Stephen Wojciechowski

The plaintiff contractor sued the defendant municipality for damages after its bid for a municipal contract was rejected unopened.

The municipality rejected the bid pursuant to a by-law prohibiting bids from contractors involved in active litigation with the municipality (a reprisal policy).

The court held that the reprisal policy was an implied term of the tendering contract (Contract A) based on the presumed intention of the parties and the need for business efficacy.

Consequently, the plaintiff's bid was non-compliant, and the municipality did not breach the contract by rejecting it.

Four patients who received Vitek Proplast Teflon Interpositional implants in their temporomandibular joints in the mid-1980s sued St. Joseph's General Hospital and oral surgeons for injuries caused by the defective implants.

The appellants settled with the oral surgeons and obtained Pierringer Orders.

Three actions were dismissed as statute-barred under the Public Hospitals Act's two-year limitation period.

One action (Hearsey) proceeded to trial.

The trial judge found the hospital 5% at fault, the oral surgeons 20% at fault, the manufacturer 50% at fault, and the distributor 25% at fault, limiting recovery to 5% of damages.

The appellants appealed, challenging the limitation period findings, the rejection of a duty to recall, and the apportionment to non-parties.

The hospital cross-appealed on the limitation period and costs.

The moving party brought a motion for directions challenging the validity of his late mother's 2006 will, alleging lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence by his brother, the responding party.

The responding party brought a cross-motion to set aside or vary a preservation order previously granted without notice.

The court found that the moving party met the minimal evidentiary threshold required to call the will's validity into question and granted the order for directions.

The court also varied the preservation order to narrow its scope, finding that while the original order was too broad, the assets in dispute met the test for preservation.

Following a 41-day trial where the plaintiffs' medical malpractice claims regarding TMJ implants were dismissed as statute-barred, the successful defendant hospital sought costs.

The defendant sought partial indemnity costs to the date of its offers to settle and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The court declined to apply Rule 49.10 to award substantial indemnity costs, finding no egregious behaviour by the plaintiffs deserving of sanction.

The court awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs for the entirety of the action, totalling $540,604.09 across the three actions.

Four plaintiffs brought a consolidated medical malpractice action against St. Joseph's General Hospital regarding defective Vitek TMJ implants surgically placed by oral surgeons at the hospital in the mid-1980s.

The trial was bifurcated to determine liability.

The court found that the claims of three plaintiffs were statute-barred under the strict two-year limitation period in the Public Hospitals Act, as the discoverability principle did not apply.

For the remaining plaintiff, the court held the hospital was not negligent in credentialing the surgeons, obtaining consent, or failing to recall patients, as those duties rested with the physicians.

However, the hospital breached its duty of care as a purchaser by failing to inquire with Health Canada whether the implants had a required Notice of Compliance.

The court apportioned fault at 5% to the hospital, 50% to the non-party manufacturer (Vitek), 25% to the non-party distributor (Instrumentarium), and 20% to the settling oral surgeons.

The defendants brought motions for security for costs against the plaintiff, who was suing for negligent investigation and malicious prosecution.

The plaintiff argued he was impecunious and that an order would deny him access to justice.

The court found the plaintiff was impecunious but that his claim was almost certain to fail because the underlying criminal proceedings did not terminate in his favour (he pleaded guilty to two charges).

The court ordered the plaintiff to post security for costs, but reduced the amount sought by the defendants to avoid blocking access to the courts, ordering $15,000 to each set of defendants payable in instalments.

The defendants, including the Thunder Bay Police Services Board and the Attorney General of Canada, brought a motion to transfer a civil action from Toronto to Thunder Bay.

The plaintiff opposed, citing concerns about a fair trial due to local family prominence, publicity, judicial conflicts, and financial hardship.

The court granted the transfer, finding that the interests of justice favored Thunder Bay because a substantial part of the events, damages, and subject matter were located there.

The court emphasized the local community's interest in allegations of police misconduct and the convenience for the majority of parties and witnesses residing in Thunder Bay.

The plaintiff's concerns about fairness and judicial bias were dismissed as speculative or manageable.

The Ontario Nurses' Association brought a motion to be added as a party to both the trial appeal and the reconsideration appeal.

The court granted the motion, adding the Association as a party on conditions including a 30-page limit on its factum, a 30-minute limit on oral submissions, and no costs awarded to or against it.

The appellant municipality appealed a slip and fall judgment arising from an icy pedestrian walkway leading to and from a recreation complex.

The central issue was whether the higher statutory standard under s. 284 of the Municipal Act governed, or whether the ordinary occupier's duty under s. 3(1) of the Occupier’s Liability Act applied.

The court held that the dominant purpose of the walkway was access to the complex, not use as a public sidewalk or highway, and therefore the Occupier’s Liability Act governed.

The finding of negligence was supported by the evidence, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant municipality appealed a trial judgment in a sidewalk slip-and-fall action.

The court held that s. 47 of the Limitations Act applies to the seven-day notice requirement in s. 284(5) of the Municipal Act, but only where the plaintiff demonstrates actual incapacity amounting to being of unsound mind.

A debilitating condition, pain, medication, or failure to turn one's mind to legal rights is insufficient absent proof that the plaintiff lacked the capacity to consider, investigate, understand advice about, and direct steps to protect the claim.

Although the trial judge's findings on gross negligence and the request to admit were not disturbed, the respondent failed to prove incapacity and the action was therefore barred for late notice.

No costs were ordered.

The complainant alleged that the City of Thunder Bay discriminated against her on the basis of sex when it denied her the position of Deputy Treasurer in 1988.

The complainant and a male candidate were the final two contenders for the position.

The Board of Inquiry found that the Treasurer chose the male candidate because of his superior municipal experience, rather than the complainant's superior academic credentials.

The Board concluded that the decision was not tainted by sex discrimination and dismissed the complaint.

The respondent City brought a motion to dismiss the complainant's human rights complaint for lack of evidence at the close of the Commission's case.

The complainant alleged direct sex discrimination in the City's failure to promote her to Treasurer and Deputy Treasurer, as well as systemic discrimination against women in financial managerial positions.

The Board of Inquiry granted the motion in part.

It dismissed the direct discrimination complaint regarding the Treasurer position, finding no evidence that gender was a factor in the appointment of the long-serving male Deputy Treasurer.

It also dismissed the systemic discrimination complaint, finding no pattern or practice of discrimination in the City's hiring.

However, the Board found sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case regarding the Deputy Treasurer position and directed the hearing to continue on that issue.

The respondent City brought a motion to dismiss the human rights complaint for lack of evidence at the close of the Commission's case.

The immediate issue was whether the City was required to elect whether it intended to call evidence before the motion could be heard.

The adjudicator departed from the normal civil court practice of requiring an election, finding that the potential prejudice to the City in requiring an election was far greater than the potential prejudice to the Commission, given the extensive evidence already heard and the onerous nature of defending against an adverse effect discrimination claim.

In a human rights complaint alleging sex discrimination in hiring for financial management positions, the respondent City sought pre-hearing disclosure of certain Commission documents, while the Commission issued a summons for City documents relating to various job competitions.

The Board of Inquiry ordered the Commission to disclose its record of investigation but not internal procedural documents or non-existent lists.

The Board declined to quash the Commission's summons, finding that the requested documents regarding past and subsequent job competitions were relevant to the complainant's allegation of systemic discrimination, and that the Commission was entitled to use a summons to compel disclosure after the City had previously refused requests.