Andrew Law

The respondents in a Charter application brought a refusals motion seeking to compel three expert witnesses retained by the applicants to re-attend cross-examinations and produce draft affidavits and notes of communications with counsel.

The respondents argued that counsel's assistance in drafting the experts' affidavits raised reasonable grounds to question their independence, thereby waiving litigation privilege.

The court applied the principles from Moore v. Getahun and White Burgess, finding that consultation between counsel and experts is a necessary part of the adversarial process.

The court dismissed the motion, concluding there was no factual foundation to support a reasonable suspicion that counsel improperly influenced the experts.

The applicant sought judicial review of two Ontario Labour Relations Board decisions dismissing its application to review orders to pay unpaid wages.

The Board dismissed the application because it was filed out of time and the applicant failed to pay the ordered amounts in trust.

The Divisional Court held that the Board's refusal to grant an extension of time was reasonable, noting the urgency inherent in the payment of wages to employees.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with no costs.

The plaintiff brought a certification motion for a class action regarding systemic negligence.

During the hearing, the judge noted a statement in the plaintiff's factum suggesting the judge had previously stated the case was ideally suited for a class action.

Concerned about a reasonable apprehension of bias, the judge inquired about the comment.

After clarification that the comment was misreported and actually related to US class action regimes, the judge adjourned the first day to allow parties to consider a recusal motion.

Neither party wished to bring a recusal motion.

The plaintiff requested an adjournment due to lost hearing time, which the Crown did not oppose.

The hearing was adjourned.

In a proposed class action brought by a former RCMP officer alleging systemic sexual harassment and discrimination against female RCMP members, the defendant Crown moved under Rule 21 to strike the statement of claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Crown argued that systemic negligence claims against the RCMP amounted to impermissible direct liability contrary to the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, that no contractual employment relationship existed, and that the claim was statute‑barred.

The court held that the breach of contract claim was untenable because the employment relationship of RCMP members is statutory rather than contractual and struck that portion of the claim.

However, the court found it was not plain and obvious that the systemic negligence claim failed, holding that the pleadings could support vicarious liability of the Crown for collective misconduct of Crown servants.

The limitation issue could not be resolved on a pleadings motion.

The appellant brought a summary conviction appeal from a decision of the Ontario Court of Justice declining jurisdiction to hear a reference under s. 74 of the Firearms Act concerning an alleged revocation of a firearm registration certificate.

The lower court determined that a letter from the Registrar advising that a rifle’s bull‑pup stock was a prohibited device did not constitute a revocation.

The appellant argued that the court erred by deciding jurisdiction without permitting him to call evidence, contrary to s. 75(2) of the Act, thereby breaching procedural fairness.

The Superior Court held that once the hearing commenced the statute required the judge to hear all relevant evidence from both parties.

Because the lower court made factual findings based only on the Registrar’s evidence while refusing the appellant’s witnesses, the process violated natural justice and constituted an error of law.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a new hearing before a different judge.