Michael Joseph Cupello

A family law trial involving disputes over child support, spousal support, and equalization of family property following the breakdown of a marriage.

The parties cohabited for approximately two years and five months (March 2014 to August 2017) and were married on August 9, 2014.

The applicant mother sought spousal support and equalization; the respondent father disputed the amounts and certain valuations.

The court determined child support arrears, awarded limited-term spousal support on a compensatory basis, and ordered an equalization payment based on adjusted valuations of family assets.

The respondent brought a motion seeking a temporary order permitting relocation of the child from Thunder Bay to Kenora, Ontario.

The applicant opposed the motion.

The court found that the respondent, as the primary care parent with sole decision-making authority, met the burden of proof under section 16.93(2) of the Divorce Act.

The court authorized the relocation, finding it was in the child's best interests based on the respondent's improved economic circumstances, the child's young age and adaptability, the manageable distance between the two locations, and the respondent's willingness to facilitate the applicant's parenting time.

The court suspended child support obligations pending further agreement or court order and awarded costs to the respondent.

This is a costs decision following motions heard on June 30, 2025 in a family law proceeding involving parenting time, child support, and related issues.

The applicant sought costs for multiple attendances before the court.

The judge awarded costs totalling $3,500.00 inclusive of HST and disbursements to the applicant, declining to award costs for certain earlier attendances but awarding costs for the April 17, 2025 child support motion and the June 30, 2025 consolidated motions hearing.

In a family law trial following the separation of a common law couple of over 22 years with three children, the court dismissed the applicant's claim for repayment of an alleged $14,000 loan made to the respondent in September 2018.

The applicant sought repayment plus prejudgment interest, while the respondent denied the funds were a loan and claimed he had provided construction supplies and services in excess of that amount.

After resolving all other outstanding issues including retroactive child and spousal support and section 7 expenses, the court found the applicant had not met her burden of proof on the balance of probabilities that the transaction constituted an enforceable loan.

The court determined the funds were instead a transfer for consideration, representing compensation for the respondent's labour and materials provided for the applicant's business ventures.

During a family law trial, the applicant sought to introduce a handwritten document as evidence of a loan obligation.

The respondent objected on the basis of settlement privilege.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine admissibility.

The court found that the document constituted an offer to settle a family law dispute and was therefore inadmissible under Rule 18(8)(b) of the Family Law Rules, which provides that settlement offers shall not be mentioned to the judge until all issues in dispute except costs have been dealt with.

The court also found that the document did not constitute an admission of the alleged debt, as it merely stated an amount would be paid at a particular time without acknowledging liability.

A family law trial concerning parenting arrangements for Lincoln, a child born to the applicant and respondent in December 2019.

The applicant sought sole decision-making and primary residence, while the respondent sought joint decision-making and increased parenting time.

The court found that the respondent had been the primary caregiver for the first 3.5 years of Lincoln's life and that the applicant had engaged in a course of conduct not in the child's best interests following the respondent's incarceration, including limiting contact with the respondent's family, relocating further away, and enrolling the child in a distant school.

The court ordered joint decision-making, primary residence with the respondent, and a parenting schedule providing the applicant with three out of five weekends plus holiday access.

Child support was ordered based on the applicant's income with imputed income for the respondent.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment and partial summary judgment brought by Labonte regarding a commercial mortgage dispute.

The court found that the motion did not advance the litigation and that the issues, including the right to set off and the meaning of the contract, required a trial.

The court also enjoined Labonte from taking further steps to enforce the notice of sale and demand for possession until further court order, and addressed costs and case management going forward.

The court dismissed a motion for partial summary judgment brought by Caroline Manon Labonte regarding a commercial mortgage dispute involving Browns Clearwater West Lodge Inc. and related parties.

The court found that the motion did not meet the criteria for partial summary judgment, as it would not make the litigation cheaper, faster, or avoid inconsistent findings.

The court also enjoined Labonte from taking further steps to enforce a notice of sale and demand for possession until further court order, and addressed costs and case management issues.

The applicants sought orders to remove the respondent as executor and estate trustee of the Estate of Milton Westover, revoke her certificate of appointment, and appoint a replacement trustee.

The applicants alleged the trustee delayed administration, had conflicts of interest, wasted assets, failed to account, disrespected court orders, and lacked capacity.

The respondent argued the applicants lacked standing.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the applicants, as judgment creditors or potential judgment creditors, did not possess the requisite "financial interest" in the estate to establish standing under Rule 75.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, consistent with a narrow interpretation of this term in estate litigation.

This urgent motion addressed a father's unilateral relocation of two of his three children, aged 11 and 13, from Marathon to Levack (over 700 km away) without the mother's consent or a court order, in violation of the amended Divorce Act.

