Matthew R. Todd

The appellant municipality appealed an Ontario Energy Board (OEB) decision approving the renewal of a natural gas franchise agreement with the respondent utility.

The municipality objected to a standard cost-sharing provision for pipeline relocation, arguing it conflicted with section 26 of the Drainage Act, which would otherwise require the utility to pay 100% of relocation costs caused by drainage works.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the OEB had broad, exclusive statutory authority under the Municipal Franchises Act to prescribe the terms of the franchise renewal in the public interest, and did not err in law or exceed its jurisdiction by imposing the standard cost-sharing terms.

The applicant appealed the Municipality of Leamington's failure to adopt an Official Plan Amendment and refusal to enact a Zoning By-law Amendment to permit a two-storey, nine-unit apartment building.

The parties reached a settlement that included minor reductions to parking space dimensions to accommodate additional spaces.

Based on uncontested expert planning evidence, the Tribunal found the modified proposal consistent with the Provincial Policy Statement and in conformity with the applicable Official Plans.

The appeal was allowed in part to implement the settlement.

The applicant appealed the municipality's refusal of applications for an Official Plan Amendment and a Zoning By-Law Amendment to permit a 9-unit apartment building.

At the first Case Management Conference, the parties requested to schedule a hearing before finalizing a Procedural Order and Issues List, citing ongoing evaluations related to Bill 23.

The Tribunal declined to schedule a hearing without these documents and directed the parties to submit a draft Procedural Order and Issues List prior to a second Case Management Conference.

The Board issued a procedural order adding the Ontario Greenhouse Vegetable Growers as a Third Party to the application.

Pursuant to subsection 9.1(1)(b) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, the Board also ordered that the application be heard at the same time as nine other related applications brought by various greenhouse farms against the Municipality of Leamington.

The Normal Farm Practices Protection Board issued a procedural order on consent adding the Ontario Greenhouse Vegetable Growers as a Third Party.

The Board also ordered that the applicant's case be heard at the same time as eight other related applications against the Municipality of Leamington, and set out a schedule for the hearing, disclosure, and procedural planning.

The Normal Farm Practices Protection Board issued a procedural order on consent adding the Ontario Greenhouse Vegetable Growers as a Third Party to the application.

The Board also ordered that the application be heard at the same time as eight other related applications challenging a municipal by-law of the Municipality of Leamington, and set out a schedule for the joint hearing, disclosure, and procedural planning.

At a pre-hearing conference, the Normal Farm Practices Protection Board ordered on consent that the Ontario Greenhouse Vegetable Growers be added as a Third Party.

The Board also ordered on consent that the application be heard at the same time as six other related applications against the Municipality of Leamington concerning By-law Number 79-20.

Hearing dates were scheduled and procedural directions were given for disclosure and the presentation of evidence.

A pre-hearing conference was held regarding an application by AMCO Farms Inc. challenging a municipal by-law under the Farming and Food Production Protection Act, 1998.

On consent of the parties, the Board ordered that this application be heard at the same time as six other applications challenging the same by-law.

The Board set hearing dates and directed the parties to develop plans for disclosure and the presentation of evidence.

At a pre-hearing conference, the Normal Farm Practices Protection Board ordered on consent that seven applications challenging the Municipality of Leamington's By-law Number 79-20 be heard at the same time.

The Board also added the Ontario Greenhouse Vegetable Growers as a third party to the proceedings on consent and set out a schedule for the joint hearing.

A pre-hearing conference was held regarding an application challenging a municipal by-law restricting normal farm practices.

On consent, the Board ordered that the Ontario Greenhouse Vegetable Growers be added as a third party and that the application be heard at the same time as six other related applications challenging the same by-law.

Procedural directions were given for disclosure and the conduct of the joint hearing.

A pre-hearing conference was held regarding an application to determine whether a municipal by-law restricts a normal farm practice.

On consent, the Board ordered that the Ontario Greenhouse Vegetable Growers be added as a third party and that the application be heard at the same time as six other related applications against the municipality.

A pre-hearing conference was held regarding an application to determine whether a municipal by-law restricts a normal farm practice.

On consent, the Board ordered that the Ontario Greenhouse Vegetable Growers be added as a Third Party and that the application be heard at the same time as six other related applications against the municipality.

