Court File and Parties
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
– and –
CAMERON ADOMKO
Counsel: D. Pierce and A. Rasetti, for the Crown M. Hargadon, for the Accused
HEARD: December 16, 2025, at Thunder Bay, Ontario
BEFORE: The Honourable Madam Justice R.A. Lepere
DECISION ON SENTENCING
Overview
1Following a trial by judge and jury, Cameron Adomko was found guilty of second-degree murder in the death of his stepmother, Darlene Giba.
2Section 235(1) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. 46 (the “Code”), requires that Mr. Adomko be sentenced to life imprisonment.
3What remains to be determined is the period of parole ineligibility.
4The Crown submits that the period of parole ineligibility should be 20 years. Mr. Adomko submits that the period of parole ineligibility should be 15 years.
Principles Applicable to Parole Ineligibility Determination
5Section 745(c) of the Code provides that upon conviction for second-degree murder, the offender must be sentenced to life imprisonment, without eligibility for parole for a fixed period from a minimum of 10 years to a maximum of 25 years.
6Section 745.4 of the Code empowers the sentencing judge to increase the parole ineligibility period from the minimum of 10 years to the period that the sentencing judge sees fit in the circumstances, up to a maximum of 25 years.
7Whatever period of parole ineligibility I set, it is the Parole Board of Canada that will ultimately determine when parole is appropriate and on what conditions parole should be granted. Regardless of when he is paroled, Mr. Adomko will remain under the supervision and control of correctional authorities for the rest of his life, including being subject to re-incarceration from parole should he breach any conditions or pose a threat to public safety.
8In R. v. Shropshire, 1995 47 (SCC), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 227 (“Shropshire”), the Supreme Court of Canada observed that the determination of the period of parole ineligibility is a very fact sensitive process. Unusual circumstances are not required for a sentencing judge to exercise his or her discretionary power to increase the period of parole ineligibility from the 10-year minimum. The Court observed, at para. 29, that in permitting a sliding scale of parole ineligibility, Parliament intended to recognize that within the offence of second-degree murder, there will be a broad range of seriousness reflecting varying degrees of moral culpability.
9In Shropshire, at para. 27, the Court stated the following:
As a general rule, the period of parole ineligibility shall be for 10 years, but this can be ousted by a determination of the trial judge that, according to the criteria enumerated in s. 745.4, the offender should wait a longer period before having his suitability to be released into the general public assessed. To this end, an extension of the period of parole ineligibility would not be “unusual”, although it may well be that, in the median number of cases, a period of 10 years might still be awarded.
10In exercising my discretion under s. 745.4 of the Code, I must consider the character of the offender, the nature of the offence, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, and the recommendation of the jury.
11When assessing the s. 745.4 criteria and in deciding whether to increase the period of parole ineligibility beyond the 10-year minimum, appropriate weight must also be placed on the fundamental purpose, principles, and all relevant objectives of sentencing as set out in s. 718 of the Code: see R. v. McKnight (1999), 1999 3717 (ON CA), 44 O.R. (3d) 263 (C.A.) (“McKnight”); R. v. Arashvand, 2012 ONSC 5852, at para. 9; R. v. Keene, 2020 ONCA 635, at para. 69.
12However, when sentencing for second-degree murder, rehabilitation has less weight than for other offences: see McKnight, at para. 39.
Nature of the Offence and the Circumstances Surrounding its Commission
13In determining the period of parole ineligibility, I am required to consider the nature of the offence and the circumstances surrounding it as one of the statutory factors pursuant to s. 745.4 of the Code.
14Ms. Giba was Mr. Adomko’s stepmother, having been married to his father for 30+ years. Mr. Adomko and Ms. Giba appeared to have a good relationship although both Ms. Giba and Mr. Adomko’s father, Gary Adomko were struggling with how to deal with Mr. Adomko’s addiction issues and the extent to which they could continue to help him around the time of the offence.
15I turn to the events of June 27, 2023. Mr. Adomko had stayed at Johnna Sonego’s apartment located at 1100 Lincoln Street, Thunder Bay, Ontario the night prior. They did not know each other well and a mutual acquaintance had asked Ms. Sonego to let Mr. Adomko stay there. He and Ms. Sonego were seen leaving 1100 Lincoln Street at 9:19 a.m. According to the evidence of Ms. Sonego, Mr. Adomko was going to walk to the home where Ms. Giba and his father resided at 223 East Mary Street to see if he could get some money which they planned to use to purchase drugs. When Mr. Adomko left 1100 Lincoln Street that morning, he had a yellow object in his pocket that appears to be the knife used to kill Ms. Giba.
