Donald R. Orazietti

This decision concerns the sentencing of Mr. Brad Southwind for second-degree murder.

The court determined the period of parole ineligibility, which is set at 15 years.

The judge considered aggravating factors such as the brutal nature of the crime (17 stab wounds), elements of planning, and the offender's lengthy criminal record with violent entries.

Mitigating factors included the offender's indigenous background (Gladue factors), severe mental health issues (drug-induced psychosis), and substance abuse, which impacted his ability to participate in reports.

Despite the need for judicial restraint for Indigenous offenders, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence due to the heinous nature of the crime and the offender's violent history.

The appellant, Joshua Gauthier, appealed his conviction for aggravated assault and his conditional sentence arising from an incident during a recreational soccer game where he struck another player, causing a fractured orbital bone and laceration.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings regarding mens rea, the rejection of reflex action and self-defence, and the characterization of the injury as "wounding." The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's conclusions that the appellant's actions were intentional retaliation, not a reflex, and that self-defence had no air of reality.

The court also confirmed that the injuries met the definition of "wounding" under the Criminal Code.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the conditional sentence was deemed fair given the goal of general deterrence.

The defendant, Brad Southwind, was accused of first-degree murder.

The case involved a judge-alone retrial following a mistrial.

The central issue was the mens rea component, specifically whether the defendant's severe intoxication and psychotic delusions, amplified by substance abuse, negated the intent required for murder or planning and deliberation for first-degree murder.

The court found that despite the defendant's impaired state, he possessed the necessary intent for murder, relying on the brutal nature of the stabbing and expert psychiatric testimony.

However, the court found reasonable doubt regarding planning and deliberation due to the unreliability of the defendant's recollections and the impulsive nature suggested by his statements and expert opinion.

Consequently, the defendant was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired driving and driving with excessive blood alcohol after police conducted a random sobriety stop on private property.

The officers had formed the intention to stop the respondent while he was on the highway under s. 48(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, but only effected the stop after he had pulled onto a private driveway.

The Supreme Court held that s. 48(1) did not authorize random sobriety stops on private property, as the respondent was no longer a 'driver' within the HTA's definition when stopped, and the police breached his s. 9 Charter rights.

However, applying the Grant framework, the Court declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2), finding that the legal uncertainty at the time rendered the breach not egregious, and the reliable and crucial nature of the evidence combined with the serious public interest in combatting impaired driving outweighed the first two lines of inquiry.

The appellant appealed a sentence of two years less a day for firearm offences, which arose from an incident where he intended to commit suicide with a sawed-off shotgun.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by placing undue emphasis on denunciation and deterrence without adequately considering the appellant's suicidal intent and the attenuated danger to the public.

The court also found an error in failing to consider the causal link between the appellant's mental health issues and addiction and his criminal conduct.

Given the appellant's significant rehabilitation efforts, the court substituted the custodial sentence with a conditional sentence.

The police followed the respondent off a public highway and onto his private driveway to conduct a random sobriety check, where they observed signs of impairment and arrested him for impaired driving.

The trial judge convicted the respondent, but the summary conviction appeal judge overturned the conviction, finding the stop violated s. 9 of the Charter and excluding the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that neither s. 48(1) of the Highway Traffic Act nor the common law ancillary powers doctrine authorized police to conduct a random, groundless sobriety stop on private property.

The Court upheld the exclusion of evidence, concluding that the serious Charter breach outweighed the public interest in adjudicating the case on its merits.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the statement of defence and for judgment, which they subsequently abandoned.

The defendants sought costs of $14,515.08 on a partial indemnity basis for the abandoned motion.

The court fixed the defendants' costs at $7,500 inclusive of HST and disbursements, noting that while the motion was not argued, the defendants' counsel had prepared materials and travelled for the hearing.

The court ordered that the costs not be payable until the conclusion of the action, as they may be deducted from any amounts found owing to the plaintiffs.

The applicant, Daniel Leo Michael Dupuis, sought to exclude evidence seized from his residence following a warrantless police search.

Police responded to a 911 call reporting a home invasion, assault, and robbery.

Approximately 90 minutes after arrival, officers conducted a "clearing search" of the second floor, where they observed a large quantity of marihuana in plain view.

The court found that this warrantless search violated Dupuis's section 8 Charter rights, as there was no objective basis to believe an imminent threat to life or safety existed at the time of the search.

The officers' conduct was deemed negligent in failing to adhere to well-established principles governing searches of private dwellings.

Consequently, the evidence obtained from this initial search, and from a subsequent search warrant that relied on the unlawfully obtained information, was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with over 80 milligrams of alcohol, arguing that his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) were breached during a traffic stop.

The trial judge had found the evidence of the appellant and the arresting officer equally credible, concluding the appellant failed to meet his burden of proving a Charter breach on a balance of probabilities.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was entitled to find both witnesses equally credible, provided sufficient reasons for her decision, and made findings of fact supported by the evidence.