Jasmine Constance Gassi Harnden

The applicant father and respondent mother brought interim motions regarding the principal residence of their two children.

The father sought residence in Elliot Lake, and the mother in Sudbury.

The court considered the children's best interests under the Divorce Act, including stability, past care, and parental plans.

The court found the father's plan for residence in Elliot Lake to be more established and in the children's best interest, citing the children's stronger connection to Elliot Lake, the oldest child's school stability, and concerns about the mother's past instability.

The father was granted primary care, with the mother receiving specified parenting time and shared holidays.

The society brought a child protection application regarding a six-year-old Indigenous child.

The mother repeatedly made false allegations that the father sexually abused the child, alienating the child from the father and subjecting the child to invasive medical exams.

The mother also engaged in pseudo-legal arguments, breached court orders, and absconded with the child.

The court found the child in need of protection due to the risk of emotional harm caused by the mother's conduct.

Custody was granted to the father under s. 102 of the CYFSA, and the mother was limited to supervised virtual access.

The parties, who had resolved most issues from their marriage breakdown, disputed their date of separation for property equalization.

The applicant asserted August 2017, while the respondent claimed January 2009.

The respondent was the moving party on this motion to determine the separation date.

The court conducted a holistic assessment of the evidence, including financial records, social media posts, and family activities, finding that despite earlier periods of separation, the parties had reconciled and continued to present as a family unit.

The court rejected the respondent's proposed date and found the date of separation to be August 15, 2017, as sought by the applicant.

The respondent father brought a motion to change a 2006 final order regarding child support, seeking to pay his adult daughter directly for her post-secondary expenses and to cease support after her sixth year.

The applicant mother brought a cross-motion seeking retroactive and ongoing child support proportionate to the parties' incomes.

The court found a material change in circumstances and calculated child support under section 3(2)(b) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, factoring in the child's needs, her expected contributions from summer employment and loans, and the parents' proportionate incomes.

The court ordered the father to pay $34,224 in arrears and ongoing monthly support, including for a seventh year of university necessitated by the child repeating a year of law school.

The father's request to pay the child directly was dismissed, and payments were ordered to continue through the Family Responsibility Office.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking an order to permit her to take the parties' two children to Australia for a six-month period.

The father opposed the motion.

The court considered the best interests of the children under the Children's Law Reform Act, noting that while the older child was nearly an adult, the younger child's mental health and academic situation made a six-month disruption potentially harmful.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the temporary relocation was not in the youngest child's best interests and that the children should not be separated.

This trial decision addresses the sole remaining issue of parenting time for the respondent mother with the child.

The applicant father sought to maintain the existing arrangement where the mother's parenting time occurred during the maternal great-grandparents' court-ordered contact.

The respondent mother sought to expand her parenting time by having the maternal grandmother granted specified contact, allowing the mother to exercise parenting time during that period.

The court found that previous orders granting contact to the maternal great-grandparents were inappropriate as they were not parties to the proceeding and had not filed the necessary affidavit.

The court declined to order specific contact for the maternal grandmother for similar reasons.

The final order maintained the mother's parenting time during the maternal great-grandparents' contact, granting the great-grandparents discretion over who may be present.

The parties, including the maternal great-grandparents, were directed to attend alternative dispute resolution to establish a more permanent long-term parenting time and contact arrangement, with proper notice to the great-grandparents if their contact is to be impacted.

The mother was also prohibited from bringing a motion to change until an outstanding costs order was satisfied and was ordered not to consume alcohol or non-prescription drugs prior to or during parenting time due to past substance misuse.

The Father applied for the child to reside with him in Sault Ste.

Marie, Ontario, while the Mother sought to relocate with the child to Schaumburg, Illinois, and have decision-making authority.

The court, applying the amended Divorce Act, found it in the child's best interests to reside permanently with the Mother in Schaumburg, granting her exclusive decision-making authority.

The Father was granted a robust parenting schedule to maintain contact.

The court emphasized the Mother's primary caregiver role and attentiveness versus the Father's relative detachment, while also acknowledging the importance of the child's relationship with his half-sibling.

The father (P.W.) appealed a trial judge's decision finding his children in need of protection under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, and placing them in the mother's custody with supervised access for the father.

The father argued the trial judge erred in applying the Act, misapprehended evidence, and erred in judicial notice and risk assessment.

The Children's Aid Society and the Office of the Children's Lawyer supported the trial judge's flexible approach to evidence and findings.

The appellate court dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding of need for protection and the disposition, upholding the flexible approach to evidence in child protection cases and deferring to the trial judge's factual findings and assessment of the children's best interests.

This decision addresses a "focused hearing" within a child protection proceeding to determine if two children (ages 13 and 9) are in need of protection under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA).

The court found that the children were in need of protection under sections 74(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the CYFSA, primarily due to the mother's mental health issues and associated unpredictable, harmful behaviours, which created a risk of physical and emotional harm.

The court emphasized the utility of focused hearings as a judge-driven procedural tool to streamline child protection cases and achieve the objectives of a just hearing, noting that such hearings are trials requiring trial-worthy evidence.

The applicant mother and respondent father brought competing motions regarding where their three children should attend elementary school following their separation.

The mother sought to enroll the children at a school in Sault Ste.

