D. John Pierce

The accused, Stephan Parr and Amy Rose-Podnar, brought mid-trial applications to exclude certain evidence in their first-degree murder trial.

Ms. Rose-Podnar sought to exclude seven text messages exchanged with a co-accused, Kaveh Lozoomi-Gamroodi, after the murder.

Both accused jointly sought to exclude testimony regarding the timing and number of phone calls between themselves and Dennis Crupi, the owner of a vehicle linked to the murder scene, around the time Crupi was being interviewed by police.

The court granted both applications, finding that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect, as its admission would invite impermissible speculation and inferences of bad character, potentially forcing the accused to testify to provide context.

This ruling addresses a question of law during a criminal trial for manslaughter, specifically whether the actions of one of the accused, Mr. Parr, constituted an attempted robbery or mere preparation.

The Crown argued for attempted robbery as a third route to manslaughter conviction.

The court, applying principles from R. v. Cline, R. v. Root, and R. v. Deutsch, found that Mr. Parr's actions, including covering his hand to avoid fingerprints and remaining with an accomplice in the building, were indicative of an attempted robbery, not mere preparation.

The ruling allows this theory to be included in the jury charge.

Stephan Parr brought a motion to exclude certain shoe print evidence from his upcoming jury trial for murder.

The evidence included a police photograph of a shoe impression ("Impression F5") found at the scene, a video/photo of wet shoe impressions allegedly made by Parr, and product evidence from Adidas regarding CF Lite Racer shoes.

The Crown sought to have the jury compare Impression F5 with a product drawing of the shoes to infer Parr's presence at the scene.

The court granted the defence application, excluding the evidence on the grounds that its prejudicial value outweighed its probative value.

The evidence was based on hearsay, lacked a proper foundation (no actual shoes seized, reliance on a product schematic), and the impression itself had poor clarity and discrepancies.

The court found that a lay jury would be unable to make meaningful conclusions from the evidence, and its introduction would distract the jury and lead to impermissible reasoning.

Devarsh Patel appealed his sentence for sexual assault, arguing the sentencing judge (Hoshizaki J.) erred by misapprehending the immigration consequences of the sentence and by failing to adequately consider relevant mitigating factors.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge was fully aware of the immigration implications and properly balanced all sentencing principles, including denunciation and deterrence.

The court concluded that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit and that no reviewable error in principle was committed.

The accused, Jett Leishman, successfully applied for a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay in his sexual assault trial.

The trial was scheduled 35 months after his arrest, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling from R. v. Jordan.

The court found no deductible defence delay, rejecting the Crown's arguments that defence requests for a non-existent video statement constituted delay.

The primary cause of delay was the Crown's 17-month failure to discover and disclose the complainant's video statement.

The court concluded the net delay of 1077 days (165 days above the ceiling) was unreasonable, breaching the accused's Charter right, and granted the stay.

The defendants moved to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiff in a mortgage enforcement action and sought an accounting of disputed amounts.

The court found the defendants' explanation for default and promptness in moving to set aside the judgment to be weak.

While the defendants had arguable defenses regarding certain fees, these represented a small fraction of the total.

The court declined to set aside the default judgment entirely but exercised its jurisdiction to vary it, disallowing a three-month bonus interest penalty as an unenforceable penalty clause, but upholding a management fee after adjusting the principal amount.