16Mr. Adomko is then seen on video surveillance footage from the neighbouring property on East Mary Street at 9:56 a.m. walking towards the garage. A few moments later, Ms. Giba’s car is seen backing down the driveway. It was determined that the murder of Ms. Giba took place sometime between 9:37 a.m. and 9:56 a.m.
17We have little evidence about what happened in the home prior to when Mr. Adomko is seen in the driveway at 9:56 a.m. While it was the position of Mr. Adomko at trial that Ms. Sonego attended at 223 East Mary Street with him on June 27, 2023 and that it was Ms. Sonego that inflicted the fatal wound to Ms. Giba, further to the guilty verdict for the purposes of sentencing, I must accept that it was Mr. Adomko that inflicted the fatal wound to Ms. Giba.
18The photos of the crime scene were particularly gruesome and disturbing. The pathology evidence clearly established that the cause of death was the large, incised injury to Ms. Giba’s neck. I am satisfied based on the evidence presented at trial, that the fatal wound was inflicted to Ms. Giba while she lay on the floor on her back. I am also satisfied based on the evidence before the Court that the fatal wound was delivered with such force that there were incisions on the vertebrae in Ms. Giba’s neck.
19Following the murder, Mr. Adomko took money from Ms. Giba’s home, and he and Ms. Sonego undertook efforts to dispose of evidence. This included returning to Ms. Sonego’s apartment and changing their clothes and placing the ones that were worn, along with the murder weapon, into a garbage bag. They also cleaned Ms. Giba’s car with bleach and other cleaning products.
20The murder of Ms. Giba occurred in the context of a domestic relationship in Ms. Giba’s own home where she expected to be safe and secure. She was unarmed. While this was a parent/child relationship rather than a spousal relationship, the relationship is one where Ms. Giba was vulnerable to Mr. Adomko as she would have answered the door when Mr. Adomko attended at her home and perhaps even invited him in. There was no evidence of forced entry into the home. It is not disputed that Mr. Adomko abused a position of trust when committing this murder.
The Character of the Offender
21The next statutory consideration is the character of the offender. This is more than an examination of Mr. Adomko’s personal circumstances and personality traits. It involves a consideration of his character revealed through his actions: see R. v. Singh, 2013 BCSC 709, at para. 28, aff’d 2015 BCCA 123.
22Mr. Adomko is 44 years old. He was born in Thunder Bay, Ontario. He graduated high school at the age of 20 with a GED. He had various jobs as a dishwasher, a roofer, and a carpenter for 15 years. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, Mr. Adomko had an alcohol addiction but maintained employment as a carpenter. He was also involved in charity events with his family.
23Since the COVID-19-pandemic, Mr. Adomko had been unemployed and developed more substantial addiction issues, which included becoming addicted to crack cocaine. He had a spouse (it was unclear if they are common law or legally married) who was also struggling with addiction issues at the time of the offence. He does not have any children.
24Mr. Adomko has a limited criminal record. Four months prior to this offence, he had been convicted of assault as a result of throwing water on his spouse. At the time of this offence, he was on probation and under a s. 110 weapons prohibition.
25Mr. Adomko addressed the Court at the sentencing hearing. He acknowledged that at the time of the offence he had lost his way due to his drug addiction. While he expressed remorse and acknowledged responsibility, this was limited to the fact that he brought Ms. Sonego to the East Mary Street home that day. He maintained that he did not murder Ms. Giba.
The Recommendation of the Jury
26Pursuant to s. 745.2 of the Code, where a jury finds an accused guilty of second-degree murder, the jury is asked if they wish to make a recommendation with respect to the number of years that the accused must serve before becoming eligible for release on parole. The jury is not required to make any recommendation.
27Following the guilty verdict in this case, three jurors made no recommendation, and 9 jurors recommended a 25-year period of parole ineligibility.
28The jury’s recommendation as to the period of parole ineligibility must be considered by the sentencing judge. However, the determination of the parole ineligibility period is very fact-sensitive, and a sentencing judge can therefore choose to apply some, little or no weight to the jury’s recommendation: see R. v. Labelle, 2023 ONSC 2854, at para. 86.
29In this case, the jury was aware of the nature of the offence and the circumstances of its commission. However, the jury did not have any information as to Mr. Adomko’s circumstances because he did not testify. Furthermore, they jury was not aware of the principles or objectives of sentencing and were not given any guidance on the appropriate range.
