Owen Young

This case conference endorsement addresses several procedural issues in a complex litigation involving Six Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians, the Attorney General of Canada, and His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario.

Key issues include determining the venue for upcoming intervention motions, managing requests for participation from individuals in response to public notices, addressing the filing of a redacted motion record to protect privacy, setting procedures for evidentiary objections, approving a minor change to the online notice regarding hearing dates, and providing detailed CaseLines directions for electronic document management.

The court provided specific instructions for each of these procedural aspects to ensure the efficient and transparent progression of the litigation.

This appeal concerned the procedural fairness requirements when a court, on its own motion, strikes the pleadings of a self-represented Indigenous party for alleged contempt and abuse of process.

The motion judge had found the appellant, an alleged protest leader, in defiance of court orders, struck his pleadings, and granted a permanent injunction with significant costs.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by conflating contempt and abuse of process, failing to provide the appellant with adequate procedural safeguards, and denying him a fair opportunity to be heard, especially given his self-represented and Indigenous status.

The appeal was allowed, the orders striking pleadings and granting the permanent injunction were set aside, and the costs award was also set aside.

The plaintiffs, beneficiaries of the Robinson Huron and Robinson Superior Treaties, brought a motion for partial summary judgment in Stage Two of their action against the federal and provincial Crowns.

They sought declarations that their claims for breach of the treaties' annuity augmentation promises were not barred by Ontario's limitations legislation or the doctrine of Crown immunity.

The Superior Court of Justice granted partial summary judgment on these issues, finding that treaties are not contracts or specialties subject to the Limitations Act, 1990, and that equitable claims for breach of fiduciary duty could historically be pursued by petition of right, thus falling outside Crown immunity under the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The court declined to grant summary judgment on the issues of joint and several liability and whether Canada should act as paymaster, deferring those matters to the Stage Three trial.

The Anishinaabe beneficiaries of the Robinson Huron and Robinson Superior Treaties of 1850 brought actions seeking declarations regarding the interpretation of the annuity augmentation clause in the Treaties.

The Treaties provided for a perpetual annuity that the Crown promised to increase if the ceded territory produced an amount enabling the Crown to do so without incurring loss, provided the amount paid to each individual did not exceed £1 ($4) per year, or such further sum as Her Majesty may be graciously pleased to order.

The Court held that the Crown has a mandatory obligation to increase the collective annuities when economic circumstances warrant, and that the $4 cap applies only to individual distributions, not the collective entitlement.

The Court also found that the Crown owes an ad hoc fiduciary duty to the beneficiaries to engage in the process of determining whether the economic circumstances warrant an increase.

The plaintiff brought a class action for damages arising from the "Sixties Scoop" alleging that Canada breached its obligation under the 1965 Canada-Ontario Welfare Services Agreement to consult Indian bands before extending child welfare services to reserves.

This failure resulted in the loss of aboriginal identity for thousands of children placed with non-aboriginal foster or adoptive parents.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, finding Canada liable for breaching a common law duty of care, though it did not establish a fiduciary duty.

The case will proceed to the damages assessment stage.

The plaintiffs successfully defended an appeal from a certification order and sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the defendant's conduct was part of a litigation strategy to obfuscate and delay.

The Divisional Court rejected this argument, finding no reprehensible conduct to justify substantial indemnity costs.

The court awarded the plaintiffs partial indemnity costs fixed at $35,000, finding the defendant's costs outline of approximately $34,400 to be a more reasonable reflection of the work required for two half-day hearings.

The plaintiffs, aboriginal persons removed from their homes by Ontario child welfare authorities and placed with non-aboriginal families, brought a proposed class action against Canada for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.

Canada appealed the dismissal of its motion to strike the statement of claim and the certification of the class action.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding it was not plain and obvious that the claims for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence disclosed no reasonable cause of action, given Canada's unique relationship with aboriginal peoples and its delegation of child welfare responsibilities to Ontario.

The defendant, the Attorney General of Canada, sought leave to appeal a decision certifying a class action and dismissing a motion to strike the amended statement of claim.

The class action was brought on behalf of Aboriginal children removed from their homes and placed in non-Aboriginal homes in Ontario between 1965 and 1984.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the certification judge's reliance on a 1965 Agreement that was not pleaded as the basis for the alleged fiduciary duty and duty of care, and noting the matter was of sufficient importance.

On a Rule 21.01 appeal, the court held that the moving party's representative treaty claim was not entirely non-justiciable.

After the respondent conceded on appeal that core claims, including a declaration about the meaning of the Treaty 3 schools provision, were justiciable, the court found it unfair to maintain an order striking the entire pleading without identifying the allegedly non-justiciable portions.

The order striking the statement of claim and dismissing the action was set aside without prejudice to a more targeted future challenge.

The court upheld the motion judge's conditions for proceeding representatively, requiring authorization from all 28 bands or joinder of non-authorizing bands, granted the requested plaintiff substitution amendment, and awarded appeal costs.

