Joseph Eliot Magnet

On a constitutional appeal, the appellants sought declarations that Métis and non-status Indians fall within Parliament’s jurisdiction under s. 91(24), that the federal Crown owes them a fiduciary duty, and that they have consultation and negotiation rights.

The Court held that Métis and non-status Indians are “Indians” under s. 91(24), restored the broader trial declaration, and rejected restricting Métis status to the Powley framework for this jurisdictional purpose.

The Court found this declaration had practical utility in ending the federal-provincial jurisdictional impasse.

The Court declined the second and third declarations as restatements of settled law lacking practical utility.

The Pikangikum First Nation appealed the dismissal of its claim for misfeasance in public office against the former Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

The First Nation alleged the Minister unlawfully withheld infrastructure funding to force the withdrawal of an application for judicial review regarding the imposition of third-party management.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the Minister's actions were not motivated by an improper purpose or vindictive desire to harm, but were a reasonable response to the ongoing dispute and the need to ensure proper management of public funds.

The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed.

The applicant First Nations sought judicial review to quash a Notice of Completion of an Environmental Study Report regarding the transfer of the Seaton lands by the Ontario Realty Corporation.

The applicants argued the Crown breached its constitutional and statutory duties to consult them about potential aboriginal burial sites on the lands.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no constitutional duty to consult because the applicants had surrendered their rights to the lands under the 1923 Williams Treaties.

The court also held that the statutory consultation process under the Environmental Assessment Act was procedurally fair, noting the broad nature of the assessment and the effective involvement of the Founding First Nations Circle.

The appellant challenged provisions of Quebec's Charter of the French Language that required the exclusive or joint use of French in commercial signage and business.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions were intra vires the province as they related to commerce within the province.

However, the Court found that freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Canadian Charter and s. 3 of the Quebec Charter includes the freedom to choose one's language of expression.

The requirement for the exclusive use of French was not justified under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter or s. 9.1 of the Quebec Charter, and those provisions were struck down.

The provisions requiring the joint use of French were upheld as reasonable limits.