30At the end of the day, it is me, not the jury, who must impose a fit period of parole ineligibility. The recommendation of the jury is but one factor for me to consider when doing so. In this instance, some weight will be attached to the recommendation as 9 out of 12 jurors provided a consistent recommendation. With that being said, this is not a case where a 25-year period of parole ineligibility ought to be imposed.
31It is clear in this case that the recommendation by the jury was an attempt to convey to the sentencing judge the community’s shock and horror in reaction to the circumstances of the offence and the need for the Court to strongly denounce what Mr. Adomko has done. The message from the jury in this case was clear – that Mr. Adomko should serve well in excess of the 10-year minimum period of parole ineligibility.
Victim Impact Statements
32Victim impact statements were provided from several individuals, including Ms. Giba’s friends, Kim Dunn and Susan Mendes. Statements were also provided by Ms. Giba’s brother, sister, son, and stepdaughter. Lastly, a statement was provided by Gary Adomko.
33Ms. Giba’s friends and family described her as compassionate, genuine, kind, loving, and the type of person that would do anything to make other’s lives better. Examples were given of the kindness and compassion she had shown to Mr. Adomko over the years, even during the worst times of his addiction when no one else would. They are now all haunted by this traumatic killing and will never understand how Mr. Adomko could have taken the life of such a beautiful person.
34Ms. Giba’s siblings, Dan Giba and Deb Giba provided details about her relationship with their brother, David Giba, who resides in a group home in Thunder Bay as he is developmentally delayed. They told the Court that Ms. Giba was David’s best friend, and he relied on her as the only sibling living in Thunder Bay to assist with his day to day tasks. They would regularly spend time together and Ms. Giba included him in all holiday and family celebrations. David has been devastated by the loss of his sister and continues to speak about her regularly. David is now alone in Thunder Bay, and the siblings struggle to oversee his affairs remotely. While dealing with their own grief over the loss of their sister, they now have the additional obligation of managing David’s care from afar and supporting him through his grief.
35Ms. Giba’s only child, Kelly Boyce, provided a statement. He spoke of the close relationship they had, as he was raised by her as a single mother. He has two children of his own who are now without their grandmother. He has been unable to come to terms with the loss of his mother.
36The statements provided by Jen Adomko and Gary Adomko further demonstrate the significant impact this event has had on the family in the years since. Jen spoke of the continuing impact of Ms. Giba’s murder on both her and her children. They have experienced bullying and gossip within the community causing her to become very isolated. She has also struggled to be a support system for her father. She described how these events have torn their family apart.
37Gary Adomko started his statement by describing his life before the murder as a beautiful put together picture. He then stated that the events of June 27, 2023 turned that picture into a puzzle that was blown apart, and he is now unable to put that puzzle back together as pieces are missing. Ms. Giba had just retired, and he planned to retire soon so they could enjoy their retirement together. Gary Adomko advised the Court that he had been sober for 20 years but has now relapsed and struggles with an addiction to alcohol. In her statement, Jen provided that she remains very concerned about her father and his physical and mental health since Ms. Giba’s death.
38These statements demonstrate that Ms. Giba was a loving and caring mother, sister, grandmother, wife, and friend. The loss of her life, and warm presence, has deeply affected all those who knew and loved her.
39There is nothing this Court can do to bring Ms. Giba back. No sentence can ever change what has happened. I express to Ms. Giba’s family and friends my sincere condolences for your loss. It is my hope that with the imposition of a sentence today, those of you who have been affected by this offence will finally have some closure.
Consideration of General Sentencing Principles
40In addition to the statutory factors considered above, I must also consider general sentencing principles.
41The fundamental principle of sentencing is proportionality. A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender: Code, s. 718.1.
42The objectives of sentencing as prescribed by s. 718 of the Code, are:
a. to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims and the community that is caused by unlawful conduct;
b. to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
c. to separate offenders from society, where necessary;
d. to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
e. to provide reparation for harm done to the victim or to the community; and
f. to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and the acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or the community.
43The primary sentencing objectives following a conviction for second-degree murder are denunciation and deterrence. These objectives address the moral blameworthiness inherent in the conviction and the fact that the sentence must reflect the gravity of the offence. Furthermore, in a domestic context, because of the vulnerability of the victim and the position of trust in which the offender operates, the objectives of denunciation and deterrence are more significant when considering the sentence to be imposed: see R. v. Cunningham, 2023 ONCA 36, at paras. 23-26.