Following a re-hearing of a class action certification motion relating to the ‘Sixties Scoop’, the court addressed costs after granting certification and dismissing the federal Crown’s motion to strike.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs, but the court held that such costs require reprehensible or outrageous conduct and were not justified.

Applying a partial indemnity scale and reviewing historical certification-motion cost awards, the court found the plaintiffs’ request modest given the complexity of the litigation and the work spanning both the original and rehearing motions.

The court fixed costs at an all-inclusive amount reflecting fairness to the losing party and proportionality to comparable certification proceedings.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to certify a class action against the Federal Crown regarding the 'Sixties Scoop', alleging breach of fiduciary duty and negligence for funding provincial child welfare services that placed on-reserve aboriginal children in non-aboriginal homes without protecting their cultural identity.

The Federal Crown brought a cross-motion to strike the pleadings under Rule 21.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding it was not plain and obvious that the claims would fail, given the evolving nature of aboriginal law.

The court granted the certification motion, revising the class definition and common issues to focus specifically on the impact of the 1965 Canada-Ontario Welfare Services Agreement.

The parties made costs submissions following an appeal.

Given the divided success of the parties, the Court of Appeal ordered that there be no costs awarded for the motion for leave to appeal or the appeal.

The appellants appealed a Divisional Court order that set aside the conditional certification of their proposed class action against Canada regarding the placement of Aboriginal children in non-Aboriginal foster care.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's finding that the case management judge erred by conditionally certifying the action when the statement of claim did not disclose a viable cause of action.

The Court also agreed that the certification motion should be heard by a different judge to avoid the original judge sitting in review of his own decision.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding costs, quashing the Divisional Court's costs award because it failed to consider the public interest and novel legal issues raised by the case.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a motion judge's decision to conditionally certify a class action on behalf of aboriginal people placed in non-aboriginal foster or adoptive homes.

The motion judge had found that the statement of claim did not disclose a cause of action but conditionally certified claims in negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, effectively pre-approving an amended pleading.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by predetermining the viability of the cause of action without conducting a full analysis and denying the defendant the opportunity to argue the certification criteria.

The statement of claim was struck with leave to amend, and the certification motion was ordered to be heard by a different judge.

The appellant First Nation enacted its own labour relations code after a union was certified to represent workers at a casino located on its reserve.

The appellant argued that its code displaced the provincial Labour Relations Act based on its aboriginal and treaty rights under s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish an aboriginal practice, custom, or tradition that supported the right to enact a labour relations code.

The Court also held that the Crown did not breach its duty to consult and accommodate, as the appellant's claim was not sufficiently credible and the appellant had taken unilateral action.

The appellants, members of the Walpole Island First Nation, were convicted of hunting without a licence in the Robinson-Superior Treaty territory.

They argued they were sheltering under the treaty rights of the Michipicoten First Nation, an Ojibway community that is a signatory to the treaty.

The Court of Appeal held that while Aboriginal persons can shelter under another First Nation's treaty rights if supported by custom, the appellants failed to establish they had obtained the necessary communal consent in advance to share in the harvesting resource.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a member of the Aroland First Nation (Treaty 9), was charged with hunting moose without a licence in Treaty 3 territory.

He argued he had a constitutionally protected right to hunt there because he was married to a member of the Lac Seul First Nation (Treaty 3) and had been accepted into that community.

The justice of the peace acquitted him, but the appeal judge entered a conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, finding that the appellant was entitled to shelter under Treaty 3 rights as he was hunting in accordance with Ojibway custom and had been accepted by the Treaty 3 community to share in their harvest.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application seeking a declaration that certain lands in Ontario are not public lands available for disposition or regulation by the Crown.

The motion judge struck the application on the basis that the courts lack authority to adjudicate challenges to Canada's sovereignty.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the appellant's claim amounted to a challenge to sovereign jurisdiction, and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant First Nations sought judicial review to quash a Notice of Completion of an Environmental Study Report regarding the transfer of the Seaton lands by the Ontario Realty Corporation.

The applicants argued the Crown breached its constitutional and statutory duties to consult them about potential aboriginal burial sites on the lands.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no constitutional duty to consult because the applicants had surrendered their rights to the lands under the 1923 Williams Treaties.

The court also held that the statutory consultation process under the Environmental Assessment Act was procedurally fair, noting the broad nature of the assessment and the effective involvement of the Founding First Nations Circle.

The applicant, a beginning hothouse tomato farmer, sought judicial review of a decision denying it full funding under the Ontario Farm Income Disaster Program.

The applicant argued it was denied procedural fairness and relied on the doctrine of legitimate expectations regarding the calculation of its reference margins.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had been afforded procedural fairness through its participation in the review process, and that the doctrine of legitimate expectations does not create substantive rights to a particular funding calculation.