James Kenneth Ball

The appellants appealed the Committee of Adjustment's refusal of a minor variance to permit a detached accessory additional dwelling unit (ADU) in the front yard of their waterfront property.

The Tribunal found that the Zoning By-law did not explicitly prohibit front yard placement and that locating the ADU in the rear yard was impracticable due to a 100-year floodplain line.

The Tribunal allowed the appeal and authorized the variance, subject to a 9-metre setback condition, concluding that it met the four tests under section 45(1) of the Planning Act.

Dunn Aggregates Limited appealed a Superior Court order barring its claim for damages under an undertaking given by Coco Paving Inc. for an interlocutory injunction.

The injunction had restrained Dunn Aggregates from breaching non-competition and restrictive covenant agreements.

The trial judge found that Coco Paving was the successful party at trial, meaning the injunction was not 'wrongfully granted,' and thus Dunn Aggregates was not entitled to damages under the undertaking.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge's decision, finding no special circumstances to warrant damages based on the undertaking.

The plaintiff, Front Construction Industries Inc., brought an action against the defendant, 38-44 Chatham Street East (2012) Limited (the "Owner"), for payment of an unpaid holdback and two claims for extras related to a construction project.

The Owner counterclaimed for significant delay damages, alleging Front Construction's failure to diligently perform work caused a loss of a long-term leasing opportunity.

The court found in favour of Front Construction, allowing its claims for the unpaid holdback and both extras, and dismissed the Owner's counterclaim for delay, concluding that Front Construction was not responsible for the alleged delay or the tenant's failure to occupy the premises.

The appellant municipality appealed a trial judgment finding that it had improperly used a post-tender addendum process as a form of "bid shopping" after accepting the respondent's bid.

The trial judge found that a contract had been formed when the municipality's council resolved to award the contract to the respondent, and that the subsequent re-tendering process and award to another bidder constituted a breach of the municipality's contractual obligations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, affirming that all bidders must be treated fairly in the tender process and that once a bid is accepted and a resolution issued, the municipality is obligated to issue a purchase order incorporating the agreed contract terms.

The court considered whether a superior court has jurisdiction to order costs against a non-party beyond the traditional "person of straw" scenario.

The respondent Azzopardi caused his company (131) to commence an action against the appellant for breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising from alleged tax consulting services.

The trial judge dismissed both actions and refused to award costs against Azzopardi personally, finding that 131 was not a person of straw put forward to shield Azzopardi from costs liability.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that courts have inherent jurisdiction to order costs against non-parties who commit abuse of process, separate from and broader than the statutory "person of straw" test.

The court found that Azzopardi's conduct in bringing a fictitious action through a nominal plaintiff constituted an abuse of process warranting a costs award against him personally.

The plaintiffs sought compensation for historical SRED tax consulting services allegedly provided to a family-owned manufacturing business, advancing claims in contract, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment.

The court found no contract was proven with either plaintiff, rejected the corporate plaintiff’s attempt to recover for services personally supplied by the individual plaintiff, and held that although the defendant benefited from the work, its retention of that benefit was not unjust given the parties’ reasonable expectations in a non-arm’s length family-business context.

The court further held that the claims were, in any event, largely statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and rejected the plaintiffs’ promissory estoppel argument.

Both actions were dismissed, with costs presumptively payable to the defendant.

The applicant, a migrant worker from St. Lucia employed under the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program, alleged discrimination and reprisal by his employer.

He claimed that an owner and a supervisor referred to him and his co-workers as 'monkeys' and that he was terminated and repatriated after complaining about the racial slurs.

The respondents alleged he was terminated for a propensity for violence following an altercation.

The Tribunal preferred the applicant's evidence, finding that the racial slurs were made and that the termination was a direct reprisal for his human rights complaint.

The Tribunal awarded $5,500 for lost wages and $18,000 for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect, and ordered the employer to implement a human rights policy and undergo training.

The applicant, a seasonal agricultural worker, alleged he was terminated because he got married in Canada, claiming discrimination based on ancestry, colour, ethnic origin, family status, and race.

The respondents maintained that the applicant abandoned his employment after his wedding and later sought employment outside of the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program, which they could not offer.

The Tribunal found the applicant's evidence contradictory regarding his residence after the wedding and concluded it was more probable that he left the worksite and sought work outside the Program.

The application was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a declaratory order that effectively determined a golf club board made no finding of assault or battery by the respondent.

This was a central contested issue in the pending lawsuit.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the order, holding that a contested factual finding cannot be determined in advance of trial merely on the consent of some parties, as this would impermissibly sanction a collateral attack at trial on an existing court order.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that extinguished their title to two strips of land between adjoining properties due to the respondents' adverse possession, and awarded damages for trespass.

The trial judge found that a fence and sidewalk were constructed based on a mutual mistake regarding the property line.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings on adverse possession or trespass damages.

The respondents agreed to grant a permanent easement for the appellants' roof overhang.

The appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal costs was denied.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that the respondent estate enjoyed a prescriptive easement over a disputed driveway.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the continuous, frequent, uninterrupted, open, and peaceful use of the driveway without express permission since 1978 by the deceased and her family members established a prescriptive easement.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment granting specific performance of a share purchase agreement.

The appellant argued the letter agreement lacked certainty regarding the mortgage amount, interest payments, and reporting requirements, amounting only to an agreement to agree.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the agreement's terms were clear and capable of enforcement when read in the context of the surrounding factual matrix.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged the validity of a series of wills executed by an elderly testatrix, alleging undue influence by the respondent beneficiaries and executors, who included the testatrix's lawyer, doctor, and accountant.

The respondents brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the challenge, which the motion judge granted after finding no triable issue.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge lacked jurisdiction to grant summary judgment and erred in finding no triable issue.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the failure to amend the order for directions was a mere procedural defect and that the appellant failed to present any evidence to counter the respondents' substantial evidence supporting the wills' validity.

The appellant appealed a judgment regarding the interpretation of a mortgage provision.

The applications judge concluded that interest for one year was payable from the date of the registration of the mortgage, even though the full funds were not advanced.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with this conclusion and noted there was no language limiting the use of funds to finance an improvement on the land.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $5,500.