Andrew Law

The applicants brought a constitutional application challenging PIPEDA provisions permitting voluntary disclosure of subscriber information to government institutions without prior judicial authorization and related veto provisions limiting disclosure to affected individuals.

They alleged infringements of Charter ss. 8, 7, and 2(b), arguing the scheme lacked oversight, accountability, and transparency.

The court held it was bound by appellate authority that PIPEDA does not itself confer search or seizure powers, so s. 8 was not engaged on this record, and further held the s. 7 claim was a repackaging of the s. 8 arguments.

The court also found no s. 2(b) breach because the veto provisions are discretionary, incorporate balancing, and did not substantially impede meaningful public discussion.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of Canada's federal electoral system under sections 3 and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

They argued that the Single Member Plurality (SMP) system violates the right to vote by creating disproportionality between votes cast and seats won, and violates equality rights by underrepresenting women, racial minorities, and small political parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the electoral system does not infringe either section 3 or section 15 of the Charter.

The court found that the right to vote is a right to participate in the electoral process, not a right to have votes translated into representation in any particular manner.

Electoral outcomes resulting from citizens' free choices cannot violate constitutional rights.

The plaintiff, Roger Foley, failed to comply with a prior court order requiring payment of over $100,000 in costs to the defendants by August 30, 2024.

Despite being given an opportunity to respond, the plaintiff did not dispute non-payment and failed to provide sufficient evidence of impecuniosity.

The court dismissed the action against all remaining defendants, refusing a further extension of time or to convert unpaid costs to costs in the cause, emphasizing the importance of compliance with court orders.

This decision addresses the issue of costs following the striking out of the plaintiff's claim.

The plaintiff sought to have his former lawyer personally pay costs or for no costs to be awarded.

The court dismissed the request for personal costs against the lawyer, finding his conduct did not cause unnecessary costs and did not meet the high threshold for such an order.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendants and imposed terms requiring the plaintiff to pay all outstanding costs orders (including prior ones) before being permitted to amend his claim, failing which the action would be dismissed.

The plaintiff, a person with a severe neurodegenerative condition, brought an action against multiple defendants alleging Charter violations, public law breaches, and private law duties related to his hospital care, home care funding, and the constitutionality of the medical assistance in dying (MAID) provisions of the Criminal Code.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b).

The court struck the statement of claim in its entirety, finding it failed to plead material facts, asserted causes of action unknown to law (such as a freestanding Charter right to health care), and constituted an abuse of process by collaterally attacking binding Supreme Court jurisprudence.

The action was dismissed against the federal and provincial Crown defendants without leave to amend.

Leave to amend was granted on strict terms for specific claims against the hospital, the local health integration network, and the independent living centre.

The applicants sought to strike down sections 2(1), 24(1), and 313(1) of the Canada Elections Act, arguing they infringed sections 3 (right to vote) and 15(1) (equality rights) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The challenge contended that Canada's single member plurality (SMP) electoral system resulted in disproportionate translation of votes to seats and underrepresentation of small national parties, women, and racial minorities.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the SMP system is constitutionally valid, does not violate Charter rights, and that the Constitution does not mandate proportional representation.

The court emphasized that voting rights focus on electoral process, not specific outcomes, and that political affiliation is not an analogous ground for discrimination under section 15.

This endorsement addresses motions for leave to intervene in a constitutional challenge brought by Fair Voting BC and Springtide Collective for Democracy Society against the Attorney General of Canada.

The challenge concerns the constitutionality of the 'first-past-the-post' electoral system under the Canada Elections Act, alleging violations of ss. 3 and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Four organizations—Apathy is Boring (AIB), Canadian Constitution Foundation (CCF), Electoral Reform Society (UK) (ERS UK), and Fair Vote Canada (FVC)—sought leave to intervene.

The court granted leave to all four to intervene as friends of the court, allowing them to file factums and make time-limited oral submissions.

However, the court denied ERS UK's request to intervene as an added party and prohibited all interveners from filing additional evidence, emphasizing the existing substantial record and the risk of delay and prejudice to the parties.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal and cross-appeal in a class proceeding.

The court outlines the disposition of costs, including payments between the Law Foundation of Ontario, the Attorney General of Canada, and the Ontario Health Insurance Plan.

The original appeal by Kathryn Anne Taylor was dismissed, leading to this costs decision.

The appellant, representative plaintiff in a class action concerning defective temporomandibular joint (TMJ) implants, appealed the dismissal of her action following a trial of common issues.

She alleged the Canadian government (Health and Welfare Canada, HWC) owed a duty of care to regulate and warn about the devices.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that no private law duty of care was owed by HWC, either through the legislative scheme or through interactions with class members, and found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding the approval status of the devices.

The Attorney General's cross-appeal on costs was granted leave but dismissed, with the court affirming the trial judge's discretion in awarding costs, particularly considering the public interest nature of the case and the Class Proceedings Fund.

This appeal concerned the procedural fairness requirements when a court, on its own motion, strikes the pleadings of a self-represented Indigenous party for alleged contempt and abuse of process.

The motion judge had found the appellant, an alleged protest leader, in defiance of court orders, struck his pleadings, and granted a permanent injunction with significant costs.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by conflating contempt and abuse of process, failing to provide the appellant with adequate procedural safeguards, and denying him a fair opportunity to be heard, especially given his self-represented and Indigenous status.

The appeal was allowed, the orders striking pleadings and granting the permanent injunction were set aside, and the costs award was also set aside.

