Eric Florjancic

The applicant estate trustee sought a declaration that the deceased's TFSA and RRIF, which designated the respondent as beneficiary, were subject to a resulting trust in favour of the estate or were the product of undue influence.

The court held that the presumption of resulting trust from Pecore does not apply to beneficiary designations on registered accounts, preferring the reasoning in Amherst Crane and Mak Estate over Calmusky.

The court found no evidence that the deceased intended the accounts to form part of his estate, nor any evidence of undue influence by the respondent.

The application was dismissed and the funds were ordered paid to the respondent.

Following a prior motion decision, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful moving party sought partial indemnity costs after prevailing on the motion.

The responding party argued that any costs should instead be borne by a third party municipality, alleging administrative error and a breached undertaking not to take a position on the motion.

The court found the municipality had merely consented to the motion and had filed no evidence or submissions beyond that consent.

As there was no pleading supporting liability against the municipality, the court ordered the unsuccessful responding party to pay partial indemnity costs to the moving party.

The defendant brought a motion to rectify the land registry record under section 159 of the Land Titles Act.

The parties are abutting landowners, and the defendant's property requires an easement over the plaintiff's land for access.

The Committee of Adjustment had previously granted a permanent easement as a condition of severing the land, but a temporary one-year easement was mistakenly registered on title following a private agreement between the parties.

The court held that the Certificate of Consent under the Planning Act does not immunize the resulting transfer from rectification where the registered instrument does not match the approved instrument.

The motion was granted, and the title was ordered rectified to reflect a permanent easement.

Following an appeal where the appellants achieved mixed success, the appellants requested to make written costs submissions, arguing that each side should bear their own costs of the appeal and costs below should be in the cause.

The Court of Appeal affirmed its original costs order, finding that the respondent was more successful on the appeal as the appellants' claim was largely statute-barred.

The original award of $6,500 in appeal costs to the respondent was maintained.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' motions for summary judgment, the successful plaintiff sought costs of $11,000.

The Condominium defendants argued that costs should not be awarded due to pleading deficiencies or should be in the cause.

The court found that this case fell within the exceptional class of cases where costs in the cause is warranted, as the merits were yet to be adjudicated and the motion materials would be useful at trial.

Costs were ordered in the cause.

The appellants commenced an action in nuisance and negligence against the respondent municipality for property damage allegedly caused by heavy truck traffic vibrations.

The action was commenced after the Ontario Municipal Board declined jurisdiction over the appellants' injurious affection claim.

The motion judge dismissed the civil action as statute-barred under the two-year limitation period.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the application of the two-year limitation period and the finding that it was not legally appropriate to wait for the OMB decision before commencing the civil action.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the municipality engaged in ongoing wrongful conduct causing damage within the two years prior to the statement of claim.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim and enforce alleged minutes of settlement.

The plaintiffs argued no binding settlement was reached and that summary judgment was unavailable without a statement of defence.

The court exercised its discretion under Rule 2.03 to allow the motion despite the lack of a statement of defence, given the plaintiffs had waived the requirement.

However, the court found the evidence regarding the plaintiffs' acceptance of the settlement equivocal, indicating a genuine issue for trial.

Due to evidentiary deficiencies and credibility issues, the court declined to grant summary judgment and instead ordered a mini-trial under Rule 20.04(2.2) to determine whether a binding settlement agreement was reached.

The appellant sought to appeal the dismissal of his summary judgment motion regarding fraudulent conveyances.

The motion judge had dismissed the motion on the basis that the underlying debt was discharged in bankruptcy and the appellant had failed to follow the correct procedure under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, finding that the motion judge's order was interlocutory because it did not determine the substantive rights of the parties.

Therefore, the appeal properly lies to the Divisional Court with leave.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order striking his claims for wrongful dismissal and severance pay.

The respondents cross-appealed seeking to strike the appellant's remaining claims for emotional distress, breach of human rights, and occupational health and safety violations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the striking of the wrongful dismissal claim but set aside the striking of the severance pay claim, finding that the limitation period for severance claims should run from the date of completion of employment rather than from the date of notice of termination.

The Court also upheld the motion judge's decision not to strike the remaining claims, finding them entangled with factual issues inappropriate for determination on a rule 21 motion.