Robin A. Lepere

The parties were in a romantic relationship and lived together for approximately one year between late 2019 and November 2020.

During their relationship, they jointly purchased a 2019 Ford F-150 truck (the "Blue Truck").

The vehicle was registered in the defendant's name alone, though both parties signed the purchase and financing documentation.

After the relationship ended, the defendant took possession of the truck and made payments until falling into arrears in spring 2022.

The plaintiff redeemed the truck from repossession and made all remaining payments, paying off the vehicle in full by June 2025.

The plaintiff sought an order for the sale of the truck with proceeds divided based on proportional contributions.

The defendant sought return of the truck and claimed various damages.

The court ordered the truck be sold with proceeds divided 64% to the plaintiff and 36% to the defendant based on their respective financial contributions.

The defendant's counterclaim was dismissed in its entirety.

The respondent brought a motion to dismiss the family law application for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that matrimonial issues were being litigated in Indian courts.

The respondent also sought to vary or set aside a restraint order on his Canadian assets, requesting either full release or access to $100,000 for living expenses.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the application could not be dismissed as issues remained within the court's jurisdiction, including division of Canadian assets and enforcement of interim child support.

The restraint order was maintained due to insufficient evidence regarding the respondent's need for funds and his failure to disclose Indian assets as ordered.

Self-represented plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action arising from the care and treatment of their son at Thunder Bay Regional Health Sciences Centre in November 2009.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against Dr. Jagger, Dr. Nigro, and the Hospital on the basis that the plaintiffs had no expert evidence to support allegations of negligence.

The court granted the motions, finding that the plaintiffs failed to provide expert evidence establishing the standard of care, breach of that standard, and causation.

The court awarded costs to the successful defendants.

This is a costs decision following motions heard on June 30, 2025 in a family law proceeding involving parenting time, child support, and related issues.

The applicant sought costs for multiple attendances before the court.

The judge awarded costs totalling $3,500.00 inclusive of HST and disbursements to the applicant, declining to award costs for certain earlier attendances but awarding costs for the April 17, 2025 child support motion and the June 30, 2025 consolidated motions hearing.

The plaintiffs, Whitesand First Nation and a holding company, sought to maintain a Mareva injunction freezing assets of the defendants up to $17.55 million CDN.

The defendants had received grant funds from the plaintiffs to secure financing for a biomass power plant project but failed to obtain financing by the contractual deadline.

The defendants moved to set aside the Mareva injunction, arguing insufficient disclosure on the ex parte motion, and sought security for costs and a stay pending alternative dispute resolution.

The court found the plaintiffs made full and fair disclosure, met the test for a Mareva injunction, and dismissed all of the defendants' motions.

The court found the underlying agreement was null and void as the defendants failed to secure financing by the deadline, and therefore the ADR provisions no longer bound the parties.

A family law trial concerning parenting arrangements for Lincoln, a child born to the applicant and respondent in December 2019.

The applicant sought sole decision-making and primary residence, while the respondent sought joint decision-making and increased parenting time.

The court found that the respondent had been the primary caregiver for the first 3.5 years of Lincoln's life and that the applicant had engaged in a course of conduct not in the child's best interests following the respondent's incarceration, including limiting contact with the respondent's family, relocating further away, and enrolling the child in a distant school.

The court ordered joint decision-making, primary residence with the respondent, and a parenting schedule providing the applicant with three out of five weekends plus holiday access.

Child support was ordered based on the applicant's income with imputed income for the respondent.

The decision addresses motions by the Attorney General of Canada and the Corporation of the City of Kenora to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claim as statute-barred under Rule 21.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Plaintiffs, three Anishinaabe Nations, seek the return of or a declaration of trust over lands known as Anicinabe Park, alleging breaches of statutory, fiduciary, and constitutional duties by Canada and Kenora.

The Court finds that it is not plain and obvious, on the pleadings, that the lands were not reserve lands or that the claim does not arise from a treaty right.

As such, the Real Property Limitations Act does not clearly bar the claim, and the motions are dismissed.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claim against his physician for alleged negligent failure to report him to the Ministry of Transportation under the Highway Traffic Act.

The court found the claim lacked expert evidence, was frivolous and without legal merit, and was not statute-barred.

The court declined to award costs against the self-represented plaintiff.

The decision addresses two motions in an estate dispute: a motion by Julie Garneau for production of records from several non-parties under Rule 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and a motion by Karen Joanne Garneau to strike Julie's Reply Affidavit.

The court struck the Reply Affidavit as improper reply evidence and dismissed the production motion as premature, finding that the parties had not yet exchanged affidavits of documents or conducted discoveries.

The court held that the requested records could be sought after the discovery phase if necessary, and that some records were subject to solicitor-client privilege.

The decision addresses a motion by the defendants to discharge a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) registered by the plaintiff, Michael Vojvodic, on property owned by the defendants.

The court considers the relevant statutory and discretionary factors, including the uniqueness of the property, the existence of alternative claims for damages, the presence of a willing purchaser, and the relative harm to the parties.

The court finds that damages would be a satisfactory remedy, the property is not unique, and the harm to the defendants outweighs the harm to the plaintiff if the CPL is discharged.

The CPL is ordered discharged, vacant possession is to be provided by the plaintiff, and sale proceeds are to be held in trust pending further order.

The decision addresses a motion to compel a lawyer, Mr. Strickland, to answer questions refused during cross-examination in a shareholder dispute among several First Nations and a jointly owned corporation.

The court analyzes the scope of permissible cross-examination on a motion to dismiss, the application of solicitor-client and litigation privilege in the context of joint retainers, and the rights of minority shareholders to information.

The court orders that certain questions regarding the existence of contractual commitments must be answered, as they are not protected by privilege, but limits further questioning.

The defendant, The Corporation of the Township of Ignace, sought an adjournment of the trial for a wrongful dismissal and breach of contract claim brought by the plaintiff, Lynda Marie Joan Colby, pending the outcome of a related appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada in another case involving the same defendant and similar issues.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the main claim to be advanced at trial—breach of contract—would not be affected by the pending appeal, and that adjourning the trial would set a problematic precedent.