Francis J. Thatcher

The court rendered a sentencing decision for Adrian Myles Puentes-Reed and Kalid Yousuf, who were found guilty of eight firearms, drug, and proceeds of crime offences.

The judge accepted the joint sentencing submission from counsel, imposing a nine-year penitentiary sentence for Puentes-Reed and an eight-year penitentiary sentence for Yousuf, less time served.

The decision emphasized the principles of denunciation and deterrence, acknowledging the severe societal harms caused by drug trafficking and the associated violence, while also considering the offenders' prospects for rehabilitation.

The accused, Adrian Myles Puentes-Reed and Kalid Yousuf, were jointly charged with multiple offences including possession of proceeds of crime, possession of cocaine and marijuana for trafficking, and various firearm offences.

They were found asleep in a "safe house" in Thunder Bay containing large amounts of cash, drugs, and firearms.

The defence argued lack of possession and knowledge, with Puentes-Reed claiming he was intoxicated and inadvertently brought to the residence.

The court rejected the defence's explanations, finding them incredible and inconsistent with documentary evidence and the nature of the "safe house" operation.

Both accused were found guilty on all remaining charges, as the Crown proved constructive possession and knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt.

C.B. was convicted of six charges, including sexual assault and sexual interference, involving a minor.

The court imposed a global sentence of six years incarceration for the sexual interference charges, conditionally staying the sexual assault charges based on the Kienapple principle.

The decision emphasized the profound wrongfulness of child sexual victimization, aligning with the Supreme Court of Canada's guidance in R. v. Friesen, and highlighted grooming behavior as an aggravating factor.

Ancillary orders for DNA, SOIRA registration, and a weapons prohibition were also made.

The accused, an 18-year-old Indigenous male employed as a guitar teacher at a youth center, was convicted of two counts of sexual interference contrary to section 151 of the Criminal Code.

The first victim was a 12-year-old girl whom the accused met through his employment, lured to his home, and sexually assaulted.

The second victim was also 12 years old; the accused met her through Facebook, took her to an empty apartment, and raped her.

The accused had a prior youth conviction for the same offense and committed the second assault while on bail for the first.

The court imposed a global sentence of five years imprisonment, with credit for pre-trial custody reducing the remaining sentence to approximately two years and four months.

The court also imposed a lifetime section 161 order restricting contact with children, prohibiting employment with children, and restricting access to public spaces where children gather.

The accused, Ricky Keewasin, was found guilty of aggravated sexual assault and sexual interference.

The Crown applied to have him declared a dangerous offender.

The court considered a joint submission on sentence for the index offences and a long-term supervision order, but the designation as dangerous offender versus long-term offender was contested.

The court, after reviewing pre-sentence and Gladue reports, victim impact statements, and expert psychiatric evidence, found the accused to be a dangerous offender due to a pattern of repetitive violent behaviour, treatment-resistant substance abuse, and antisocial personality disorder.

The court accepted the joint submission for an eight-year concurrent sentence for the index offences, less credit for time served, followed by a 10-year long-term supervision order, and ancillary orders including DNA sample, Sex Offender Information Registration Act compliance, and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The accused, Ricky Lionel Keewasin, was charged with aggravated sexual assault, sexual interference, and two counts of breach of recognizance involving a 13-year-old complainant, J.M. The trial focused on identity, as J.M.'s recollection was sparse due to intoxication.

The Crown relied on J.M.'s preliminary inquiry testimony, video surveillance, and DNA evidence (J.M.'s blood on the accused's sweatshirt).

The defence argued J.M.'s testimony was unreliable and the video quality insufficient for identification.

The court rejected the accused's testimony, finding the video and DNA evidence, combined with J.M.'s and her sister's testimony, sufficient to establish identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also ruled J.M.'s initial statements to her cousin and police were not admissible as *res gestae*.

The accused was found guilty on all four charges.

The appellant appealed convictions for assault and uttering a threat arising from an altercation with his intimate partner in a confined kitchen space.

He argued that the trial judge failed to properly apply the credibility analysis required by R. v. W.(D.) and improperly relied on credibility findings to reject his evidence.

The appellant further submitted that the conduct, even if intentional, should have been treated as trivial under the maxim de minimis non curat lex.

The court held that the trial judge correctly assessed credibility, considered the evidence as a whole, and provided alternative reasoning demonstrating that the conduct constituted a non‑consensual touching amounting to assault.

The factual findings supporting the uttering threats conviction were also supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with assault against a domestic partner and assault against a police officer.

The Crown alleged that on October 16, 2013, the defendant assaulted the victim in a convenience store and subsequently assaulted a constable during arrest.

The court found a reasonable doubt regarding the first assault charge due to insufficient evidence of the nature and seriousness of the altercation, and acquitted on both counts.

The court found that the defendant's injuries were caused by the police during arrest, not by any assault on the officer, and that the defendant's resistance during arrest did not constitute intentional application of force.

The plaintiff, a lawyer, brought a defamation action against a conservation officer and the Crown after the officer left a voicemail for the plaintiff's client stating that the plaintiff was 'pretty much incompetent' and had 'mishandled grossly' the client's case.

The defendants conceded the statement was defamatory but argued the defence of qualified privilege.

The court found that the officer did not have a moral duty to make the call, and thus the occasion was not protected by qualified privilege.

Furthermore, even if privilege applied, the officer exceeded its scope by making gratuitous comments about the plaintiff's competence.

The court awarded the plaintiff $10,000 in general damages.

The plaintiff alleged that he and another individual formed a partnership with a third person to develop a nightclub and microbrewery venture, and that the defendants diverted the opportunity by securing a lease and operating the business themselves.

The plaintiff also claimed standing as assignee of the co‑venturer’s alleged cause of action through security agreements relating to unrelated debts.

The court found that the plaintiff was not a partner in the venture, noting his absence from key negotiations and documentation such as the letter of intent to lease.

The court further held that the co‑venturer’s refusal or inability to provide financing effectively constituted withdrawal from the partnership, permitting the remaining participant to proceed independently.

As a result, neither the co‑venturer nor the plaintiff as alleged assignee had a viable cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty or diversion of opportunity.