Tamara Dawn Barclay

The appellants, two cottagers' associations, appealed a decision dismissing their application for a declaration that individual cottage sewage systems were subject to the Building Code Act rather than the Ontario Water Resources Act.

The central issue was whether the relevant "lot or parcel of land" for determining regulatory jurisdiction was the five registered parcels owned by the Grand River Conservation Authority or the individual cottage lots described in leases.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that "lot or parcel of land" means land that is legally recognized for municipal and planning law purposes and for which title can be conveyed.

Since the individual cottage lots were not formally severed or registered, the five registered parcels constituted the relevant "lot or parcel of land," bringing the collective sewage systems (exceeding 10,000 litres per day) under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Environment.

The Crown appealed a motion judge's order striking its third party claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding it was not plain and obvious that the Crown's third party claim had no reasonable prospect of success.

However, the respondent plaintiff amended his pleading to include language that would render the Crown's third party claim subject to being struck.

As a result, while the appeal was allowed, the practical outcome remained that the Crown's third party claim was struck.

The court awarded costs in accordance with the motion judge's decision, with each party bearing their own costs of the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether a 1985 indemnity provided by the Province of Ontario to Great Lakes and Reed covered the costs of complying with a 2011 Director's Order requiring remedial work at an abandoned mercury waste disposal site near Dryden, Ontario.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment in favour of Weyerhaeuser and Resolute, finding both were entitled to indemnification.

The appellate court was divided.

The majority (Brown and Lauwers JJ.A.) held that the 1985 indemnity did cover the costs of complying with the Director's Order, but found that Resolute had no legal interest in the indemnity because Bowater had assigned the full benefit to Weyerhaeuser in 1998.

The majority remitted the issue of Weyerhaeuser's rights as assignee to the trial court.

Justice Laskin dissented, arguing the 1985 indemnity covered only third-party pollution claims, not first-party regulatory compliance costs.

This is an appeal of a motion judge's decision to strike the Crown's third party claims against 15 non-government, non-profit organizations that operated youth detention centres under contract with the Crown.

The plaintiff alleged negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of Charter rights arising from the use of solitary confinement in youth detention centres.

The plaintiff limited his claim to damages attributable to the Crown's proportionate degree of fault.

The motion judge struck the Crown's third party claims, relying on the principle from Taylor v. Canada (Health Canada) that when a plaintiff limits damages to a defendant's proportionate fault, the defendant cannot pursue contribution and indemnity claims.

The Crown appealed, arguing it was not plain and obvious that third party claims had no reasonable prospect of success, particularly regarding vicarious liability and breach of fiduciary duty claims.

This case concerns the interpretation of a 1985 indemnity agreement granted by the Province of Ontario to Great Lakes Forest Products Limited (now Resolute FP Canada Inc.) and its successors and assigns, regarding mercury contamination.

Weyerhaeuser Company Limited, a subsequent owner of the property, and Resolute sought indemnity from the Province for costs incurred complying with a 2011 environmental remediation order issued by the Ministry of the Environment.

The court granted summary judgment, finding that the indemnity's broad language covered statutory claims by provincial agencies and that the fettering doctrine did not apply to this business agreement.

Weyerhaeuser was also found to be able to rely on the indemnity as a successor or assignee.