Tamara Dawn Barclay

The plaintiffs, a group of affiliated wine manufacturers and retailers, brought an action against the LCBO, the AGCO, and the Crown challenging the 'Made Policy', which regulates where wineries can sell their products.

The parties brought six competing motions, including motions to strike pleadings, motions for summary judgment, and a motion regarding the late disclosure of a tolling agreement between the defendants.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion to strike the defendants' pleadings over the tolling agreement, finding it did not alter the expected adversarial landscape.

The court struck significant portions of the plaintiffs' statement of claim against the LCBO and AGCO, particularly allegations relating to pre-2001 conduct that had been settled in prior litigation, and claims for intentional interference with economic relations.

The Crown's motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action against it.

The AGCO's and the plaintiffs' respective motions for summary judgment were dismissed, as the complex factual matrix and allegations of bad faith required a trial.

The applicants, a physician and three corporate entities operating independent health facilities, sought judicial review of the Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care's decision to set off $1.6 million in future facility fees against alleged past overbilling.

The Ministry had also alleged overbilling of physician fees but refused to issue a final notice that would allow the physician to seek an independent adjudication before the Physician Payment Review Board.

The Divisional Court found that the Ministry had no express or implied statutory authority under the Independent Health Facilities Act to impose the set-off.

Furthermore, the court held that the Ministry acted unreasonably in relying on equitable set-off to avoid an independent adjudication of the billing dispute.

The court granted the application and issued an order of mandamus requiring the Ministry to reimburse the applicants for the facility fees taken pursuant to the unlawful set-off decision.

The plaintiffs appealed an order of a Master upholding numerous refusals made during Rule 39.03 examinations of non-party witnesses.

The examinations related to interlocutory motions concerning the late disclosure of a tolling agreement between the defendants.

The plaintiffs alleged 14 errors of fact and law, primarily challenging the Master's findings on litigation privilege, common interest privilege, and the scope of permissible questions for Rule 39.03 witnesses.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors of fact or errors of law, and affirming that the documents and communications surrounding the tolling agreement were protected by privilege.

Three cross-appeals arose from the interpretation of a 1985 environmental indemnity granted by the Province of Ontario to former pulp mill owners, their successors and assigns, in the context of the settlement of mercury contamination litigation brought by two First Nations.

The majority held that the indemnity did not cover first party regulatory compliance orders, as the motion judge made palpable and overriding factual errors, and the indemnity, properly read as a whole, was intended to cover only third party pollution claims.

The appeal of the Province was allowed; the appeals of the corporate successors were dismissed.

The dissent (Côté, Brown and Rowe JJ.) would have dismissed the Province's appeal and allowed the appeal of Resolute, concluding the indemnity covered the Director's remediation order, that the fettering doctrine did not render the indemnity unenforceable, and that Resolute — as Great Lakes' corporate successor — was entitled to the indemnity's protection, but Weyerhaeuser was not, as neither an assignee nor a corporate successor of Great Lakes or Reed.

The appellants, two cottagers' associations, appealed a decision dismissing their application for a declaration that individual cottage sewage systems were subject to the Building Code Act rather than the Ontario Water Resources Act.

The central issue was whether the relevant "lot or parcel of land" for determining regulatory jurisdiction was the five registered parcels owned by the Grand River Conservation Authority or the individual cottage lots described in leases.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that "lot or parcel of land" means land that is legally recognized for municipal and planning law purposes and for which title can be conveyed.

Since the individual cottage lots were not formally severed or registered, the five registered parcels constituted the relevant "lot or parcel of land" bringing the collective sewage systems (exceeding 10,000 litres per day) under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Environment.

The Crown appealed a motion judge's order striking its third party claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding it was not plain and obvious that the Crown's third party claim had no reasonable prospect of success.

However, the respondent plaintiff amended his pleading to include language that would render the Crown's third party claim subject to being struck.

As a result, while the appeal was allowed, the practical outcome remained that the Crown's third party claim was struck.

The court awarded costs in accordance with the motion judge's decision, with each party bearing their own costs of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether a 1985 indemnity provided by the Province of Ontario to Great Lakes and Reed covered the costs of complying with a 2011 Director's Order requiring remedial work at an abandoned mercury waste disposal site near Dryden, Ontario.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment in favour of Weyerhaeuser and Resolute, finding both were entitled to indemnification.

The appellate court was divided.

The majority (Brown and Lauwers JJ.A.) held that the 1985 indemnity did cover the costs of complying with the Director's Order, but found that Resolute had no legal interest in the indemnity because Bowater had assigned the full benefit to Weyerhaeuser in 1998.

The majority remitted the issue of Weyerhaeuser's rights as assignee to the trial court.

Justice Laskin dissented, arguing the 1985 indemnity covered only third-party pollution claims, not first-party regulatory compliance costs.

This is an appeal of a motion judge's decision to strike the Crown's third party claims against 15 non-government, non-profit organizations that operated youth detention centres under contract with the Crown.

The plaintiff alleged negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of Charter rights arising from the use of solitary confinement in youth detention centres.

The plaintiff limited his claim to damages attributable to the Crown's proportionate degree of fault.

