Francis J. Thatcher

The court rendered a sentencing decision for Adrian Myles Puentes-Reed and Kalid Yousuf, who were found guilty of eight firearms, drug, and proceeds of crime offences.

The judge accepted the joint sentencing submission from counsel, imposing a nine-year penitentiary sentence for Puentes-Reed and an eight-year penitentiary sentence for Yousuf, less time served.

The decision emphasized the principles of denunciation and deterrence, acknowledging the severe societal harms caused by drug trafficking and the associated violence, while also considering the offenders' prospects for rehabilitation.

The accused, Adrian Myles Puentes-Reed and Kalid Yousuf, were jointly charged with multiple offences including possession of proceeds of crime, possession of cocaine and marijuana for trafficking, and various firearm offences.

They were found asleep in a "safe house" in Thunder Bay containing large amounts of cash, drugs, and firearms.

The defence argued lack of possession and knowledge, with Puentes-Reed claiming he was intoxicated and inadvertently brought to the residence.

The court rejected the defence's explanations, finding them incredible and inconsistent with documentary evidence and the nature of the "safe house" operation.

Both accused were found guilty on all remaining charges, as the Crown proved constructive possession and knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.

C.B. was convicted of six charges, including sexual assault and sexual interference, involving a minor.

The court imposed a global sentence of six years incarceration for the sexual interference charges, conditionally staying the sexual assault charges based on the Kienapple principle.

The decision emphasized the profound wrongfulness of child sexual victimization, aligning with the Supreme Court of Canada's guidance in R. v. Friesen, and highlighted grooming behavior as an aggravating factor.

Ancillary orders for DNA, SOIRA registration, and a weapons prohibition were also made.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of sexual assault and sexual interference against a 13-year-old complainant, as well as breach of probation.

The Crown alleged four distinct incidents of sexual assault.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found the complainant's evidence credible and rejected the accused's denials for three of the incidents.

The court found the accused guilty of sexual assault and sexual interference for the incidents at the apartment building, the public library, and the accused's mother's home.

The accused was acquitted of the charges relating to the fourth incident due to reasonable doubt.

The accused was also found guilty of breaching his probation order.

The accused, an 18-year-old Indigenous male employed as a guitar teacher at a youth center, was convicted of two counts of sexual interference contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code.

The first victim was a 12-year-old girl whom the accused met through his employment, lured to his home, and sexually assaulted.

The second victim was also 12 years old; the accused met her through Facebook, took her to an empty apartment, and raped her.

The accused had a prior youth conviction for the same offense and committed the second assault while on bail for the first.

The court imposed a global sentence of five years imprisonment, with credit for pre-trial custody reducing the remaining sentence to approximately two years and four months.

The court also imposed a lifetime section 161 order restricting contact with children, prohibiting employment with children, and restricting access to public spaces where children gather.

The accused, Ricky Keewasin, was found guilty of aggravated sexual assault and sexual interference.

The Crown applied to have him declared a dangerous offender.

The court considered a joint submission on sentence for the index offences and a long-term supervision order, but the designation as dangerous offender versus long-term offender was contested.

The court, after reviewing pre-sentence and Gladue reports, victim impact statements, and expert psychiatric evidence, found the accused to be a dangerous offender due to a pattern of repetitive violent behaviour, treatment-resistant substance abuse, and antisocial personality disorder.

The court accepted the joint submission for an eight-year concurrent sentence for the index offences, less credit for time served, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order, and ancillary orders including DNA sample, Sex Offender Information Registration Act compliance, and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The accused pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing the death of three people after operating an overloaded, ill-equipped boat in severe weather while impaired by alcohol, despite police warnings.

The court considered the accused's Indigenous background and intergenerational trauma detailed in a Gladue report.

Balancing denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation, the court sentenced the accused to 18 months in custody followed by three years of probation, along with ancillary orders including a DNA order and a qualified boating prohibition.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of criminal harassment and disobeying a court order relating to his ex-partner, her family members, and a police officer.

The Crown alleged the accused engaged in threatening conduct toward the officer and repeatedly communicated with the ex-partner's family members through letters and in-person encounters.

The court found the accused not guilty of the criminal harassment charges, concluding the conduct toward the officer was not a tool of intimidation and the Crown failed to prove repeated communications with the family members.

However, the accused was found guilty of one count of disobeying a non-communication order for sending a letter to the ex-partner's uncle that explicitly asked him to speak to the accused's daughter on his behalf.

The accused, Monica Spence and Daniel Debassige, were sentenced for their roles in the beating death of the victim.

Following a trial, Debassige was found guilty of second-degree murder, and Spence was found guilty of manslaughter due to intoxication and provocation after the victim sexually assaulted her.

Applying Gladue principles and considering pre-sentence reports, the court sentenced Spence to five years (with credit for pre-sentence custody, leaving 703 days) followed by three years of probation.

Debassige received a mandatory life sentence with no parole eligibility for 10 years, in accordance with a joint submission.

The accused, Ricky Lionel Keewasin, was charged with aggravated sexual assault, sexual interference, and two counts of breach of recognizance involving a 13-year-old complainant, J.M. The trial focused on identity, as J.M.'s recollection was sparse due to intoxication.

