Michelle Packer

The minor plaintiff tripped and fell over a raised concrete edge of a buried metal transformer box owned by the defendant hydro company, located on a municipally-owned driveway apron adjacent to the moving defendants' properties.

The moving defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the action against them, arguing they were not 'occupiers' under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

The court granted the motions, finding no genuine issue for trial as the moving defendants did not exercise sufficient control over the municipal property to be deemed occupiers under the 'special circumstances' exception, nor did the 'flow exception' apply.

The action and cross-claims against the moving defendants were dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing her motor vehicle negligence action arising from a collision at an intersection in London, Ontario.

The appellant's vehicle struck the respondent's pickup truck after the appellant proceeded through a stop sign.

The motion judge found the respondent was not speeding and could not see the appellant's vehicle due to an intervening cement truck.

The appellant argued the respondent should have been more cautious given the presence of stopped vehicles.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's conclusion that the respondent had no duty to reduce speed or take extra precautions under the circumstances.

The defendants brought a motion to bifurcate the issues of liability and damages, and to compel the plaintiff to attend independent medical assessments by a neurologist and a psychiatrist.

The plaintiff opposed bifurcation and the psychiatric assessment, but agreed to a neurological and psychological assessment.

The court dismissed the motion for bifurcation, finding no persuasive evidence that it was in the interest of justice and noting it would likely increase costs and delay.

The court also declined to order a psychiatric assessment, finding that a psychological assessment was more appropriate given the plaintiff's treatment history and to avoid needless delay and expense.

The defendants brought a motion to bifurcate the issues of liability and damages, and to compel the plaintiff to attend a psychiatric assessment.

The court dismissed the request for bifurcation, finding no clear advantage or cost savings, as causation touched equally on liability and damages.

The court also declined to order a psychiatric assessment, noting the plaintiff had only seen a psychologist and her psychiatric condition was not in issue.

A psychological assessment was deemed appropriate instead, and the trial was adjourned.

Following dismissal of the defendants’ motion for summary judgment seeking to strike a motor vehicle accident claim as statute-barred, the plaintiffs sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The motion had raised a novel issue concerning the interaction between discoverability and the plaintiffs’ admitted knowledge of the two‑year limitation period prior to its expiry.

The court held that the defendants were justified in bringing the motion given the claim’s lengthy procedural history and the legal uncertainty surrounding the limitation issue.

While the plaintiffs were entitled to costs as the successful party, the court found the hours claimed excessive and rejected substantial indemnity.

Costs were fixed at a reduced amount that was fair and reasonable to the unsuccessful party.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' motor vehicle accident claim as statute-barred, arguing the two-year limitation period had expired.

The plaintiffs argued the discoverability principle extended the limitation period because the plaintiff did not know her injuries met the statutory threshold until later.

The court found a genuine issue for trial regarding discoverability, noting that the plaintiff's initial concerns about her injuries were insufficient to start the limitation period without medical evidence establishing a serious and permanent impairment.

The motion was dismissed.

Following the allowance of the Crown's appeal, the Crown sought costs of the action against the Litigation Administrator and Litigation Guardian, solely to support a Rule 57.07 award of costs against Class Counsel personally.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the request, finding that while Class Counsel's conduct in pursuing the matter following the Supreme Court's decision was questionable, it did not constitute bad faith or the type of conduct required to found an order for costs against a solicitor personally under the test in Young v. Young.

The cost orders of the trial judge were set aside as a result of the original order allowing the appeal.

The Crown appealed a motion judge's decision awarding $4.6 billion in damages to a class of disabled veterans for the Crown's failure to invest or pay interest on administered pension funds prior to 1990.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that a previous Supreme Court of Canada decision upholding the validity of s. 5.1(4) of the Department of Veterans Affairs Act finally ended the litigation.

The Court held that s. 5.1(4) constituted a complete bar to the class's claims for damages, and that the motion judge erred in interpreting it as only a partial bar.

Furthermore, the Court found that the claims were time-barred and that the doctrine of equitable fraud did not apply to toll the limitation period.