Lynn Tegosh

M.R. and D.R., former customary caregivers, brought a motion to be added as parties to a child protection proceeding concerning the child R.S.V.B. Batchewana First Nation brought a cross-motion to dismiss M.R. and D.R.'s motion.

The court dismissed M.R. and D.R.'s motion, finding they did not meet the statutory criteria for party status under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, nor did they demonstrate a legal interest or a viable plan in the child's best interests under the Family Law Rules.

The court noted significant concerns about their care and cooperation with the Agency and First Nation.

The Batchewana First Nation's motion to dismiss was granted.

This is a decision under section 90(2)(b) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA) regarding the identification of a child's First Nations status and band affiliation in a Status Review Application.

The child, age 6, was previously identified under the Child and Family Services Act (CFSA) as not being an Indian or native child.

The court determined that the child is a First Nations child based on the mother's identification of the child as such, and identified the child's band as Michipicoten Band based on the mother's indication that the child identifies with that band through maternal family ties.

A motion by the Children's Aid Society of Algoma for production of records from the Sault Ste.

Marie Police Service, Ontario Provincial Police, and Ministry of Community Safety and Corrections regarding the respondent parents in a child protection proceeding.

The mother did not oppose production; the father opposed.

The court granted production from the Sault Ste.

Marie Police Service for the period following a prior production order, finding the relevance test under section 130 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act was met.

The court declined to order production from the other two record holders due to insufficient evidence of relevance.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to transfer carriage of a child protection proceeding to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, a newly designated native children's aid society.

The child subject to the proceeding (H.S.) was identified as non-status and not an Indian or native child under the Child and Family Services Act.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that Nogdawindamin CAS lacked jurisdiction under its ministerial designation to provide services in this case.

The court held that jurisdictional compliance with the Minister's designation cannot be overridden by efficiency or duplication of services arguments, and that the court has authority to determine whether a society has jurisdiction to be the applicant in a child protection proceeding.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to transfer carriage of a child protection status review proceeding to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, a newly designated native children's aid society.

The motion involved determining whether Nogdawindamin CAS had jurisdiction under its ministerial designation to act as the applicant society.

The court examined the complex jurisdictional issues arising from the designation, including territorial jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction based on aboriginal status, and the conditions imposed on the designation.

The court granted the motion, finding that Nogdawindamin CAS had jurisdiction to carry out its mandate as a children's aid society in this case involving an Indian child identified as a member of one of the seven listed First Nations.

The Children's Aid Society brought two motions: (1) to remove R.J.H. as a party to child protection proceedings and terminate outstanding orders in his favor, and (2) to add D.N. as a party after DNA testing established he was the biological father of the child.

The court dismissed the motion to remove R.J.H., finding that despite not being the biological father, he qualified as a parent under section 37(1)(d) of the Child and Family Services Act by demonstrating a settled intention to treat the child as his own over many years.

The court granted the motion to add D.N. as a party, finding him to be the biological father and therefore a parent under the statutory definition, while reserving the question of whether he should be granted access or custody.

A motion by the Children's Aid Society of Algoma seeking a temporary care and custody order under section 51(2)(b) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The society sought to place three children in the care of their mother subject to society supervision and numerous terms and conditions.

The mother opposed the motion and sought an order under section 51(2)(a) with no supervision or conditions.

The father of the youngest child supported the society's position.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children were at risk of harm based on evidence of alcohol abuse, domestic discord, violence, questionable caregiver arrangements, and inadequate supervision.

The court granted the society's motion but modified several proposed conditions, finding some to be unreasonable or overly intrusive for a temporary order.

In a high-conflict custody and access dispute involving three children (Dakota, 16; Nathan, 15; and Madison, 9), the court addressed two competing motions.

The mother sought to maintain interim custody of Madison with supervised access by the father through family members.

The father sought a shared parenting schedule with equal time-sharing.

The court found that the boys, being older, should have their residence determined by their own wishes.

For Madison, the court terminated the family-supervised access arrangement and ordered that paternal access be supervised through a professional supervised access facility, finding that family supervision had been inadequate.

The court invited the Office of the Children's Lawyer to become involved and indicated willingness to reconsider the arrangement if family supervisors could provide proper assurances of their understanding of the supervisory role.

Following a three-day trial, the court determined custody of a three-year-old child.

The father sought sole custody with reasonable access to the mother; the mother sought joint custody with week-about residency, alternatively sole custody.

The court rejected joint custody due to the parents' inability to work effectively together, finding a history of conflict, unilateral decision-making, and poor communication.

The court awarded sole custody to the father, finding his home more stable, his parenting proactive and engaged, and his support system more extensive.

The mother's home showed signs of instability with a new cohabiting partner, a second child, and ongoing involvement by child protective services.

The court ordered structured maternal access with specific provisions for transportation and information sharing.