The Crown relied on J.M.'s preliminary inquiry testimony, video surveillance, and DNA evidence (J.M.'s blood on the accused's sweatshirt).

The defence argued J.M.'s testimony was unreliable and the video quality insufficient for identification.

The court rejected the accused's testimony, finding the video and DNA evidence, combined with J.M.'s and her sister's testimony, sufficient to establish identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also ruled J.M.'s initial statements to her cousin and police were not admissible as *res gestae*.

The accused was found guilty on all four charges.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for breach of contract and inducing breach of contract regarding a commercial restaurant lease.

The trial judge found the appellants unreasonably refused consent to a sublease and maliciously induced a tenant to breach her contract to punish the respondent for unrelated litigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's factual findings, credibility assessments, or the damages award.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed a trial judgment that awarded her $10,000 in general damages for defamation but declined to award punitive damages.

The defamation occurred when a conservation officer left a voicemail for the appellant's client suggesting she was incompetent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge applied the correct test from Hill v. Church of Scientology and made factual findings supporting the conclusion that the officer's conduct was not malicious, oppressive, or high-handed.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault and uttering a threat arising from an altercation with his intimate partner in a confined kitchen space.

He argued that the trial judge failed to properly apply the credibility analysis required by R. v. W.(D.) and improperly relied on credibility findings to reject his evidence.

The appellant further submitted that the conduct, even if intentional, should have been treated as trivial under the maxim de minimis non curat lex.

The court held that the trial judge correctly assessed credibility, considered the evidence as a whole, and provided alternative reasoning demonstrating that the conduct constituted a non‑consensual touching amounting to assault.

The factual findings supporting the uttering threats conviction were also supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with assault against a domestic partner and assault against a police officer.

The Crown alleged that on October 16, 2013, the defendant assaulted the victim in a convenience store and subsequently assaulted a constable during arrest.

The court found a reasonable doubt regarding the first assault charge due to insufficient evidence of the nature and seriousness of the altercation, and acquitted on both counts.

The court found that the defendant's injuries were caused by the police during arrest, not by any assault on the officer, and that the defendant's resistance during arrest did not constitute intentional application of force.

The plaintiff, a lawyer, brought a defamation action against a conservation officer and the Crown after the officer left a voicemail for the plaintiff's client stating that the plaintiff was 'pretty much incompetent' and had 'mishandled grossly' the client's case.

The defendants conceded the statement was defamatory but argued the defence of qualified privilege.

The court found that the officer did not have a moral duty to make the call, and thus the occasion was not protected by qualified privilege.

Furthermore, even if privilege applied, the officer exceeded its scope by making gratuitous comments about the plaintiff's competence.

The court awarded the plaintiff $10,000 in general damages.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their counterclaim as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellants argued that the limitation period was suspended under s. 52 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, because an arbitration had been commenced via correspondence, or alternatively, that the respondent was estopped from pleading a limitations defence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the parties' correspondence merely proposed an arbitration agreement and did not commence an arbitration under s. 23 of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The court also found no evidence to support an estoppel claim.

The plaintiff alleged that he and another individual formed a partnership with a third person to develop a nightclub and microbrewery venture, and that the defendants diverted the opportunity by securing a lease and operating the business themselves.

The plaintiff also claimed standing as assignee of the co‑venturer’s alleged cause of action through security agreements relating to unrelated debts.

The court found that the plaintiff was not a partner in the venture, noting his absence from key negotiations and documentation such as the letter of intent to lease.

The court further held that the co‑venturer’s refusal or inability to provide financing effectively constituted withdrawal from the partnership, permitting the remaining participant to proceed independently.

As a result, neither the co‑venturer nor the plaintiff as alleged assignee had a viable cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty or diversion of opportunity.

The appellant moved for substantial indemnity costs and an order prohibiting the respondent from filing responding material after the respondent's cheques for costs, payable as a condition of an adjournment, were returned for insufficient funds.

The respondent's counsel had promptly replaced the cheques with a firm trust cheque once notified.

The court awarded $200 in costs for the inconvenience of the dishonoured cheques but dismissed the request to prohibit responding materials as premature.

The court noted the escalation of costs was due to a lack of professional courtesy and communication between counsel.

The applicant, a former First Nations Constable, sought judicial review of the 1998 decisions terminating her employment and her appointment as a police officer.

The application was commenced in 2007 and perfected in 2008, nearly ten years after the impugned decisions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for delay, finding the applicant's explanations for the delay unsatisfactory and noting that the respondents would suffer actual prejudice due to the passage of time and the unavailability of witnesses.

The Crown appealed acquittals on multiple sexual offence counts involving two young complainants in a judge-alone trial.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge misapprehended the Crown's purpose in seeking to rely on the evidence on each count as similar fact evidence across the indictment, wrongly characterizing the purpose as an attack on credibility rather than proof of a pattern refuting coincidence and confirming the complainants' accounts.

The court further held that, in a non-jury multi-count trial where the evidence was already before the court, reasoning prejudice and moral prejudice carried little weight.

The proposed similar fact evidence was highly probative and should have been admitted.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.