Gina M. Scarcella

The plaintiff brought a certification motion for a class action regarding systemic negligence.

During the hearing, the judge noted a statement in the plaintiff's factum suggesting the judge had previously stated the case was ideally suited for a class action.

Concerned about a reasonable apprehension of bias, the judge inquired about the comment.

After clarification that the comment was misreported and actually related to US class action regimes, the judge adjourned the first day to allow parties to consider a recusal motion.

Neither party wished to bring a recusal motion.

The plaintiff requested an adjournment due to lost hearing time, which the Crown did not oppose.

The hearing was adjourned.

In a proposed class action brought by a former RCMP officer alleging systemic sexual harassment and discrimination against female RCMP members, the defendant Crown moved under Rule 21 to strike the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Crown argued that systemic negligence claims against the RCMP amounted to impermissible direct liability contrary to the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, that no contractual employment relationship existed, and that the claim was statute‑barred.

The court held that the breach of contract claim was untenable because the employment relationship of RCMP members is statutory rather than contractual and struck that portion of the claim.

However, the court found it was not plain and obvious that the systemic negligence claim failed, holding that the pleadings could support vicarious liability of the Crown for collective misconduct of Crown servants.

The limitation issue could not be resolved on a pleadings motion.

The plaintiff, who was previously investigated for stock fraud and entered into a settlement agreement with the Ontario Securities Commission, sued 67 defendants for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, and other torts.

Ten motions were brought by 64 defendants to strike the pleadings and dismiss the actions.

The court dismissed the action against the Attorney General of Ontario because the malicious prosecution claim could not succeed, as the criminal proceedings were stayed pursuant to a settlement and thus not terminated in the plaintiff's favour.

The actions against the remaining moving defendants were dismissed as an abuse of process because they attempted to re-litigate facts already settled or judicially determined in prior proceedings.

An advocacy organization challenged the constitutionality of federal legislation repealing the long‑gun registry created under the Firearms Act.

The applicant argued that eliminating the registration requirement for non‑restricted firearms violated s. 7 of the Charter by increasing risks to life and security of the person, and violated s. 15 by disproportionately endangering women, particularly in situations of intimate partner violence.

The court held that the alleged harm resulted from private violence rather than state action and that s. 7 does not impose a positive obligation on the state to maintain a risk‑reduction regulatory scheme.

The evidentiary record failed to establish a causal link between repeal of the registry and increased violence or gender‑based harm.

The legislation was therefore constitutional and represented a policy choice within Parliament’s authority.

The defendants brought a motion to strike portions of the plaintiff's fresh as amended statement of claim and for particulars.

The plaintiff, a generic drug manufacturer, sued the defendants for misfeasance in public office and other torts related to the handling of new drug submissions.

The court struck the claim for unlawful discrimination, finding it had no reasonable prospect of success, and struck certain paragraphs for improperly pleading evidence.

However, the court refused to strike claims based on res judicata, finding the tort claims distinct from prior judicial review proceedings, and refused to strike claims related to the loss of the benefit of section 8 of the Patent Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations.

The motion for particulars was dismissed.

The federal government sought costs of $16,235.75 on a partial indemnity scale against the Barbra Schlifer Commemorative Clinic and the City of Toronto following the dismissal of their respective motions for leave to appeal and leave to intervene regarding changes to the firearms registry.

The court declined to award costs against the City of Toronto, noting the usual rule that intervenors are neither granted nor awarded costs and that the City acted in good faith.

The court also declined to award costs against the Clinic, recognizing it as a non-profit organization that advanced a claim in the public interest with a genuine interest in the issues in dispute.

The City of Toronto sought leave to intervene in a motion for leave to appeal a decision refusing an interlocutory injunction regarding the federal firearms registry.

The underlying application by the Barbra Schlifer Commemorative Clinic challenged the constitutionality of legislation eliminating the requirement to register unrestricted firearms.

The court dismissed the City's motion to intervene, finding that the City could not make a useful contribution to the narrow issue of whether leave to appeal should be granted, as no further evidence would be admitted and the applicant could fully argue the relevant issues.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision refusing an interlocutory injunction to prevent the federal government from destroying data about unrestricted firearms in the Firearms Registry.

The moving party argued that the destruction of data would disproportionately affect women and endanger their safety, violating sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no conflicting decisions that applied different principles and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's discretionary decision to refuse the injunction.

The applicant, a clinic providing services to victims of domestic violence, brought an application challenging the constitutionality of the federal government's repeal of the long-gun registry under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The respondents moved to strike the application under Rule 21 for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The applicant moved for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the destruction of the registry data pending the hearing of the application.

The court dismissed the respondents' motion to strike, finding the claims were not plainly and obviously doomed to fail given the novelty of the issues.

However, the court also dismissed the applicant's motion for an interlocutory injunction, concluding that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the evidence of irreparable harm was weak and the balance of convenience favoured the public interest in the enacted legislation.

Following a decision on a special case in favour of the plaintiff, the parties reached a consensus on costs.

The Court of Appeal ordered costs of $15,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements payable forthwith by Canada to the plaintiff.

A municipal government brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in a Charter application challenging federal legislation repealing the long‑gun registry and mandating destruction of registry records.

The underlying application alleged the repeal violated ss. 7 and 15(1) of the Charter by increasing risks of domestic violence against women.

The court considered the principles governing intervention under Rule 13.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including whether the proposed intervenor had a real and identifiable interest, a distinct perspective, or relevant expertise.

The court found the municipality had demonstrated a substantial interest in firearm‑related public safety and domestic violence issues and could provide assistance on the public interest component of the injunction analysis without expanding the evidentiary record.

Leave to intervene was granted subject to limitations on evidence, length of submissions, and costs.

The plaintiff brought a class action against the Attorney General of Canada alleging Health Canada was negligent in regulating temporomandibular joint implants.

The defendant moved to decertify the action, arguing the pleadings did not establish a private law duty of care.

On a special case stated to the Court of Appeal, the court held that while a regulator's public statements alone do not create proximity, the plaintiff's allegations that Health Canada repeatedly misrepresented the safety of the implants and failed to correct the misrepresentation despite knowing the risks could arguably establish a prima facie duty of care.

The motion was granted, allowing the claim to proceed.

The plaintiff brought a class action against the manufacturer of a medical device and the Attorney General of Canada, alleging Health Canada was negligent in its regulation of the device.

The Attorney General moved to strike the claim on the basis that it owed no private law duty of care to the plaintiff.

The motions judge dismissed the motion, finding a full factual record was necessary.

On appeal, the Divisional Court allowed the appeal and struck the claim, holding that it was plain and obvious under the Anns test that the federal government did not owe a private law duty of care to individual consumers of medical devices, and that residual policy considerations negated any such duty.

The appellant sought a declaration that s. 43 of the Criminal Code, which justifies the reasonable use of force by way of correction by parents and teachers against children, violates ss. 7, 12, and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 43 does not offend the Charter.

The Court found that s. 43 is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and does not discriminate against children, as it is grounded in their actual needs and circumstances by protecting them from the blunt instrument of the criminal law for minor disciplinary contacts.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of section 43 of the Criminal Code, which provides a defence for parents and teachers who use reasonable force to correct a child.

The appellant argued that the provision violates sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while section 43 engages a child's security of the person, it does not violate the principles of fundamental justice.

The court also held that section 43 does not constitute state-imposed cruel and unusual punishment under section 12, and any infringement of equality rights under section 15 is justified under section 1 of the Charter.