E. Ria Tzimas

Following a prior decision in favour of the plaintiffs on a motion, the court addressed the quantum of costs payable.

The plaintiffs sought approximately $174,000 in costs on a partial indemnity basis, while the federal defendant argued that $75,000 was reasonable.

The court considered the substantial evidentiary record, the importance of the motion, and the extensive preparation required to establish a meritorious claim related to Indigenous rights litigation.

Balancing these factors, the court fixed costs at $125,000 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The costs award remained subject to possible re‑adjustment between the governmental defendants at trial.

The Aboriginal appellants were convicted of night hunting and discharging a firearm on a road after shooting at a moose decoy from a gravel logging road.

They appealed, arguing they were exercising their hunting rights under Treaty No. 9.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the road was a 'right of way for public vehicular traffic' and constituted land 'taken up' for forestry and public use, making it visibly incompatible with hunting.

Therefore, the treaty right did not protect their actions on that specific road.

The appellants were successful on their appeal and sought costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants costs fixed at $50,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The respondent Frontenac Ventures Corporation was ordered to pay $40,000, and the respondent Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario was ordered to pay $10,000, as its position during the original contempt and sentencing hearings was instrumental in leading to the appeal.

Following a successful appeal of sentences imposed for contempt, the appellants sought costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants their costs of the appeal fixed at $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The respondent corporation was ordered to pay $20,000, and the respondent Minister was ordered to pay $5,000, as the Minister's position during the original contempt and sentencing hearings was instrumental in leading to the appeal.

The appellants, a First Nation and its leaders, engaged in a peaceful protest and blockade to prevent a private mining company from conducting exploratory drilling on lands subject to an ongoing aboriginal land claim.

They were found in civil contempt for violating interim and interlocutory injunctions and were sentenced to six months' imprisonment and substantial fines.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the custodial and monetary sentences, holding that they were excessively harsh and that the sentencing principles from R. v. Gladue apply to aboriginal persons facing civil contempt proceedings.

The appellants, a First Nation and six individuals, appealed their six-month sentences for contempt of a court order.

The respondent did not oppose the appeal, conceding that the appellants had spent enough time in jail and that the underlying dispute required negotiation.

The Court of Appeal accepted the respondent's position and allowed the appeal, ordering the release of the appellants.

The applicants sought judicial review of the Minister of the Environment's approval of Terms of Reference for an environmental assessment regarding a proposed landfill expansion.

The core issue was the interpretation of section 6.1(3) of the Environmental Assessment Act, specifically whether the phrase 'other than' meant 'in addition to' or 'different from' the standard requirements.

The Divisional Court held that 'other than' means 'in addition to', requiring the proponent to fulfill the comprehensive environmental assessment requirements listed in section 6.1(2).

The Minister's decision approving the Terms of Reference was quashed.

Following the release of reasons disposing of the appeals regarding an Indigenous land claim, the Court of Appeal determined the costs of the proceedings.

The court ordered the appellant to pay 50% of the federal and provincial crowns' costs of the appeals on a party and party basis, noting the federal crown's unsuccessful arguments regarding the validity of the land surrender.

The class representatives, including the railway company, were awarded 100% of their costs for both the summary judgment motions and the appeals on a party and party basis.

The court directed that all costs be assessed rather than fixed.

An Indigenous band appealed from a summary judgment disposition concerning reserve lands sold in the 19th century without a lawful formal surrender.

The Court of Appeal held that there had been no surrender and that the claim was not barred by statutory limitation periods, but concluded that declaratory and possessory relief should nevertheless be refused.

The court applied public law discretion and equitable doctrines, emphasizing the band's historical acquiescence, the extraordinary delay in asserting the land claim, and the reliance of innocent third-party landowners who had held and developed the properties for generations.

The band was left to pursue its damages claims against the Crown.

Several Indigenous moving parties sought leave to intervene in multiple appeals concerning Aboriginal rights and title issues.

The court held that three of the moving parties had a sufficient interest in the outcome and could usefully add to the issues, and granted intervention on strict conditions, including that the existing record would stand and a single factum be delivered.

A separate moving party seeking intervention primarily to challenge portions of Ontario's factum was refused leave because the court was not persuaded it would add anything materially new to the arguments already to be made by existing parties.

No costs were ordered.