44In this case, further to the circumstances of the offence, I am precluded from elevating other sentencing objectives to an equivalent or greater priority than denunciation and deterrence when determining the period of parole ineligibility for Mr. Adomko.
Aggravating Factors
45Pursuant to s. 718.2 of the Code, it is also a principle of sentencing that a sentence should be increased to account for any relevant aggravating factors relating to the offence or the offender. Aggravating factors must be proven by the Crown beyond a reasonable doubt.
46Section 718.2(a) of the Code lists several statutorily prescribed aggravating factors, the following of which are relevant in this case:
a. (ii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused …a member of the… offender’s family; and
b. (iii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim.
47Ms. Giba, while not a blood relative of Mr. Adomko was a member of his family, having been his stepmother for 30+ years. She was killed by Mr. Adomko in her home, a place where she ought to have been safe. As there was no sign of forced entry, Mr. Adomko used his personal and familial relationship with Ms. Giba and the trust she had in Mr. Adomko to gain access to the home which ultimately led to her death. It is clear that further to the circumstances of the offence, Mr. Adomko abused a position of trust in committing this offence.
48In addition to the statutorily prescribed aggravating factors, I find the following to be aggravating factors in this case:
a. While the murder did not involve as much gratuitous or protracted violence as in some other cases, it certainly had elements of violence and the evidence demonstrated that Ms. Giba was murdered in a brutal manner.
b. Mr. Adomko’s conduct after the murder is also an aggravating factor. Firstly, he took money from Ms. Giba’s home and also took her car. Secondly, he attempted to conceal evidence from the murder, including his clothing and the murder weapon, and then attempted to clean Ms. Giba’s car with cleaning products and bleach. This was a calculated attempt to conceal that he had killed Ms. Giba and to avoid detection. He put his self-preservation above anything else: see R. v. Kennedy, 2024 ONSC 1741, at para. 48.
49It is not an aggravating factor that Mr. Adomko pled not guilty to the charge against him and had a trial. However, he cannot benefit from the mitigation that flows from a plea of guilty and the expression of remorse that it carries.
50As part of its submissions, the Crown has asked me to take into consideration the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision, R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 (“Lacasse”). At paras. 89 and 95, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a sentencing judge can take notice of certain unique social problems or issues within their local communities when imposing a sentence which can provide an explanation for differences in sentences for the same offence in different regions.
51In this case, the Crown has asked me to take judicial notice of the increasing violence in our community and the high number of homicides that take place each year largely related to the drug trade. Thunder Bay has regularly been referred to in the last several years as the “murder capital of Canada”. The Crown further asserts that the residents of our region are tired of these violent crimes which is reflected in the jury recommendation made in this case.
52Counsel for Mr. Adomko asserts that this is not an appropriate case to take judicial notice as requested by the Crown. He asserts that this is not your “typical” murder in Thunder Bay which are usually linked more directly to the drug trade.
53I accept the position of Mr. Adomko in this regard. While there may be other cases in our region to which the principles in Lacasse would apply, I find that this is not one of those cases. We have a very serious issue with the drug trade in our region and violence that results from that. While Mr. Adomko had an addiction issue at the time of the offence and there is a link between the offence and that addiction, the facts of this case do not bring it squarely within the larger societal issues we are experiencing in our region.
54As such, I have not taken into consideration the unique social problems and issues we have in our region resulting from the drug trade in determining the period of parole ineligibility for Mr. Adomko.
Mitigating Factors
55Section 718.2 of the Code also requires that a sentence account for any relevant mitigating circumstances. I find the following mitigating factors present in this case:
a. Mr. Adomko had only one criminal conviction prior to this offence. While it was for assault, the circumstances of that offence do not establish that he had a history of violence.
b. It is clear that Mr. Adomko was suffering from serious addiction issues at the time of the offence and that same is linked to the circumstances of the offence. With that being said, I do not have any information as to whether Mr. Adomko continues to struggle with addiction issues and what he has done during his period of custody to avail himself of services to assist with his rehabilitation.
c. Mr. Adomko did express remorse in bringing Ms. Sonego to Ms. Giba’s on the day of the murder and thereby causing Ms. Giba’s death.
Period of Parole Ineligibility
56In R. v. Praljak, 2013 ONSC 298, at para. 17, Dambrot J. stated that “it is commonplace to increase the minimum period of parole ineligibility in domestic homicide cases beyond the 10-year minimum to reflect the seriousness of the breach of trust in such cases.”