The plaintiff in a medical malpractice action sought an extension of time for discoveries.

The defendant Dr. Tayfour cross-moved for dismissal for delay or a stay until costs were paid.

The court dismissed the defendant's motions, finding that the plaintiff's delays were not inordinate or inexcusable, and there was no substantial risk of an unfair trial.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, setting new timelines for discoveries and trial, and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff costs of the motion.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim and enforce alleged minutes of settlement.

The plaintiffs argued no binding settlement was reached and that summary judgment was unavailable without a statement of defence.

The court exercised its discretion under Rule 2.03 to allow the motion despite the lack of a statement of defence, given the plaintiffs had waived the requirement.

However, the court found the evidence regarding the plaintiffs' acceptance of the settlement equivocal, indicating a genuine issue for trial.

Due to evidentiary deficiencies and credibility issues, the court declined to grant summary judgment and instead ordered a mini-trial under Rule 20.04(2.2) to determine whether a binding settlement agreement was reached.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order declaring that life insurance proceeds from his deceased father's policy are payable to the father's estate.

The father had originally designated the appellant as a revocable beneficiary in 1998, but in 2006 executed an Assignment Policy Absolute that cancelled all previous beneficiary designations, making the estate the beneficiary.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the father clearly intended the estate to be the beneficiary through the 2006 Assignment and that there was no genuine issue requiring trial.

The appellant failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support his claim.

The court heard two separate motions for adjournment of a four-week trial.

Desjardins Financial Security Investments Inc. sought an adjournment to bring a summary judgment motion against the plaintiffs, arguing that an MFDA finding of misconduct against plaintiff Popovich provided just cause for termination.

The Woodall defendants sought an adjournment to pursue leave to appeal a decision by Carey J. that dismissed their motion to strike or stay the plaintiffs' claim due to unpaid costs orders.

The court denied Desjardins' motion, finding that they had delayed in bringing the summary judgment motion and that it would not fully dispose of the claim.

However, the court granted the Woodall defendants' motion, adjourning the trial, to allow their appeal process to conclude, citing the risk of conflicting outcomes and wasted judicial resources if the trial proceeded while a potentially dispositive appeal was pending.

The court considered whether a superior court has jurisdiction to order costs against a non-party beyond the traditional "person of straw" scenario.

The respondent Azzopardi caused his company (131) to commence an action against the appellant for breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising from alleged tax consulting services.

The trial judge dismissed both actions and refused to award costs against Azzopardi personally, finding that 131 was not a person of straw put forward to shield Azzopardi from costs liability.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that courts have inherent jurisdiction to order costs against non-parties who commit abuse of process, separate from and broader than the statutory "person of straw" test.

The court found that Azzopardi's conduct in bringing a fictitious action through a nominal plaintiff constituted an abuse of process warranting a costs award against him personally.

The defendant brought a motion to strike out or stay the plaintiffs' claim due to the plaintiffs' failure to pay outstanding costs orders from an unsuccessful summary judgment application.

The plaintiffs admitted default but claimed impecuniosity.

The court dismissed the motion without costs, finding that the plaintiffs were genuinely without funds, the previous motion was not frivolous, and the defendants failed to show prejudice.

The applicant sought judicial review of two decisions of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario dismissing his discrimination complaint.

He argued the Tribunal unfairly refused to hear three allegations, improperly conducted the hearing by teleconference, and reached an unreasonable decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Tribunal reasonably declined to re-litigate allegations already decided in another complainant's hearing, the applicant had agreed to the teleconference format, and the Tribunal's decision was defensible on the facts.

The respondent, a union president, commenced a representative action claiming the appellant employer failed to provide employees with their share of employment insurance premium reductions under the Employment Insurance Act.

The employer moved to dismiss the action, arguing exclusive jurisdiction lay with a labour arbitrator.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, relying on previous case law.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred by not properly applying the Supreme Court's decisions in Weber and Parry Sound.

The Court held that the essential character of the dispute arose from the collective agreement, as informed by the substantive rights in the Employment Insurance Act, giving an arbitrator exclusive jurisdiction.

The appeal was allowed and the action stayed.