Elaine Burton

The defendant was charged with sexual assault and failure to comply with probation.

The complainant alleged non-consensual sexual activity, while the defendant claimed consent or an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The court assessed the credibility of the complainant, who presented as highly excitable and inconsistent, and other witnesses whose testimony was found unreliable or influenced.

The court noted ambiguities in the evidence, including text messages that did not explicitly accuse sexual impropriety.

Given the inconsistencies and the complainant's demeanor, the court found that the Crown had not proven the sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt, and it was a reasonable possibility that the defendant had an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

Consequently, both charges were dismissed.

The accused, Ricky Lionel Keewasin, was charged with aggravated sexual assault, sexual interference, and two counts of breach of recognizance involving a 13-year-old complainant, J.M. The trial focused on identity, as J.M.'s recollection was sparse due to intoxication.

The Crown relied on J.M.'s preliminary inquiry testimony, video surveillance, and DNA evidence (J.M.'s blood on the accused's sweatshirt).

The defence argued J.M.'s testimony was unreliable and the video quality insufficient for identification.

The court rejected the accused's testimony, finding the video and DNA evidence, combined with J.M.'s and her sister's testimony, sufficient to establish identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also ruled J.M.'s initial statements to her cousin and police were not admissible as *res gestae*.

The accused was found guilty on all four charges.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of home invasion sexual assault dating back to 1985-1987.

After being discharged at a preliminary inquiry in 1989, the police kept the investigation open pending advancements in DNA technology.

A preferred indictment was eventually obtained in 2010 after DNA linked the accused to the crimes.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed by the 25-year delay.

The court found that while much of the delay was inherent time required for DNA science to evolve, there were 32 months of unreasonable delay attributable to the Crown and police.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts: failing to remit revenues from fishing licence sales over a two-year period (approximately $50,931.92) contrary to the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act, 1997, and unlawfully possessing fish in excess of the daily possession limit contrary to the Ontario Fishery Regulations, 2007.

The defendant was a 50-year-old Canadian citizen operating a fishing licence sales business who had recently undergone personal bankruptcy and made partial restitution of approximately $30,000 out of $98,000 owed.

The court imposed a 30-day intermittent sentence (served on weekends), a $300 fine for the possession offence, and two years of probation, balancing denunciation and general deterrence against mitigating factors including the defendant's economic circumstances, guilty plea, and restitution efforts.

The accused faced multiple historical sexual assault charges and brought a motion seeking a stay of proceedings under ss. 7 and 11(b) of the Charter based on delay.

The parties sought directions on whether the stay application should be argued before trial or during the jury trial.

The court held that, absent unusual circumstances, motions for a stay based on unreasonable delay should generally be heard prior to trial.

Because the defence relied on an inference of prejudice and there was an adequate evidentiary record, the court directed that the Charter motion be argued in advance of trial.

The accused applied under s. 520 of the Criminal Code for a review of a detention order pending trial on multiple charges including armed robbery with a firearm, breach of recognizance, and sexual assault.

The applicant argued that material changes in circumstances justified release, including the commencement of trials, proposed new sureties, alleged harsh detention conditions, and asserted defences to the charges.

The court held that a bail review is not a de novo hearing and requires either an error in principle in the original decision or a material change in circumstances.

The proposed sureties were found unsuitable and did not constitute a material change, particularly given prior breaches and concerns about supervision and firearms at the proposed residence.

The court concluded that no material change in circumstances had been established and upheld the detention order.

The accused brought an application to quash a search warrant authorizing the search of his residence and vehicle for firearms, and to exclude evidence obtained during the search under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The police had obtained the warrant after the accused admitted to firing a 9 mm handgun at intruders and stated the gun was in his car.

The court found there was insufficient evidence to justify searching the residence, as the information only connected the offences to the handgun in the vehicle.

The court held the search of the residence violated the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded the breach was serious and profoundly intrusive, and excluded the evidence found in the residence, including a prohibited rifle, under s. 24(2).