Karen Pritchard

The decision concerns the trial of T.D., who was charged with sexual offences against two complainants, H.M. and E.C. The court reviews the evidence of both complainants, the accused, and other witnesses, and applies the law regarding credibility, collusion, and similar fact evidence.

The court finds the accused guilty of sexual offences against E.C. but not guilty regarding H.M., due to concerns about H.M.'s credibility and inconsistencies in her evidence, including a statement suggesting a motive to fabricate.

The judgment provides a detailed analysis of the law on credibility, delayed disclosure, demeanor, motive to fabricate, and the use of similar fact evidence.

The court considered a Crown application to admit similar fact evidence in a sexual assault prosecution involving two complainants, H.M. and E.C. The court found that the probative value of the evidence, including the similarity of the alleged conduct, the relationship of the complainants to the accused, and the timing and location of the events, outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The court also addressed the issue of possible collusion between the complainants and found that, on a balance of probabilities, the evidence was not tainted by collusion.

The application to admit the similar fact evidence was granted.

This decision concerns a Gardiner hearing following a conviction for sexual interference.

The court analyzes the evidence to determine the aggravating facts necessary for sentencing, including the number of incidents, the nature and manner of the touching, and the position of trust.

The judge finds that the evidence supports three specific incidents of sexual touching by the accused, W.S., against K.M., his niece, while in a position of trust, and that the complainant’s evidence is credible and reliable.

The court rejects the defence’s arguments for a lesser finding and sets out the legal principles for fact-finding at sentencing following a jury verdict.

This decision concerns the sentencing of M.C. for historical sexual offences against his two daughters, C.B. and N.K., including sexual assault, incest, and gross indecency.

The court considered the fundamental purpose of sentencing, aggravating factors such as the offender's position of trust, the victims' vulnerability (especially C.B.'s disability), and the significant emotional and economic impact on C.B. The Crown sought a 12-year global sentence, while the defence proposed 7 to 9 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of 12 years, finding it proportionate to the gravity of the offences and the offender's high moral blameworthiness.

This decision concerns the sentencing of Mr. Brad Southwind for second-degree murder.

The court determined the period of parole ineligibility, which is set at 15 years.

The judge considered aggravating factors such as the brutal nature of the crime (17 stab wounds), elements of planning, and the offender's lengthy criminal record with violent entries.

Mitigating factors included the offender's indigenous background (Gladue factors), severe mental health issues (drug-induced psychosis), and substance abuse, which impacted his ability to participate in reports.

Despite the need for judicial restraint for Indigenous offenders, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence due to the heinous nature of the crime and the offender's violent history.

The defendant, Brad Southwind, was accused of first-degree murder.

The case involved a judge-alone retrial following a mistrial.

The central issue was the mens rea component, specifically whether the defendant's severe intoxication and psychotic delusions, amplified by substance abuse, negated the intent required for murder or planning and deliberation for first-degree murder.

The court found that despite the defendant's impaired state, he possessed the necessary intent for murder, relying on the brutal nature of the stabbing and expert psychiatric testimony.

However, the court found reasonable doubt regarding planning and deliberation due to the unreliability of the defendant's recollections and the impulsive nature suggested by his statements and expert opinion.

Consequently, the defendant was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The accused, A.H., was charged with three criminal offences: making child pornography, possession for the purpose of distribution of child pornography, and agreeing or arranging to commit a sexual offence against a child.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant's testimony, finding it compelling despite minor inconsistencies due to time passage and age.

The court determined that the photographs described by the complainant constituted child pornography, were taken for a sexual purpose, and that A.H. was actively involved in their creation and possession with intent to distribute to an online contact ("Ed").

The court also found that A.H. had agreed and arranged with "Ed" via telecommunication to commit these offences.

A.H. was found guilty on all three counts.

The applicant, charged with sexual offences against his nieces, brought an application for directions seeking to exclude child welfare records from the third-party records regime under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant argued the child welfare agencies acted as secondary state agents in a joint investigation with police.

The court dismissed the application, finding the agencies and police conducted parallel investigations in accordance with their distinct statutory mandates under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, and the records remained subject to the s. 278.1 regime.

The accused, charged with sexual offences, brought a Charter motion challenging the constitutionality of sections 278.92 and 278.94 of the Criminal Code.

These provisions govern the admissibility of records in the accused's possession, such as the complainant's social media messages.

The court applied the 'plainly wrong' test to a recent coordinate jurisdiction decision, R. v. Reddick, which had struck down the provisions.

Finding that Reddick was not plainly wrong, the court followed it and declared sections 278.92 and 278.94 unconstitutional and of no force or effect.

The accused applied to sever counts in an indictment involving two different complainants, both of whom are his biological daughters.

The charges relate to allegations of sexual offences against minors.

Applying the factors from R. v. Last, the court found sufficient factual and legal nexus between the counts and determined that a judge sitting alone would not be subject to moral or reasoning prejudice.

The application for severance was dismissed, as the public interest in a single trial outweighed any risk of prejudice to the accused.

Stephen Ward brought an application for detention review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, challenging his detention by a Justice of the Peace on tertiary grounds.

The application raised three issues: whether the Crown needed leave to cross-examine a surety, whether the Justice of the Peace adequately balanced tertiary ground factors, and the failure to explicitly mention the lack of trial dates due to COVID-19.

The reviewing judge dismissed the application, finding no error in the Justice of the Peace's decision not to require leave for cross-examination of a surety, and that the tertiary ground analysis was functionally sound despite a minor misstatement.

The judge also found no error in the omission regarding trial dates, noting the fluid nature of the pandemic's impact on court operations.

The accused commercial truck driver was charged with criminal negligence causing death after a fatal collision with an oncoming vehicle.

The Crown sought a conviction for the lesser included offence of dangerous driving, arguing the accused was fatigued from violating hours of service regulations and falsifying logbooks.

The court found that while the accused was fatigued and breached regulations, the Crown failed to prove the actus reus of dangerous driving beyond a reasonable doubt because there was no accident reconstruction evidence to establish how the collision occurred or to link the fatigue to a marked departure in the manner of driving.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused, a physician, was charged with one count of sexual assault against his employee.

The Crown alleged multiple incidents of unwanted touching and attempted kissing in the workplace, set against a backdrop of admitted sexual harassment.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility, rejecting the accused's denials as implausible and inconsistent.

Finding the complainant's evidence credible and corroborated in part by other witnesses, the court concluded that at least one incident of sexual assault—rubbing his groin against her leg—was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

A conviction was entered.