The municipality argued that acquiring and constructing transit facilities constituted a distinct taxable supply to the province, supporting entitlement to input tax credits.

The Court held that the alleged facilities service was preparatory and integral to the single exempt supply of municipal transit services to the public, and that provincial funding and accountability terms did not create a separate supply of goods, services, or benefit to the province.

The statutory framework and funding agreements were characterized as cost-sharing and administration mechanisms rather than consideration for a distinct taxable supply.

The appeal was dismissed and input tax credits were denied beyond the statutory rebate scheme for exempt-supply activities.

The debtor company commenced CCAA proceedings and obtained a stay.

It owed unremitted GST to the Crown.

The ETA creates a deemed trust for unremitted GST, but the CCAA nullifies statutory deemed trusts in favour of the Crown.

The chambers judge ordered the GST funds segregated in the Monitor's trust account.

When reorganization failed, the debtor sought to make an assignment in bankruptcy.

The Crown sought immediate payment of the GST funds.

The Supreme Court held that the CCAA rule prevails, meaning the Crown ranks as an unsecured creditor for GST claims during CCAA proceedings.

The Court also held that the chambers judge had the discretion to partially lift the stay to allow the assignment in bankruptcy, and that no express trust was created by segregating the funds.

The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) audited the Redeemer Foundation, a registered charity, regarding its forgivable loan program.

The CRA requested and obtained donor information from the Foundation without prior judicial authorization, and subsequently used this information to reassess the donors' tax returns.

The Foundation applied for judicial review, arguing the CRA needed judicial authorization under section 231.2(2) of the Income Tax Act to obtain information about unnamed persons.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Minister was entitled to the donor information under the broad audit powers in section 231.1(1) combined with the charity's record-keeping obligations under section 230(2)(a), and that judicial authorization was not required when the information was sought for the legitimate purpose of auditing the charity.

The respondent sued the Ministers of National Revenue and Indian Affairs and CRA officials, alleging they targeted him and his business regarding the tax exemption in s. 87 of the Indian Act.

The appellants moved to strike the Amended Statement of Claim.

The motion judge dismissed the motion in part.

The appellants appealed, focusing on the Superior Court's jurisdiction to declare a GST assessment null and void.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and struck the claim for declaratory relief, finding the pleadings did not provide a basis in fact or law for such a declaration, without deciding the broader jurisdictional issue.

The appellant received a lump sum settlement of $105,000 from her disability insurer after her benefits were terminated and she sued.

The Minister of National Revenue reassessed her to include the full amount as income.

The Tax Court set aside the reassessment, but the Federal Court of Appeal held that the portion attributable to arrears was taxable.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that under the surrogatum principle, the portion of the settlement intended to replace past disability benefits was payable on a periodic basis pursuant to a disability insurance plan and was therefore taxable under s. 6(1)(f) of the Income Tax Act.

The appellant, a financial advisor, borrowed $100,000 to purchase a departing colleague's client list and sought to deduct the purchase price and the interest on the borrowed funds from his employment income.

The Minister of National Revenue denied the deductions.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that both the purchase price and the interest payments were payments 'on account of capital' and were therefore precluded from deduction under section 8(1)(f)(v) of the Income Tax Act.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an egg producer, intentionally exceeded its production quota and was assessed an over-quota levy by the provincial marketing board.

The appellant deducted the levy as a business expense under the Income Tax Act.

The Minister disallowed the deduction.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the levy was deductible as a current business expense under s. 18(1)(a) of the Act, as it was incurred for the purpose of gaining or producing income.

The Court ruled that the income tax system does not distinguish among levies, fines, and penalties, and that public policy considerations should not be used by courts to disallow deductions that are otherwise permitted by the clear language of the Act, leaving such policy choices to Parliament.