57In R. v. Morales, 2023 ONSC 1607, at para. 42, Woollcombe J. stated the following with respect to the appropriate range for parole ineligibility for the second-degree murder of a domestic partner:
While Laskin J.A. stated for the majority in R. v. McKnight, 1999 3717 (ON CA), [1999] O.J. No. 1321 (C.A.) at para. 48 that the usual range of parole ineligibility for a brutal second-degree murder of an unarmed domestic partner is 12 to 15 years, subsequent cases have increased that range. It is now 12 to 17 years, especially where there are no mitigating factors or remorse [Citations omitted.]
58The courts have found that there is no reason to distinguish between a spouse and a parent in sentencing. Both relationships leave the victim vulnerable to the offender. Therefore, the range of 12-17 years for the second-degree murder of a domestic partner is also applicable to the murder of a parent: see R. v. Boukhalfa, 2013 ONSC 1255, at paras. 23-24 (“Boukhalfa”).
59In his submissions on sentencing, counsel for Mr. Adomko also relied on the decision of R. v. Ryan, 2015 ABCA 286 (“Ryan”), from the Court of Appeal of Alberta. It was his submission that the decision provides a useful framework when determining the period of parole ineligibility for an offender by creating subsets or categories. Paragraphs 169 to 173 of the decision state:
[169] More often than not, the case law reserves the shortest period of parole ineligibility for offences in which the offender acted impulsively and killed someone who was not the offender’s current or former domestic partner or child, as a result of an incident that occurred shortly before the homicide. This subset captures the least egregious offences committed by second degree murderers. A parole ineligibility period of ten to fifteen years inclusive is the appropriate range to commence the analysis for this subset of offences. And, if there are no aggravating or mitigating circumstances requiring an adjustment to this starting point, it will also be the appropriate period of parole ineligibility. A death which ensues from a bar fight is a typical example of the kind of second degree murder which falls in this subclass. The offender and the victim usually do not know each other and the event which caused the conflict preceded the victim’s death by a relatively short period of time.
[170] The second subset captures those offences in which there is often a familial relationship between the offender and the victim. This is the case if the victim is the offender’s spouse or common-law partner or offspring. This subset is more egregious than the first subset because of the nature of the relationship between the offender and the victim. The offender has a moral duty, at the very least, and, in many cases, a legal duty to protect his or her spouse or common-law partner or offspring. Section 718.2(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code expressly declares that this subset warrants special attention: “a sentence should be increased... [if there is] evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused the offender’s spouse or common- law partner”…
[171] A parole ineligibility period of sixteen to twenty years inclusive is the appropriate range to commence the analysis if:
(a) the offender was or had been the domestic partner or was a parent or grandparent of the victim and the homicide was directly attributable to this relationship;
(b) the offender betrayed the kindness extended by the victim; or
(c) the victim was a vulnerable member of the community.
[172] The subset of second degree murderers whose offences are the most egregious or grave consists, primarily, of offenders who contemplated killing their victims well in advance of doing so – it cannot be said that their acts were impulsive – or who killed someone to effect another criminal purpose. The victim may have been the occupant of a home who died as a result of a confrontation with the intruder or whose death is otherwise directly attributable to a criminal undertaking of the offender.
[173] A parole ineligibility period of twenty-one to twenty-five years inclusive is the appropriate range to commence the analysis if
(a) the offender gave consideration to causing the death of the victim well in advance of the act causing the death of the victim;
(b) the offender would not have committed the offence but for the offender’s engagement in other criminal activities; or
(c) the offender committed acts of extreme violence in causing the victim’s death.
60It is the position of Mr. Adomko on sentencing that this case falls into the second subset of cases as set out by the Court of Appeal of Alberta in Ryan, due to the familial ties between Mr. Adomko and Ms. Giba and the breach of trust that occurred. For cases that fall into this second subset, the Court of Appeal of Alberta states that 16 to 20 years is the appropriate range of parole ineligibility. It is the position of Mr. Adomko that further to the circumstances of this case, the period of parole ineligibility should be at the low end of this range. It is the position of the Crown that the period of parole ineligibility for Mr. Adomko should be at the high end of this range.
61The framework in Ryan has not been adopted by the Ontario courts, and I do not intend to do so in this case. With that being said, the second subset of cases referred to in Ryan has several of the same characteristics that would be present in a case involving the second-degree murder of a domestic partner, parent, or child. In Ontario, the range that has been established for parole ineligibility for such offences is 12-17 years. While the range in Ryan is slightly higher at 16-20 years, there is some overlap between the ranges set out by the two Courts.
