Matthew R. Todd

The plaintiff in a medical malpractice action sought an extension of time for discoveries.

The defendant Dr. Tayfour cross-moved for dismissal for delay or a stay until costs were paid.

The court dismissed the defendant's motions, finding that the plaintiff's delays were not inordinate or inexcusable, and there was no substantial risk of an unfair trial.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, setting new timelines for discoveries and trial, and ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff costs of the motion.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim and enforce alleged minutes of settlement.

The plaintiffs argued no binding settlement was reached and that summary judgment was unavailable without a statement of defence.

The court exercised its discretion under Rule 2.03 to allow the motion despite the lack of a statement of defence, given the plaintiffs had waived the requirement.

However, the court found the evidence regarding the plaintiffs' acceptance of the settlement equivocal, indicating a genuine issue for trial.

Due to evidentiary deficiencies and credibility issues, the court declined to grant summary judgment and instead ordered a mini-trial under Rule 20.04(2.2) to determine whether a binding settlement agreement was reached.

The appellant appealed from a motion judge's order declaring that life insurance proceeds from his deceased father's policy are payable to the father's estate.

The father had originally designated the appellant as a revocable beneficiary in 1998, but in 2006 executed an Assignment Policy Absolute that cancelled all previous beneficiary designations, making the estate the beneficiary.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the father clearly intended the estate to be the beneficiary through the 2006 Assignment and that there was no genuine issue requiring trial.

The appellant failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support his claim.

The court heard two separate motions for adjournment of a four-week trial.

Desjardins Financial Security Investments Inc. sought an adjournment to bring a summary judgment motion against the plaintiffs, arguing that an MFDA finding of misconduct against plaintiff Popovich provided just cause for termination.

The Woodall defendants sought an adjournment to pursue leave to appeal a decision by Carey J. that dismissed their motion to strike or stay the plaintiffs' claim due to unpaid costs orders.

The court denied Desjardins' motion, finding that they had delayed in bringing the summary judgment motion and that it would not fully dispose of the claim.

However, the court granted the Woodall defendants' motion, adjourning the trial, to allow their appeal process to conclude, citing the risk of conflicting outcomes and wasted judicial resources if the trial proceeded while a potentially dispositive appeal was pending.

The court considered whether a superior court has jurisdiction to order costs against a non-party beyond the traditional "person of straw" scenario.

The respondent Azzopardi caused his company (131) to commence an action against the appellant for breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising from alleged tax consulting services.

The trial judge dismissed both actions and refused to award costs against Azzopardi personally, finding that 131 was not a person of straw put forward to shield Azzopardi from costs liability.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that courts have inherent jurisdiction to order costs against non-parties who commit abuse of process, separate from and broader than the statutory "person of straw" test.

The court found that Azzopardi's conduct in bringing a fictitious action through a nominal plaintiff constituted an abuse of process warranting a costs award against him personally.

The defendant brought a motion to strike out or stay the plaintiffs' claim due to the plaintiffs' failure to pay outstanding costs orders from an unsuccessful summary judgment application.

The plaintiffs admitted default but claimed impecuniosity.

The court dismissed the motion without costs, finding that the plaintiffs were genuinely without funds, the previous motion was not frivolous, and the defendants failed to show prejudice.

The plaintiffs sought leave under Rule 48.04(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to bring a summary judgment motion, despite the action having already been set down for trial.

The proposed motion would only address claims against two of the defendants for breaches of share purchase and consulting agreements.

The court dismissed the motion for leave, finding that the proposed summary judgment motion would not eliminate any parties, would not shorten the trial given the interconnected factual matrix, and would risk inconsistent verdicts and prejudice regarding the defendants' counterclaim.

The defendant university brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's representative action, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction and the dispute should be resolved by a labour arbitrator.

The plaintiff alleged the defendant failed to share savings from the Employment Insurance Premium Reduction Program with employees.

The court applied the Weber test and found that the essential character of the dispute did not arise from the collective agreement, but rather from the defendant's alleged failure to comply with the Employment Insurance Act.

The motion to dismiss was denied.

The moving defendant sought a declaration that a subcontractor’s construction lien was invalid for failure to preserve the lien in accordance with s. 34(2) of the Construction Lien Act after the claim for lien was delivered to a municipality’s deputy clerk rather than directly to the clerk.

The court held that the lien was properly preserved because the deputy clerk received the document within the statutory period and delivered it to the municipal clerk the same day.

The court further found that s. 228(2) of the Municipal Act, 2001 grants deputy clerks the powers and duties of the clerk, including receipt of lien claims.

A literal interpretation requiring service only on the clerk would create an impractical and absurd result where service would be impossible if the clerk were unavailable.

The motion seeking to invalidate the lien and return the security bond was dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the corporate plaintiff lacked sufficient assets in Ontario to satisfy a potential costs award.

The court also addressed a request by the defendant for leave under Rule 39.02(2) to file a late affidavit after cross‑examinations, which was refused because the evidence should have been delivered earlier and did not justify departure from the rule’s purpose of ensuring parties know the case to meet before cross‑examination.

On the security for costs issue, the court found there was good reason to believe the plaintiff had insufficient assets, given substantial debts and writs of execution.

However, the plaintiff failed to establish impecuniosity due to insufficient evidence regarding the finances of the shareholder and the principal beneficiary of the action.

Although the claim was found to have a good chance of success, balancing the interests of the parties justified ordering staged security for costs.