Kate Diane Mary Brindley

Devarsh Patel appealed his sentence for sexual assault, arguing the sentencing judge (Hoshizaki J.) erred by misapprehending the immigration consequences of the sentence and by failing to adequately consider relevant mitigating factors.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge was fully aware of the immigration implications and properly balanced all sentencing principles, including denunciation and deterrence.

The court concluded that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit and that no reviewable error in principle was committed.

This criminal trial concerned charges against the accused, J.M., for sexual touching (s. 151) and inviting sexual touching (s. 152) of his step-daughter, L.M., who was 8-9 years old at the time of the alleged offences.

The central issue was the credibility and reliability of the child complainant's evidence, including the admissibility and weight of her video-taped statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code.

The defence argued that the complainant's evidence was influenced by leading questions from the police officer and her mother, and contained material inconsistencies.

The court found the complainant's evidence compelling and credible despite some frailties and inconsistencies, concluding that the sexual abuse involving penetration and cunnilingus occurred.

The accused was found guilty on the sexual touching charge (s. 151) but acquitted on the inviting sexual touching charge (s. 152) due to insufficient detail and reliability for that specific allegation.

The Crown applied to admit presumptively inadmissible evidence as similar fact evidence in a criminal trial for sexual offences against a youth.

The Crown sought to introduce facts from the accused's prior sexual interference conviction.

The defence argued that the facts the Crown sought to rely upon were not fully admitted by the accused during the 2009 plea.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the alleged similar facts were not strongly proven by the 2009 transcript and that the defence would be unable to fairly respond to the allegations.

The accused, Randall William Creed, was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking methamphetamine.

The court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was in possession of a Schedule 1 controlled substance.

However, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the intent or purpose of physically making the narcotic available to others.

The court found the expert evidence on drug quantity unreliable due to hearsay and lack of basis, and other seized items (baggies, scales, pipe) were deemed equivocal as to trafficking intent, with reasonable alternative explanations.

Consequently, the accused was found not guilty of the charge.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for assault, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient for appellate review and revealed reliance on impermissible stereotypical thinking about how victims of domestic abuse behave.

The Superior Court found that the trial judge's sparse reasons frustrated meaningful appellate review and that the comment regarding the complainant's failure to report the "gravamen of the offence" to officers could reflect an impermissible stereotypical inference.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The accused was charged with sexual assault.

The complainant died prior to trial, and her evidence from the preliminary inquiry was admitted under s. 715 of the Criminal Code.

The core issue was whether the accused stopped sexual intercourse when the complainant withdrew her consent.

Applying the W.(D.) test for credibility, the court rejected the accused's evidence and accepted the complainant's version of events.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused commercial truck driver was charged with criminal negligence causing death after a fatal collision with an oncoming vehicle.

The Crown sought a conviction for the lesser included offence of dangerous driving, arguing the accused was fatigued from violating hours of service regulations and falsifying logbooks.

The court found that while the accused was fatigued and breached regulations, the Crown failed to prove the actus reus of dangerous driving beyond a reasonable doubt because there was no accident reconstruction evidence to establish how the collision occurred or to link the fatigue to a marked departure in the manner of driving.

The accused was acquitted.

The applicant, an Indigenous man, sought a review of a detention order made by a Justice of the Peace following charges of possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose and reckless discharge of a firearm.

The incident occurred during a mental health crisis while the applicant was severely intoxicated.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the Justice of the Peace erred in law by failing to consider Gladue factors and the applicant's personal circumstances when detaining him under the tertiary ground.

The court concluded that the proposed release plan, which included medical treatment and a surety, would not undermine public confidence in the administration of justice, and ordered the applicant's release.

The applicant, Drew Mitchell, sought to vacate a detention order made by a Justice of the Peace.

The application for bail review was based on alleged errors of law by the Justice of the Peace and the presentation of new evidence demonstrating a material change in circumstances.

The court found no error of law in the Justice of the Peace's assessment of the Crown's opposition to bail or in the finding of fact regarding compliance with previous conditions.

The new release plan, while offering some improvements, still had a significant gap in supervision and was not considered a material change in circumstances.

The application for bail review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge erred in law in applying the mens rea principles governing impairment caused by prescription medication.

The appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding warning labels on medications and her awareness of the medications’ effects.

Applying the principles from R. v. King, the court held that the presumption that impairment is voluntarily induced is assessed using an objective test.

The court found the trial judge properly considered the warning labels and the appellant’s acknowledgment that she felt unusually tired before driving.

The findings of fact were reasonably supported by the evidence and disclosed no legal error.