Marie, while the father sought to keep them at their current school in Echo Bay.

The court found that despite the logistical inconvenience to the parents, it was in the best interests of the children to maintain stability and consistency by remaining at their current school for the academic year, given the stress they were experiencing from the separation.

The Children's Aid Society brought a status review application regarding a six-year-old child who had been apprehended at birth and placed with his paternal grandmother.

The mother and the paternal grandmother both sought custody.

The court applied the two-part test for status reviews, finding that the child would still be in need of protection if returned to the mother due to her unresolved mental health and substance abuse issues.

Applying the best interests of the child factors, the court noted the child's strong attachment to the paternal grandmother, who had cared for him throughout his treatment for leukemia, and the disruption a move to the mother's home in Alberta would cause.

The court granted a deemed custody order to the paternal grandmother.

The court issued an evidentiary ruling regarding the proper use and interpretation of Requests to Admit and Responses to Requests to Admit under Rule 22 of the Family Law Rules in a child protection status review case.

The ruling clarified that a Request to Admit should be tailored to each party's knowledge, and that gratuitous corrections or qualifications in responses are not permitted.

The court held that a fact or document is only deemed admitted if all served parties admit it or fail to respond; if even one party denies or refuses to admit with a reason, the fact or document is not deemed admitted and must be proven otherwise.

In a status review trial under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, the Children's Aid Society sought to admit affidavits from a prior child protection proceeding as exhibits.

The respondent mother opposed this, citing hearsay and lack of cross-examination opportunity.

The court ruled against formally admitting the affidavits as exhibits, stating it would be tantamount to re-litigating a judicially decided matter.

However, the court affirmed its inherent authority and mandate to access and consider the entire prior child protection file to determine the continuing need for protection, especially in the absence of specific findings of fact from the original protection order.

This is a ruling on a voir dire held during a child protection status review application.

The Children's Aid Society sought to qualify Mr. John Dahl as an expert witness in parental risk assessment and child development.

The court declined to qualify Mr. Dahl, citing concerns regarding his academic and professional qualifications (Master's degree, clinical/counselling psychology background rather than forensic, lack of professional publications, and limited formal training in parenting capacity assessments).

More significantly, the court found Mr. Dahl's understanding of his duty as an expert to be flawed, as he believed he was working for the applicant society rather than the court, and his impartiality was questioned due to receiving materials predominantly from one litigant.

The ruling clarifies that while Mr. Dahl was not qualified as an expert, his parenting capacity assessment report remains part of the court record and may be cross-examined.

The respondent mother in a child protection proceeding brought a motion to strike portions of the society's and paternal grandmother's trial affidavits, arguing they contained inadmissible hearsay and non-expert opinion.

Before the motion was heard, the society and grandmother served revised affidavits removing some of the objectionable content.

Because the mother did not identify which parts of the revised affidavits she still objected to, the court dismissed the motion.

However, the court awarded the mother $1 in costs against the society, finding that the society acted unreasonably by including clearly inadmissible hearsay in its initial affidavits.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing his motion to strike affidavit evidence filed by the Children's Aid Society on a summary judgment motion.

The father argued that under recent appellate jurisprudence, the court was required to automatically vet and excise non-trial-worthy evidence before responding parties filed their materials.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the responsibility remains on the parties to file trial-worthy evidence and to raise specific objections via a motion to strike, rather than imposing an automatic initial vetting process on the court.

The respondent M.R. brought a motion to transfer a family law proceeding from Sault Ste.

Marie to Thunder Bay, arguing that the child's ordinary residence had changed to Marathon (near Thunder Bay) following the child's removal from the applicant's care in October 2018.

The applicant C.B., the paternal grandmother, opposed the transfer.

The court found that the child's ordinary residence remained in Sault Ste.

Marie where the child had been residing with C.B. since June 2018 pursuant to a customary care arrangement.

The court held that a unilateral removal of a child by a parent does not change the child's ordinary residence without consent or acquiescence of the person who had established that residence.

The motion to transfer was dismissed.

The accused, Michel Bertrand, was charged with trafficking methamphetamine under section 5(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

An undercover officer sought to purchase drugs from the accused, who stated he did not sell methamphetamine but could introduce the officer to someone who did.

The accused then facilitated an introduction to a third-party vendor, Shaun Gravelle, from whom the officer directly purchased methamphetamine.

The court analyzed whether the accused's actions constituted trafficking or aiding and abetting trafficking.

Applying the principles from R. v. Greyeyes, the court found that the accused's conduct amounted to merely incidental assistance to the purchaser, not the vendor, and therefore did not meet the definition of trafficking.

The accused was found not guilty.

This is a temporary care and custody hearing in a child protection application brought by the Children's Aid Society of Algoma.

The society sought placement of five children with their mother subject to society supervision and twelve conditions for twelve months.

The mother opposed the motion and sought placement with no supervision or conditions, alternatively with less restrictive conditions.

The court considered the statutory framework under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and the principles governing temporary care and custody orders.

The court found that the father of the two youngest children posed minimal risk given his current circumstances, including house arrest and criminal charges.

The court granted temporary care and custody to the mother for three of the children without supervision or conditions, granted limited supervision and conditions for the two youngest children, and made no order regarding one child pending further evidence.