Crista L. Rea

The plaintiff rear-ended the defendant Middel after Middel was forced to brake suddenly when an unidentified vehicle cut him off.

Middel moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claim against him.

The co-defendant insurer, RBC, cross-moved for summary judgment, arguing Middel was at least 1% liable, which would release RBC from uninsured/unidentified motorist coverage, or alternatively, that the OPCF-44R family protection coverage was not triggered due to lack of independent corroboration.

The court granted Middel's motion, finding him 0% liable as he reacted reasonably to the sudden emergency.

The court dismissed RBC's cross-motion, holding that Middel's evidence constituted independent and material corroboration of the unidentified vehicle, thereby triggering the OPCF-44R coverage.

The applicant, a truck driver, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal against his former employer, a recycling company.

The respondents brought a preliminary motion arguing the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the employer's operations involved continuous and regular transportation of materials to the United States.

The Tribunal agreed, finding that the undertaking fell under federal jurisdiction pursuant to s. 92(10)(a) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The application was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability.

The respondents brought a preliminary request to dismiss the application, arguing that the corporate respondent, a scrap metal recycling and logistics business, is a federally-regulated undertaking because it regularly transports goods to the United States.

The Tribunal found that the corporate respondent operated an international transportation undertaking and that the applicant's duties were an integral part of it.

Consequently, the Tribunal concluded it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the application.

The defendants brought a motion seeking an order compelling the plaintiff to attend a defence neuropsychological examination in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff alleged significant physical, psychological, and cognitive impairments, including a head injury and memory problems, and had obtained expert reports including a neuropsychological opinion.

The defendants had already arranged three defence medical examinations but sought a fourth assessment by a neuropsychologist to respond to the plaintiff’s expert evidence.

Applying the principles of necessity, fairness, and prejudice under s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 33.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that a neuropsychological assessment was necessary to level the playing field.

The court found the defence would be prejudiced without an opportunity to respond to the plaintiff’s neuropsychological report and permitted the examination to proceed over one and a half days across two days.

The corporate respondent requested that the human rights application be deferred because the applicant had filed an objection with the WSIB regarding loss of earnings benefits.

The Tribunal denied the deferral request, finding that there was no active WSIB proceeding underway and that the Tribunal's jurisdiction over the harassment and discrimination allegations was broader than the WSIB's.

The Tribunal also denied the applicant's request to join this application with another application against the same respondent, noting that the facts and procedural issues in each case were different.

The respondents requested that the human rights application alleging discrimination based on disability be dismissed under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, arguing that a WSIB proceeding had appropriately dealt with its substance.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that while there was overlap, the WSIB did not deal with the substance of the human rights allegations, which included failure to accommodate and harassment.

The Tribunal also denied the applicant's request to join the application with another employee's application, but granted an unopposed request to amend the monetary remedy claimed.

Appeal from an application decision concerning the effect of dissolution of a two-person accounting partnership on a restrictive covenant in the partnership agreement.

The application judge held that the appellant had withdrawn, thereby triggering a capital-account reduction tied to clients transferring to the departing partner, and directed a trial on damages.

The Court of Appeal held that, on a general dissolution of a two-member firm, the firm ceased to exist and absent an express surviving contractual restraint, the parties were free to pursue their own practices.

The finding that the appellant had withdrawn so as to trigger the covenant was set aside, the impugned paragraphs of the judgment were deleted, and the cross-appeal was unnecessary to decide.

The moving defendants sought summary judgment dismissing claims and cross‑claims arising from a motor vehicle collision where a driver turning left collided with an oncoming vehicle and pedestrians were injured.

The court considered whether there was a genuine issue requiring a trial under Rule 20.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The responding defendant argued the oncoming driver may have contributed to the accident by slowing or failing to keep a proper lookout.

The moving defendants relied largely on unsworn statements and an affidavit from counsel rather than firsthand evidence.

The court held the evidentiary record was insufficient and that a trier of fact could potentially find contributory negligence by the oncoming driver.

The plaintiff appealed an order of a Master dismissing her action for delay following a status hearing.

The action arose from the suspension of her nursing licence, allegedly due to a flawed report by the defendant physician.

The Master had applied a rigid two-part test, finding the plaintiff failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Master erred in principle by failing to apply a contextual approach and by ignoring the broader litigation history, including a companion case that resolved a key issue regarding document admissibility.

The order dismissing the action was set aside.

The testator bequeathed his shares in a family business to his sister.

A brother challenged the bequest, arguing it violated a shareholders' agreement restricting share transfers.

The trial judge found the bequest null and void.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that contractual obligations do not constrain a person's ability to bequeath property by will.

Under section 67(2) of the Business Corporations Act, the estate trustees are entitled to be treated as registered security holders.

While the estate trustees are bound by the shareholders' agreement and cannot immediately distribute the shares without compliance, this does not render the bequest void.

The appeal was allowed.

The Minister of Finance appealed a decision entitling the respondent corporation to defer land transfer tax on the acquisition of properties from a related company.

The deferment depended on whether the two companies were 'affiliates' controlled by the same person under the Land Transfer Tax Act.

While the companies were under the de facto control of the same individual, they were not under the same de jure control.

The Court of Appeal held that the statutory definition of control is exhaustive and requires de jure control.

The appeal was allowed and the Minister's decision denying the deferment was restored.

The appellant received a lump sum settlement of $105,000 from her disability insurer after her benefits were terminated and she sued.

The Minister of National Revenue reassessed her to include the full amount as income.

The Tax Court set aside the reassessment, but the Federal Court of Appeal held that the portion attributable to arrears was taxable.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that under the surrogatum principle, the portion of the settlement intended to replace past disability benefits was payable on a periodic basis pursuant to a disability insurance plan and was therefore taxable under s. 6(1)(f) of the Income Tax Act.