62While sentencing is an individualized process, sentences imposed in other cases can provide useful guidance but are not binding.
63In support of the Crown’s position that the period of parole ineligibility in this case should be set at 20 years, they have provided two cases.
64The first is R. v. Allen, 2023 ONSC 6098, where a 40-year-old offender, who stabbed his 18-year-old stepbrother twice was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder. The offender had a significant criminal record with some violent offences. The offender and the victim were close and there was evidence that drug use was involved on the night of the offence. In imposing a 15-year period of parole ineligibility, the trial judge held that while the offender was remorseful and struggled with substance abuse, the victim was vulnerable to the offender due to the nature of their relationship and was murdered in his own home.
65The second is Boukhalfa, where a 26-year-old man was convicted of killing his mother. He inflicted over 30 stab wounds to his mother with 25 of them being to her neck area in the apartment where they resided after an argument about his medication. In imposing a 15-year period of parole ineligibility, the trial judge found that there were several aggravating factors such as the fact that the victim was vulnerable to the offender due to the nature of their relationship and the size discrepancy between them, the fact that the offender had a criminal record and was on a conditional sentence at the time of the offence and subject to a weapons prohibition, as well as the brutal nature of the murder. The trial judge found that there were few, if any mitigating factors. While the offender was being treated with anti-psychotic medication at the time of the offence and was suspected to be suffering from schizophrenia, there was no evidence of a diagnosis provided to the trial judge.
66In support of Mr. Adomko’s position that the period of parole ineligibility in this case should be set at 15 years, he did not provide any specific cases. He did however, assert that the cases provided by the Crown support his position. He argued that sentencing is an individualized process and after a consideration of all relevant factors, a period of 15 years of parole ineligibility is appropriate in this case.
67I find that the sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence must be the primary considerations in determining the period of parole ineligibility for Mr. Adomko. I also find that there are both statutory and other aggravating factors present in this case as I have already set out.
68I also find that proportionality in sentencing requires that the degree of responsibility of a particular offender be balanced against the gravity of the offence. Mr. Adomko’s background circumstances and the other mitigating factors as I have already set out bear on his degree of responsibility and are relevant to the determination of his sentence. With that being said, there are more aggravating factors in this case than mitigating factors, and the gravity of the offence is significant.
69I disagree with the Crown that a period of parole ineligibility of 20 years should be imposed. Doing so would be unduly harsh and excessive when all of the relevant factors on sentencing are considered. The cases provided by the Crown did not impose a period of parole ineligibility of 20 years. This would also be outside of the range of 12-17 years for the second-degree murder of a domestic partner, parent, or child. I do not find that there are any factors in this case that would bring it outside of the noted range. While the Ryan case does provide a range of 16-20 years, the framework and range set out in that decision has not been adopted by Ontario courts.
70I also disagree with the position of Mr. Adomko that a 15-year period of parole ineligibility should be imposed in this case. With that being said, by Mr. Adomko’s own admission, this offence falls into the second subset referenced in the Ryan case for which a range of 16-20 years of parole ineligibility is applicable. Furthermore, the period of parole ineligibility for Mr. Adomko should certainly be at the high end of the applicable range established in Ontario when all of the above factors are considered. While a 15-year period of parole ineligibility is approaching that high end it does not, in this case, sufficiently account for the aggravating factors, the gravity of the offence, and the primary sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence.
71Mr. Adomko, please stand.
72Mr. Adomko you have been convicted of second-degree murder in relation to the death of Darlene Giba on June 27, 2023. For this offence, I sentence you to life imprisonment. I further order, pursuant to s. 745.4 of the Code, that you serve 17 years in custody before being eligible to apply for parole.
Ancillary Orders
73As a further consequence, ancillary orders are mandated by the Code for this conviction. Pursuant to s. 109(1)(a), you are prohibited from possessing any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition and explosive substance for life. Further, you are required to submit a sample of your DNA to the DNA Data Bank pursuant to s. 487.051.
74I further order that pursuant to s. 743.21 of the Code, you are prohibited from communicating with the following individuals for the duration of the custodial period of your sentence: Gary Adomko, Deb Giba, Dan Giba, David Giba, Jen Adomko, Kelly Boyce, Kim Dunn and Susan Mendes.
The Hon. Madam Justice R.A. Lepere
Released: March 31, 2026