Following the dismissal of a class action concerning medical device implants, the Crown sought over $6.3 million in costs.

The plaintiff argued for no costs based on public interest and access to justice principles under the Class Proceedings Act, and sought costs for an unproven fraud allegation against a witness.

The court significantly reduced the Crown's costs to $385,000, noting the public interest nature of the case, the access to justice mandate, and the Crown's own contribution to the 20-year delay.

OHIP was ordered to pay 10% of the costs, with the remainder payable by the Law Foundation of Ontario.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of the Canadian prison needle exchange program (PNEP), specifically its "threat risk assessment" (TRA) feature, arguing it violated sections 7 and 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by denying effective access to essential health care.

The court dismissed the application, finding it premature due to the ongoing PNEP rollout and evolving design.

Furthermore, the applicants failed to establish that professionally accepted standards required a health services-centered model without security staff involvement, or that the PNEP/TRA model breached Charter rights by being arbitrary, overbroad, or grossly disproportionate, or by discriminating on enumerated grounds.

The plaintiff brought a class action against the Crown alleging negligent regulation of Vitek Proplast temporomandibular joint (TMJ) implants by Health Canada.

The plaintiff claimed that the Crown owed a private law duty of care to the class members and breached that duty by failing to properly regulate the devices, issuing Notices of Compliance negligently, and failing to adequately warn the public or recall the devices.

Following a lengthy common issues trial, the Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action.

The court applied the Anns test and concluded that the Crown did not owe a private law duty of care to the class members, as there was insufficient proximity between the regulator and the unidentifiable group of potential implant recipients.

Furthermore, the court found that even if a duty of care existed, the Crown did not breach the applicable standard of care, as its regulatory actions and responses to the evolving scientific understanding of the implants' risks were reasonable and appropriate.

The appellant was found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD) for sexual assault charges in 2002 and received an absolute discharge from the Ontario Review Board in 2003.

He challenged the constitutionality of Christopher's Law (Sex Offender Registry) and the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA), which imposed mandatory lifetime sex offender registration and reporting requirements on him with no possibility of exemption.

The Court of Appeal found that while the legislation did not violate section 7 of the Charter (fundamental justice), it violated section 15(1) (equality rights) by discriminating against persons found NCRMD who received absolute discharges.

The court declared the provisions of no force or effect as applied to such persons, suspended the declaration for 12 months, but exempted the appellant from the suspension, ordering his removal from the registries.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 60.12 to strike the defendant's Statement of Defence in a class action, alleging failure to produce documents.

Mid-motion, the plaintiff changed the requested relief to an order for specific further productions and examinations.

The Master found that the plaintiff's mid-motion change in position and late-filed materials prevented the defendant from properly responding.

The Master also concluded that granting the proposed order risked jeopardizing a fixed 17-week trial date, and a Master lacks authority under Rule 37.02(2)(b) to make orders that would effectively adjourn a judge's fixed trial date.

Consequently, the motion was adjourned sine die, and the parties were directed to attend before Justice Firestone for directions regarding the trial date and the relief sought.

The respondents in a Charter application brought a refusals motion seeking to compel three expert witnesses retained by the applicants to re-attend cross-examinations and produce draft affidavits and notes of communications with counsel.

The respondents argued that counsel's assistance in drafting the experts' affidavits raised reasonable grounds to question their independence, thereby waiving litigation privilege.

The court applied the principles from Moore v. Getahun and White Burgess, finding that consultation between counsel and experts is a necessary part of the adversarial process.

The court dismissed the motion, concluding there was no factual foundation to support a reasonable suspicion that counsel improperly influenced the experts.

The plaintiff brought a certification motion for a class action regarding systemic negligence.

During the hearing, the judge noted a statement in the plaintiff's factum suggesting the judge had previously stated the case was ideally suited for a class action.

Concerned about a reasonable apprehension of bias, the judge inquired about the comment.

After clarification that the comment was misreported and actually related to US class action regimes, the judge adjourned the first day to allow parties to consider a recusal motion.

Neither party wished to bring a recusal motion.

The plaintiff requested an adjournment due to lost hearing time, which the Crown did not oppose.

The hearing was adjourned.

In a proposed class action brought by a former RCMP officer alleging systemic sexual harassment and discrimination against female RCMP members, the defendant Crown moved under Rule 21 to strike the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Crown argued that systemic negligence claims against the RCMP amounted to impermissible direct liability contrary to the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, that no contractual employment relationship existed, and that the claim was statute‑barred.

The court held that the breach of contract claim was untenable because the employment relationship of RCMP members is statutory rather than contractual and struck that portion of the claim.

However, the court found it was not plain and obvious that the systemic negligence claim failed, holding that the pleadings could support vicarious liability of the Crown for collective misconduct of Crown servants.

The limitation issue could not be resolved on a pleadings motion.

The appellant brought a summary conviction appeal from a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice declining jurisdiction to hear a reference under s. 74 of the Firearms Act concerning an alleged revocation of a firearm registration certificate.

The lower court determined that a letter from the Registrar advising that a rifle’s bull‑pup stock was a prohibited device did not constitute a revocation.

The appellant argued that the court erred by deciding jurisdiction without permitting him to call evidence, contrary to s. 75(2) of the Act, thereby breaching procedural fairness.

The Superior Court held that once the hearing commenced the statute required the judge to hear all relevant evidence from both parties.

Because the lower court made factual findings based only on the Registrar’s evidence while refusing the appellant’s witnesses, the process violated natural justice and constituted an error of law.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a new hearing before a different judge.