Romuald F. Kwolek

The offender, Graham Sean St. Pierre, pleaded guilty to mischief, break and enter, and arson related to incidents involving his former intimate partner, as well as breaches of release conditions.

The Crown sought full restitution for significant property damage caused by the arson (over $250,000), while the defence argued against a restitution order due to the offender's inability to pay.

The court considered the principles of sentencing, including denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and reparations, alongside the statutory provisions regarding restitution.

The court ultimately imposed a sentence of 19 months jail for arson (with concurrent sentences for other charges), followed by 2 years probation, and ordered partial restitution of $25,000 for the arson and $721.40 for tire damage, finding that full restitution would impede the offender's rehabilitation.

The offender, J.D., pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual touching of a person under 16 and two counts of breach of probation.

The court addressed the outstanding issue of whether to impose a Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order, following recent legislative amendments.

Applying the new s. 490.012(3) of the Criminal Code, which places the onus on the offender to demonstrate that a SOIRA order is unwarranted, the court considered the seriousness of the offences against a vulnerable 13-year-old victim, the offender's lengthy criminal history (though not for sexual offences), and the lack of expert evidence on recidivism risk or specific programming for sexual offending.

The court found the risk of recidivism to be significant and was not convinced that the criteria for exemption were met.

Consequently, a 10-year SOIRA order was imposed.

The accused, David Carrie, was charged with unlawful confinement, assault with a weapon, and assault causing bodily harm.

The complainant, Gerald Chretien, sustained severe neck injuries resulting in paraplegia after falling from a second-story window, alleging the accused's actions led to his fall.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the complainant's testimony, which the defence challenged on credibility and reliability due to inconsistencies, his extensive criminal record (including for dishonesty), and lack of corroborating physical evidence.

The court found significant concerns regarding the complainant's credibility and reliability, including contradictions in his account, lack of physical evidence of assault, and implausibility of certain aspects of his testimony.

The court also addressed the admissibility and reliability of hearsay statements within medical reports.

Ultimately, the Crown failed to prove the elements of the offences beyond a reasonable doubt, and all charges were dismissed.

The Crown brought an application under section 714.1 of the Criminal Code seeking an order to allow three police witnesses to testify remotely via videoconference rather than in person at the courthouse.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, over 80, and possession of marijuana, and had brought a Charter application alleging multiple breaches of rights.

The defence opposed the remote testimony application, arguing that the officers' evidence was contentious and credibility was in issue.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that COVID-19 constituted exceptional circumstances justifying remote testimony, provided that the quality of audio and video transmission would not jeopardize the fairness of the hearing.

The court imposed ten conditions on the remote testimony, including that only one witness be present in the boardroom at a time, that witnesses use headphones, and that witnesses not communicate with each other until all testimony was complete.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for a parenting capacity assessment under section 98 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The central issue was what documentation should be provided to the assessor prior to conducting the assessment.

The father's counsel argued that providing extensive background materials would create confirmatory bias, while the Society contended that such information was necessary for a meaningful assessment.

The court held that while not all affidavit materials need be automatically provided in advance, the assessor must have discretion to request any information deemed necessary to properly answer the assessment questions.

The court ordered that a brief factual summary, discussions with child protection workers, and any further materials requested by the assessor be provided.

The Crown sought leave to withdraw charges against four defendants (three members of Batchewana First Nation and one self-identified Métis individual) for unlawfully harvesting forest resources in Crown forests without proper licenses, contrary to the Crown Forest Sustainability Act.

The defendants opposed the withdrawal, arguing the prosecution was a vehicle to establish aboriginal and treaty rights.

The court granted the Crown leave to withdraw the charges, finding it was in the public interest to resolve such complex aboriginal issues outside the criminal forum.

However, the court awarded substantial costs against the Crown for its delay in withdrawing the charges and for failing to reassess its position when it received the defendants' expert report in May 2014.

The court awarded $90,000 to Clinton Robinson and $300,000 to the three other defendants.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on a breach of his section 11(b) Charter rights to be tried within a reasonable time.

The charges included assault, unlawful confinement, and three breaches of a probation order, arising from events on December 14, 2014.

The accused appeared in court 28 times over approximately 23 months, with four separate trial dates set.

The first trial date was adjourned due to insufficient time; the second was not reached because the Crown proceeded with an in-custody matter; the third was adjourned due to the complainant's scheduled caesarean section; and the fourth trial date was set for November 10, 2016.

The court applied the new framework established in R. v. Jordan and found that the total delay exceeded the presumptive ceiling of 18 months for Provincial Court matters.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The Children's Aid Society brought two motions: (1) to remove R.J.H. as a party to child protection proceedings and terminate outstanding orders in his favor, and (2) to add D.N. as a party after DNA testing established he was the biological father of the child.

The court dismissed the motion to remove R.J.H., finding that despite not being the biological father, he qualified as a parent under section 37(1)(d) of the Child and Family Services Act by demonstrating a settled intention to treat the child as his own over many years.

The court granted the motion to add D.N. as a party, finding him to be the biological father and therefore a parent under the statutory definition, while reserving the question of whether he should be granted access or custody.

A temporary care and custody motion under the Child and Family Services Act concerning two children (ages 11 and 9) apprehended from their mother's care due to concerns regarding the mother's mental health crisis, inadequate supervision, poor home conditions, and insufficient food.

The mother was hospitalized involuntarily for exhibiting paranoid and delusional behavior.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children would suffer harm if returned to either parent's immediate care.

The court ordered the children remain in society care with graduated access to the mother, with an expectation of return to maternal care by September 3, 2015, contingent upon the mother's continued mental health stability and compliance with conditions.

The father's role remained uncertain pending further investigation.

The respondent parents in a child protection proceeding brought a motion seeking permission for the paternal grandfather to represent them in court proceedings under clause 4(1)(c) of the Family Law Rules.

The Children's Aid Society opposed the motion, citing concerns about the grandfather's prior hostile and argumentative conduct toward the society and its workers.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while the respondents had a legal aid certificate available and child protection law is complex, the evidence did not demonstrate special circumstances or special expertise justifying non-lawyer representation.

The court noted that the grandfather lacked the necessary knowledge and objectivity to provide proper legal advice and encouraged the parents to retain a lawyer with expertise in child protection law.

The respondent father sought leave from the court to bring a motion to vary a custody and access order made by Justice Dunn on March 7, 2013.

The father was restricted from bringing further motions regarding custody and access without leave of the court, and from bringing motions regarding child support until arrears were paid in full.

The father alleged material changes in circumstances including parental alienation by the mother and sought increased access to his daughter.

The court denied leave, finding no material change in circumstances and determining that proceeding to court would not be in the best interests of the child.

The child was thriving under the current arrangement, and the father's actions were contributing to alienation rather than the mother's conduct.