Sarah J. Bujold

This decision addresses a "focused hearing" within a child protection proceeding to determine if two children (ages 13 and 9) are in need of protection under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA).

The court found that the children were in need of protection under sections 74(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the CYFSA, primarily due to the mother's mental health issues and associated unpredictable, harmful behaviours, which created a risk of physical and emotional harm.

The court emphasized the utility of focused hearings as a judge-driven procedural tool to streamline child protection cases and achieve the objectives of a just hearing, noting that such hearings are trials requiring trial-worthy evidence.

This appeal concerned the determination of a child's Indigenous background under section 90 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The motions judge had found the child to be a First Nations person based on the father's self-identification and his maternal grandfather's identification.

The appellant, Batchewana First Nation, argued that this evidence was insufficient and that a simple statement of self-identification could not establish band affiliation for the purposes of the Act.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed, finding that the motions judge erred in law by relying solely on self-identification without a sufficient evidentiary foundation connecting the child to the community, and made a palpable and overriding error by overstating the evidence regarding the lack of contradiction.

The appeal was granted, and the matter remitted for a new hearing.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order making her youngest child a Crown ward without access.

The child had been apprehended at birth.

A parenting capacity assessment concluded there was a serious risk of neglectful parenting due to the mother's severe intellectual limitations and personality traits, despite her commitment and efforts to improve.

The appeal court found no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's findings that the child was in need of protection, that supervision was unworkable, and that access would not be meaningful or beneficial to the child.

The appeal was dismissed.