Anthony Orazietti

The defendant, Brad Southwind, was accused of first-degree murder.

The case involved a judge-alone retrial following a mistrial.

The central issue was the mens rea component, specifically whether the defendant's severe intoxication and psychotic delusions, amplified by substance abuse, negated the intent required for murder or planning and deliberation for first-degree murder.

The court found that despite the defendant's impaired state, he possessed the necessary intent for murder, relying on the brutal nature of the stabbing and expert psychiatric testimony.

However, the court found reasonable doubt regarding planning and deliberation due to the unreliability of the defendant's recollections and the impulsive nature suggested by his statements and expert opinion.

Consequently, the defendant was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The appellant, M.V., appealed an eight-year global sentence for sexual interference, child luring, and child pornography.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by relying on aggravating circumstances from the sexual interference offences to determine the sentence for the child luring offences, effectively sentencing the appellant twice for the same conduct.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the original sentence, and substituted a five-and-a-half-year global sentence, emphasizing the importance of respecting joint sentencing submissions and the principle of totality.

The offender, Joshua Gauthier, was convicted of aggravated assault.

At the sentencing hearing, the court dismissed his application to enter a conviction for assault causing bodily harm instead of aggravated assault, affirming that the injuries sustained by the victim constituted "wounding" under the Criminal Code.

The court then imposed a 12-month conditional sentence followed by 24 months of probation, along with a DNA order and a 10-year firearms prohibition.

The decision balanced aggravating factors, such as the unprovoked violence in a recreational setting, with significant mitigating factors, including the offender's lack of criminal record, genuine remorse, and strong community and family support.

General deterrence was emphasized as a paramount sentencing objective.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired driving and driving with excessive blood alcohol after police conducted a random sobriety stop on private property.

The officers had formed the intention to stop the respondent while he was on the highway under s. 48(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, but only effected the stop after he had pulled onto a private driveway.

The Supreme Court held that s. 48(1) did not authorize random sobriety stops on private property, as the respondent was no longer a 'driver' within the HTA's definition when stopped, and the police breached his s. 9 Charter rights.

However, applying the Grant framework, the Court declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2), finding that the legal uncertainty at the time rendered the breach not egregious, and the reliable and crucial nature of the evidence combined with the serious public interest in combatting impaired driving outweighed the first two lines of inquiry.

The Mother sought to relocate the Son from Sault Ste.

Marie to the Barrie/Parry Sound area, citing better support networks and employment opportunities.

The Father opposed the relocation, emphasizing the Son's stable life and strong bonds with him and the paternal grandparents in Sault Ste.

Marie.

The court dismissed the Mother's application, finding that while her proposed plan was reasonable, the benefits of relocation did not outweigh the significant detriment of severing the Son's existing strong emotional ties with his Father and paternal grandparents.

The decision underscored that maintaining maximum parental contact and emotional stability was in the child's best interests.

The respondent father brought a contempt motion against the applicant mother for overholding their child.

The child was returned before the motion, and the court dismissed the contempt motion as it was not in the child's best interests.

In this costs decision, the court found the father was justified in preparing the motion materials but should not have argued the motion after the child was returned.

The court awarded the father $1,500 in costs.

Krista-Lee Bruzas pleaded guilty to having care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg, with readings of 390 mg.

She brought a Charter application challenging the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences under s. 255(1) and the unavailability of conditional discharges under s. 255(5) of the Criminal Code, arguing violations of ss. 12 and 15 of the Charter, particularly for First Nations individuals in Ontario.

The court considered significant mitigating factors, including Gladue factors and extensive rehabilitation efforts.

Despite finding a conditional discharge to be in the accused's best interests, the court determined it would be contrary to the public interest given the extremely high blood alcohol readings and the paramountcy of denunciation and general deterrence in impaired driving cases.

The court imposed a fine of $2000, 12 months of probation, and a 12-month driving prohibition.

The Crown brought an application under section 714.1 of the Criminal Code seeking an order to allow three police witnesses to testify remotely via videoconference rather than in person at the courthouse.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, over 80, and possession of marijuana, and had brought a Charter application alleging multiple breaches of rights.

The defence opposed the remote testimony application, arguing that the officers' evidence was contentious and credibility was in issue.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that COVID-19 constituted exceptional circumstances justifying remote testimony, provided that the quality of audio and video transmission would not jeopardize the fairness of the hearing.

The court imposed ten conditions on the remote testimony, including that only one witness be present in the boardroom at a time, that witnesses use headphones, and that witnesses not communicate with each other until all testimony was complete.

The appellant appealed his impaired driving conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter application.

The central issue at trial was the arresting officer's credibility regarding whether he had an Approved Screening Device (ASD) in his cruiser, as he had failed to make notes about it.

After conviction, the officer's notes were disclosed, revealing he had taken inventory of his cruiser's backseat but omitted the ASD.

The appeal court applied the Dixon test and found that the undisclosed notes were highly material and raised a reasonable possibility that the verdict might have been different, as they directly impacted the officer's credibility.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to exclude breath room evidence, which had led to the accused's acquittal on a charge of refusing to provide a breath sample.

The trial judge found that the police breached the accused's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel of choice by failing to make reasonable inquiries to contact her specific lawyer after leaving a message at an office number.

The Superior Court of Justice found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the police failed to make reasonable efforts.

The court upheld the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter and dismissed the appeal.

This decision concerns a review of an interim parenting order for the parties' child.

The interim order had granted the applicant father custody and the respondent mother alternate weekend parenting time.

The applicant sought to continue this arrangement with a minor abridgment of the mother's parenting time, while the respondent sought to revert to a shared care arrangement.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer supported the continuation of the existing arrangement, citing the child's expressed preferences and improved well-being.

The court found that the child's best interests required the current arrangement to continue, denying the mother's request for shared care and the father's request for abridged parenting time.

The court also ordered joint counselling between the mother and child, a suggestion made by the mother.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking and breach of recognizance.

The applicant argued that his new ability to secure GPS electronic monitoring constituted a material change in circumstances.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that electronic monitoring does not address the tertiary ground for detention and merely monitors rather than prevents non-compliance, thus failing to meet the test for a material change in circumstances under R. v. St. Cloud.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a longstanding shared custody arrangement, seeking sole custody of the parties' 13-year-old child.

The respondent mother sought to maintain the status quo.

The child consistently expressed a strong desire to reside primarily with the father due to a strained relationship with the mother and the parents' high-conflict dynamic.

The court found that the parents lacked the necessary communication and cooperation for shared custody.

Given the child's age, clear wishes, and the detrimental effect of the current arrangement, the court found exceptional circumstances to vary the custody order on an interim basis, granting the father sole custody and the mother alternate weekend parenting time.