The motion judge struck the Crown's third party claims, relying on the principle from Taylor v. Canada (Health Canada) that when a plaintiff limits damages to a defendant's proportionate fault, the defendant cannot pursue contribution and indemnity claims.

The Crown appealed, arguing it was not plain and obvious that third party claims had no reasonable prospect of success, particularly regarding vicarious liability and breach of fiduciary duty claims.

This case concerns the interpretation of a 1985 indemnity agreement granted by the Province of Ontario to Great Lakes Forest Products Limited (now Resolute FP Canada Inc.) and its successors and assigns, regarding mercury contamination.

Weyerhaeuser Company Limited, a subsequent owner of the property, and Resolute sought indemnity from the Province for costs incurred complying with a 2011 environmental remediation order issued by the Ministry of the Environment.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that the indemnity's broad language covered statutory claims by provincial agencies and that the fettering doctrine did not apply to this business agreement.

Weyerhaeuser was also found to be able to rely on the indemnity as a successor or assignee.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for directions regarding the proper scope of questioning when examining a non-party witness on a pending motion under Rule 39.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held that the scope of such an examination is limited solely to the personal knowledge of the witness.

A Rule 39.03 witness is not required to take reasonable steps to inform themselves prior to being examined, nor are they obliged to make enquiries of others if they cannot answer questions due to a lack of knowledge or recollection.

The respondent Moose Cree First Nation brought a motion to strike portions of a judicial review application and supporting affidavit filed by the MoCreebec Council of the Cree Nation regarding a hydroelectric project.

The parties resolved several issues, including the removal of Charter and Aboriginal rights claims.

The court deferred a decision on striking hearsay evidence in the affidavit pending further information.

Given the complexity and public policy implications, the court referred the remaining issue of the applicant's capacity to bring the application to a full panel of the Divisional Court.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed the dismissal of her civil actions against police officers, the police services board, and the Crown for negligent investigation, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, false imprisonment, and Charter breaches.

The claims arose from her arrest for criminal harassment and a peace bond application related to her involvement in a domestic dispute between her romantic partner and his wife.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's core conclusions—that the police acted reasonably and had abundant admissible evidence to proceed—were supported by the evidence.

The appellants were successful on their appeal and sought costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants costs fixed at $50,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The respondent Frontenac Ventures Corporation was ordered to pay $40,000, and the respondent Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario was ordered to pay $10,000, as its position during the original contempt and sentencing hearings was instrumental in leading to the appeal.

Following a successful appeal of sentences imposed for contempt, the appellants sought costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants their costs of the appeal fixed at $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The respondent corporation was ordered to pay $20,000, and the respondent Minister was ordered to pay $5,000, as the Minister's position during the original contempt and sentencing hearings was instrumental in leading to the appeal.

The appellants, a First Nation and its leaders, engaged in a peaceful protest and blockade to prevent a private mining company from conducting exploratory drilling on lands subject to an ongoing aboriginal land claim.

They were found in civil contempt for violating interim and interlocutory injunctions and were sentenced to six months' imprisonment and substantial fines.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the custodial and monetary sentences, holding that they were excessively harsh and that the sentencing principles from R. v. Gladue apply to aboriginal persons facing civil contempt proceedings.

The appellants, a First Nation and six individuals, appealed their six-month sentences for contempt of a court order.

The respondent did not oppose the appeal, conceding that the appellants had spent enough time in jail and that the underlying dispute required negotiation.

The Court of Appeal accepted the respondent's position and allowed the appeal, ordering the release of the appellants.

The applicant First Nations sought judicial review to quash a Notice of Completion of an Environmental Study Report regarding the transfer of the Seaton lands by the Ontario Realty Corporation.

The applicants argued the Crown breached its constitutional and statutory duties to consult them about potential aboriginal burial sites on the lands.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no constitutional duty to consult because the applicants had surrendered their rights to the lands under the 1923 Williams Treaties.

The court also held that the statutory consultation process under the Environmental Assessment Act was procedurally fair, noting the broad nature of the assessment and the effective involvement of the Founding First Nations Circle.

The applicant, a beginning hothouse tomato farmer, sought judicial review of a decision denying it full funding under the Ontario Farm Income Disaster Program.

The applicant argued it was denied procedural fairness and relied on the doctrine of legitimate expectations regarding the calculation of its reference margins.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had been afforded procedural fairness through its participation in the review process, and that the doctrine of legitimate expectations does not create substantive rights to a particular funding calculation.

The appellant appealed an order striking his statement of claim.

The Court of Appeal found the allegations in the statement of claim to be confusing, difficult to follow, and legally untenable, with some relating to the Federal Crown and decades-old criminal dispositions.

Finding no error in the motion judge's reasons, the Court dismissed the appeal and awarded costs of $1,000 to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action for malicious prosecution against a Crown Attorney.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motions judge that there was no evidence of malice.

The court noted that the Crown Attorney chose not to call an unsavoury witness to prevent a wrongful conviction, which demonstrated an absence of malice, and that malice could not be inferred merely from a possible absence of reasonable and probable grounds.