Peter Sengbusch

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable either as guarantors or on a promise to purchase promissory notes.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge's interpretation of the agreement based on the context and intention of the parties.

The court also refused to interfere with the trial judge's costs order and awarded costs of the appeal to the respondents.

The plaintiffs advanced funds to a corporation that later went into receivership.

The plaintiffs sought repayment from the individual defendants based on a poorly drafted document entitled 'Agreement to Purchase'.

The court applied the factual matrix approach to contractual interpretation and concluded that the document was intended to be a personal guarantee by the individual defendants for the corporation's debt.

Judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiffs for the outstanding principal and interest.

Following the allowance of the Crown's appeal, the Crown sought costs of the action against the Litigation Administrator and Litigation Guardian, solely to support a Rule 57.07 award of costs against Class Counsel personally.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the request, finding that while Class Counsel's conduct in pursuing the matter following the Supreme Court's decision was questionable, it did not constitute bad faith or the type of conduct required to found an order for costs against a solicitor personally under the test in Young v. Young.

The cost orders of the trial judge were set aside as a result of the original order allowing the appeal.

The Crown appealed a motion judge's decision awarding $4.6 billion in damages to a class of disabled veterans for the Crown's failure to invest or pay interest on administered pension funds prior to 1990.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that a previous Supreme Court of Canada decision upholding the validity of s. 5.1(4) of the Department of Veterans Affairs Act finally ended the litigation.

The Court held that s. 5.1(4) constituted a complete bar to the class's claims for damages, and that the motion judge erred in interpreting it as only a partial bar.

Furthermore, the Court found that the claims were time-barred and that the doctrine of equitable fraud did not apply to toll the limitation period.

The appellant, acting as a representative plaintiff in a class action, appealed a decision regarding the Crown's obligation to pay administered funds to a veteran's estate upon death.

The appellant argued that clear statutory language was required to divest such funds, which was absent in the lapsing provisions of the Pension Act and Veterans Treatment Regulations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the lapsing provisions clearly intended to prioritize spouses and dependants over estates.

The Crown's cross-appeal was allowed, with the court finding that section 55 of the Veterans Treatment Regulations remained intra vires after 1986, as subordinate legislation is not required to mirror its enabling statute exactly.

The moving party sought leave to re-argue a Charter issue that was not addressed by the Supreme Court of Canada when it reversed the Court of Appeal's earlier decision based on the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, noting that the moving party was seeking relief not originally sought and had an alternative route to raise the issue by appealing a recent decision of the class action motion judge.

The representative plaintiff, a disabled veteran, sued the federal Crown for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to pay interest on pension funds administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs.

Parliament enacted legislation barring claims for interest prior to 1990.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the expropriative legislation was valid and not inconsistent with the due process or fair hearing protections of the Canadian Bill of Rights, as Parliament has the power to expropriate property without compensation using clear and unambiguous language.

The successful respondent in an appeal regarding the Crown's breach of fiduciary duty to disabled veterans sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The Crown argued for partial indemnity costs and requested that the quantum be referred to an assessment officer.

The dissenting judge would have awarded substantial indemnity costs due to the Crown's historical conduct.

However, the majority of the Court of Appeal held that because the Crown raised serious and important issues of law on appeal, the appropriate scale was partial indemnity.

The court unanimously agreed that the case was exceptional and referred the quantum of costs to an assessment officer.

The representative plaintiff, a disabled war veteran, brought a class action against the federal Crown for failing to invest or pay interest on pension funds administered by the Department of Veterans Affairs.

The Crown appealed a summary judgment decision that found it had breached its fiduciary duty and declared a statutory bar on interest claims inoperative under the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Crown owed and breached a fiduciary duty to the veterans, the Superior Court had jurisdiction, and the statutory bar was inoperative for depriving the veterans of property without due process and denying a fair hearing.