Peter Kresimir Hrastovec

The court considered whether a strip of land (the "0020 property") between the applicant's two properties was a public highway that should vest in the Town of Essex under the Municipal Act, 2001.

The applicant argued the land was a roadway on a registered plan of subdivision and should be owned by the Town.

The court found that the land was never dedicated or accepted as a public highway, was not used by the public, and was instead used by the respondent golf course for irrigation.

The application was dismissed and ownership confirmed in the respondent.

The respondents moved for an order to try two proceedings (CV-16-24195 and CV-18-26529) together.

The first action concerned the estate trustee's administration of an estate and passing of accounts, including allegations of breach of fiduciary duty.

The second action, commenced by the estate trustee, sought to collect a payment on a promissory note related to a share purchase agreement, with the respondent in the first action counterclaiming undue influence and economic duress.

The court applied Rule 6.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the balance of convenience test.

It found that while there was a minor common issue (value of estate's shares), the relief claimed did not arise from the same transactions, and the actions were at different stages of litigation with different complexities.

The motion to consolidate or hear the actions together was dismissed.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment against the defendants on two promissory notes related to a land development company.

The defendants opposed, arguing promissory estoppel based on a verbal agreement that repayment would occur through the sale of residential lots.

The court found some evidence of a course of action relied upon by the defendants, suggesting a genuine issue for trial.

Consequently, the motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The applicant requested to re-activate her deferred human rights application after the conclusion of criminal proceedings against the personal respondent.

The respondents did not oppose the request.

The Tribunal granted the request to re-activate the application and directed the parties to file a copy of the court's decision in the criminal proceeding.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging sexual harassment in the workplace.

A concurrent grievance was also filed regarding the employer's handling of the complaint.

The applicant's union requested intervenor status, which was granted.

The Tribunal deferred the human rights application pending the conclusion of the grievance process, noting the overlap in issues and the established practice of deferring to concurrent grievance proceedings.

The appellant employer appealed a decision granting the respondent employee post-retirement health and welfare benefits.

The employee had worked for the employer for nearly 32 years, transitioning from part-time to full-time.

The employer's HR department had informed the employee in writing that her part-time service would be commuted and she would qualify for benefits if she worked an additional three years, which she did.

Upon termination due to restructuring, the employer denied the benefits, claiming the HR information was an error.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that a binding contractual agreement had been reached between the parties entitling the employee to the benefits.

The appellants appealed a declaratory order that effectively determined a golf club board made no finding of assault or battery by the respondent.

This was a central contested issue in the pending lawsuit.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside the order, holding that a contested factual finding cannot be determined in advance of trial merely on the consent of some parties, as this would impermissibly sanction a collateral attack at trial on an existing court order.

The applicant requested a reconsideration of a Tribunal decision that dismissed his human rights application for being filed outside the one-year limitation period.

The applicant argued the Tribunal erred in its application of the discoverability doctrine.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding that the applicant was merely attempting to re-argue his case and appeal the original decision, which does not meet the strict criteria for reconsideration under Rule 26.5.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment regarding retirement benefits.

The respondents argued the application was filed outside the one-year limitation period under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The applicant claimed he only discovered the discriminatory treatment months after his retirement was finalized.

The Tribunal found that the discovery of new evidence did not establish good faith for the delay, and that the continuing effects of the alleged discrimination did not constitute a continuing contravention.

The application was dismissed as out of time.

The applicant alleged discrimination in employment on the basis of sex and race, claiming she was treated unfairly and terminated during her probationary period for discriminatory reasons.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's perceptions of discrimination were based on ambiguous events and that the respondent provided credible, non-discriminatory reasons for her termination, including performance issues and an incident where she was unable to work due to crying.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing its claim for damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it unnecessary to determine if the trial judge applied the correct test for liability because the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant failed to prove its damages due to a volatile market.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's discretionary costs order against the guiding mind and principal shareholder of the appellant.

The applicant union filed a grievance under section 124 of the Labour Relations Act seeking to enforce a collective agreement clause imposing a 1% per day compounded penalty on late benefit contributions.

The respondent employer paid the principal amount of $137,507.50 after the first day of hearing, leaving a penalty claim of $35,361.85 for 23 days of delay.

The Board held that the clause was penal and unconscionable, as the effective annual interest rate exceeded 3000% and was disproportionate to any actual damages suffered by the benefit funds.

The Board declined to enforce the penalty clause and instead awarded interest on the late payment at the chartered banks' prime rate.