Hoilett

The applicants, two high school students, sought judicial review of a principal's decision to suspend them and transfer them to another school following a violent altercation.

The applicants argued the principal lacked jurisdiction to transfer them, breached procedural fairness, and violated their rights under sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the principal had the statutory authority to deny access and transfer students for safety reasons.

The court also held that there was no breach of procedural fairness and that the applicants failed to establish any Charter violations.

The appellant brought a motion to consolidate the hearing of a motion to set aside a 2007 order with a motion to set aside a 2003 order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to consolidate, noting the appellant had ample time to bring the 2003 motion on for hearing and failed to do so, and that the 2007 order was a discrete matter.

The appellant brought a motion for leave to introduce fresh evidence and a motion to set aside an order of a single judge quashing her appeal.

The underlying appeal was from a Law Society Hearing Panel's decision to recuse itself and the Appeal Panel's decision to quash her appeal of that recusal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for fresh evidence as the proposed evidence was irrelevant to whether the appealed decision was interlocutory.

The Court also dismissed the motion to set aside the order, finding no error in the conclusion that the decision appealed from was interlocutory and therefore not subject to appeal under the Law Society Act.

The Commissioner of the Cornwall Public Inquiry stated a case to the Divisional Court after a witness refused to answer questions at the inquiry.

The witness attended the inquiry but refused to answer questions, claiming he had no faith in the justice system and was a scapegoat.

The Divisional Court found that the witness had no lawful excuse for his refusal and found him guilty of contempt under section 8 of the Public Inquiries Act.

The witness was ordered to re-attend the inquiry to answer questions and to appear before the Court for punishment.

Following the dismissal of a judicial review application regarding environmental assessment bump-up requests, the successful respondents sought costs.

The Divisional Court found that the applicants brought the proceeding in bad faith to frustrate a land exchange, constituting an abuse of process.

Consequently, the court awarded costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

The Minister of the Environment was awarded $302,000 in fees, and the Ontario Realty Corporation was awarded $400,000 in fees.

A request to award costs personally against the principal of the applicant corporations was dismissed.

The applicant First Nations sought judicial review to quash a Notice of Completion of an Environmental Study Report regarding the transfer of the Seaton lands by the Ontario Realty Corporation.

The applicants argued the Crown breached its constitutional and statutory duties to consult them about potential aboriginal burial sites on the lands.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no constitutional duty to consult because the applicants had surrendered their rights to the lands under the 1923 Williams Treaties.

The court also held that the statutory consultation process under the Environmental Assessment Act was procedurally fair, noting the broad nature of the assessment and the effective involvement of the Founding First Nations Circle.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a labour arbitrator's decision forbidding the implementation of a finger scan system for checking employees in and out of the workplace.

The employer argued the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction and the decision was patently unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the employer had conceded jurisdiction before the arbitrator and that the arbitrator's balancing of the employer's interests against the employees' privacy interests was not patently unreasonable.