The mother immediately sought an order for the children's return.

The court found the father's actions unlawful, ordered the immediate return of the children to the mother's care in Marathon, and temporarily established the mother's residence as the children's primary residence.

The court also granted the mother costs of the motion.

The moving parties (the "Browns") sought an injunction to prevent the responding parties (Labonte) from enforcing a notice of sale under mortgage.

The Browns had withheld mortgage payments, relying on a set-off clause in the purchase agreement.

The court applied the three-part RJR-MacDonald test for interlocutory injunctions.

While a serious issue to be tried existed regarding the interpretation of the set-off clause, the Browns did not fully satisfy the irreparable harm or balance of convenience tests as requested.

The court found that the Browns would suffer irreparable harm if the property was sold, but the balance of convenience did not favour granting an outright injunction due to substantial mortgage arrears and the lack of quantification of the set-off claim.

The motion was adjourned, and an interim order was made prohibiting Labonte from enforcing the notice of sale on terms that required the Browns to make substantial payments towards the mortgage arrears.

The Applicant, Ms. Baxter, sought an order for costs against the Respondent, Mr. Pykari, related to Mr. Pykari’s dismissed motion to vary child and spousal support on a temporary basis.

The court awarded Ms. Baxter costs in the amount of $8,500, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The decision applied family cost rules, emphasizing the presumption that a successful party is entitled to costs, and considered factors such as the parties' behaviour, the complexity of issues, and proportionality.

The court found that Mr. Pykari's original motion was best left for trial due to insufficient evidence and dated income information, and noted that both parties shared responsibility for delays and lack of disclosure, which influenced the final costs award.

This trial addressed two outstanding issues from a prior settlement: whether the payor spouse's spousal support obligation should bind his estate, and if so, whether it should be secured.

The court found that the recipient spouse was in need and that the payor's death was not unanticipated given his age and declining health.

Applying principles from Katz v. Katz, the court ordered a limited spousal support obligation of $25,000 to bind the payor's estate, but declined to order security for this obligation, citing the payor's uninsurability and potential complications for future asset sales.

The respondent sought to vary interim child and spousal support orders, arguing for annual adjustments to child support and termination or reduction of spousal support due to decreased income and accumulated arrears.

The applicant opposed, arguing the issues were for trial due to complex income determination, including the respondent's business income and potential imputation of income to both parties.

The court dismissed the motion, finding insufficient evidence to determine income for support purposes and that the issues were best left for a full trial.

The applicant, Brown’s Clearwater West Lodge Inc., brought two motions: one to consolidate two related actions (a share purchase action and a mortgage action) and another to set aside default judgments obtained by the respondent, Caroline Manon Labonte, in the mortgage action.

The court granted both motions, finding that the default judgments were irregularly obtained and should be set aside as of right without imposing terms.

The court also found that consolidation was appropriate given the interwoven issues and common questions of fact and law stemming from the same share purchase agreement, promoting judicial efficiency and avoiding multiplicity of proceedings.

The respondent moved to adjourn a trial in a mobility case, which the applicant opposed.

The motion was based on the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) being unable to complete its report by a court-ordered deadline, which had effectively vacated the OCL's involvement.

The court denied the adjournment, emphasizing the importance of adhering to procedural orders, the vacating of the OCL order due to non-compliance with the deadline, and the need for timely adjudication in the child's best interests given limited judicial resources.

This addendum to a trial judgment addresses unresolved parenting time arrangements for two young children following the mother's approved relocation from Marathon to Espanola, ON.

The court considered the father's request for a weekly monthly schedule and the mother's proposal for a 4-5 day monthly schedule, balancing the children's need for frequent contact with the father against the challenges of long-distance travel and school attendance.

The court ordered a five-day monthly parenting schedule, to be arranged around statutory holidays or PD days to minimize missed school.

It also determined specific holiday parenting time, including summer and March Break, and clarified exchange locations and communication methods.

This appeal concerned a dispute over the purchase price of a property.

The appellant (vendor) claimed the agreed price was $80,000, while the respondent (purchaser) asserted it was $40,000, which he had already paid.

The trial judge found in favour of the purchaser, interpreting the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) contextually.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's contextual interpretation of the contract, consistent with the principles set out in Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., and deferring to the trial judge's findings of fact and assessment of evidence.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a prior motion where the respondent mother was entirely successful and "bested" her offer to settle.

The mother sought costs on a partial indemnity basis up to the offer date and full recovery thereafter.

The applicant father argued the claimed costs were unreasonable and disproportionate.

The court, exercising its discretion, declined to award full recovery costs despite the successful offer, finding the hours claimed by counsel excessive for the straightforward issues.

Costs were fixed on a partial indemnity basis at 65% of the mother's claimed amount, payable by the father.